Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Introduction
- 1 The open question argument
- 2 Emotivism
- 3 Error theory
- 4 Moral realism and naturalism
- 5 Moral realism and non-naturalism
- 6 Quasi-realism
- 7 Moral relativism
- 8 Moral psychology
- 9 Moral epistemology
- 10 Fictionalism and non-descriptive cognitivism
- Questions
- Glossary
- References
- Index
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6 - Quasi-realism
Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Introduction
- 1 The open question argument
- 2 Emotivism
- 3 Error theory
- 4 Moral realism and naturalism
- 5 Moral realism and non-naturalism
- 6 Quasi-realism
- 7 Moral relativism
- 8 Moral psychology
- 9 Moral epistemology
- 10 Fictionalism and non-descriptive cognitivism
- Questions
- Glossary
- References
- Index
Summary
Some philosophers like to call themselves realists, and some like to call themselves anti-realists. An increasing number, I suspect, wish to turn their backs on the whole issue.
(Blackburn 2007: 47)CHAPTER AIMS
To explain the Frege–Geach problem.
To explain quasi-realism and how it can respond to the Frege–Geach problem.
To pose a number of problems for quasi-realism.
To describe some problems with trying to demarcate cognitivism from non-cognitivism.
Introduction
Quasi-realism starts from a non-cognitivist position and it may be easier to understand it if we first consider why non-cognitivism developed as it did. Non-cognitivism grew in popularity after the publication of Moore's Principia Ethica in 1903. Although non-cognitivists believe that the truth in Moore's work is that moral terms cannot be defined, they also think that Moore was wrong to reach for non-natural properties as an explanation for this. Instead, the non-cognitivist rejects realism and claims that moral judgements express not beliefs but rather non-cognitive states. Part of the attraction of non-cognitivism is that it seems to respect the insights of Moore's work without resorting to non-naturalism, which is thought to be ontologically problematic. However, something was looming on the horizon that would take the wind out of the non-cognitivist's sails and would change the metaethical landscape, a problem that some philosophers believe has left non-cognitivism dead in the water: the Frege-Geach problem.
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- Chapter
- Information
- MetaethicsAn Introduction, pp. 91 - 110Publisher: Acumen PublishingPrint publication year: 2011
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