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2 - Emotivism

Andrew Fisher
Affiliation:
University of Nottingham
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Summary

If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.

(Hume [1748] 1995: 165)

Under the pretence of ultimate wisdom [Ayer's book] guillotines religion, ethics and aesthetics, self, persons, free will, responsibility and everything worth while. I thank Mr Ayer for having shown us how modern philosophers can fiddle and play tricks while the world burns.

(D'Arcy, quoted in Stevenson 1944: 265)

CHAPTER AIMS

  • To outline cognitivism and non-cognitivism.

  • To explain why Ayer rejects cognitivism and adopts non-cognitivism.

  • To state the main motivations for emotivism.

  • To show how emotivism raises issues about relativity, truth and normativity.

Introduction

Morality keeps us awake at night and our moral compass guides us to think things we do not want to think and to do things we do not want to do; where morality is concerned we shout at the television, we form and break relationships, make career decisions, weep and laugh. Morality affects us in a deep and sometimes dramatic way. Emotivists argue that they are in a better position to capture this feature of morality than rival theorists are and that they can better capture the practicality of moral judgements that we mentioned in the previous chapter.

Type
Chapter
Information
Metaethics
An Introduction
, pp. 25 - 38
Publisher: Acumen Publishing
Print publication year: 2011

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  • Emotivism
  • Andrew Fisher, University of Nottingham
  • Book: Metaethics
  • Online publication: 05 February 2013
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/UPO9781844652594.004
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  • Emotivism
  • Andrew Fisher, University of Nottingham
  • Book: Metaethics
  • Online publication: 05 February 2013
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/UPO9781844652594.004
Available formats
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Save book to Google Drive

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  • Emotivism
  • Andrew Fisher, University of Nottingham
  • Book: Metaethics
  • Online publication: 05 February 2013
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/UPO9781844652594.004
Available formats
×