References
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 September 2009
Summary
A summary is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- A Metaphysics for Scientific RealismKnowing the Unobservable, pp. 235 - 243Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2007
References
(1999). ‘The Causal Theory of Properties: Properties According to Shoemaker, Ellis, and Others’, Philosophical Topics 26: 25–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Armstrong, D. M., C. B. Martin, and U. T. Place (1996). Dispositions: A Debate, (ed.). London: Routledge.Google Scholar
, , and (1994). Realism Rescued: How Scientific Progress Is Possible. London: Duckworth.Google Scholar
, , and (eds.) (1992). Emergence or Reduction? Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism. Berlin: de Gruyter.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(2005). ‘The Dispositionalist Conception of Laws’, Foundations of Science 10: 353–70.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1993). ‘Hume and Thick Connexions’, in Essays in Quasi-Realism, pp. 94–107. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Boyd, R. (1981). ‘Scientific Realism and Naturalistic Epistemology’, in and (eds.), PSA 1980, vol. II, pp. 613–62. East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association.Google Scholar
Boyd, R. N. (1999). ‘Homeostasis, Species, and Higher Taxa’, in (ed.), Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays, pp. 141–85. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
(1950). ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’, Revue Intérnationale de Philosophie 4: 20–40. Reprinted in R. Carnap 1956: Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantic and Modal Logic. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
(1987). ‘Ontology and the Laws of Nature’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65: 261–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(ed.) (1998). Interpreting Bodies: Classical and Quantum Objects in Modern Physics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
(2001). ‘Getting Real With Quanta’, review of C. Norris, Quantum Theory and the Flight from Realism: Philosophical Responses to Quantum Mechanics, Metascience 10: 483–7.Google Scholar
(1989). ‘Hume and Causal Realism’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67: 172–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Craig, E.(2000). ‘Hume on Causality – Projectivist and Realist?’, in and (eds.), The New Hume Debate, pp. 113–21. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
(1989). ‘Kinds of Kinds: Individuality and Biological Species’, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 3: 119–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, and (1985). ‘Critical Notice: Bertrand Russell's The Analysis of Matter: Its Historical Context and Contemporary Interest’, Philosophy of Science 52: 621–39.Google Scholar
(1992). ‘Wesley Salmon's Process Theory of Causality and the Conserved Quantity Theory’, Philosophy of Science 59: 195–216.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1993). The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
(1994). ‘Laws, Natures, and Contingent Necessities’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54: 649–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ellis, B. (1999). Contributions to (ed.), Causation and Laws of Nature. Dordrecht: Kluwer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(2000). ‘Causal Laws and Singular Causation’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61: 329–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, and (1994). ‘Dispositional Essentialism’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72: 27–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1973). ‘Underdetermination: Craig and Ramsey’, Journal of Philosophy 70: 453–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1998). ‘Species Pluralism and Anti–Realism’, Philosophy of Science 65: 103–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(2001). The Poverty of the Linnaean Hierarchy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, and (2005). ‘Taxonomy, Polymorphism, and History: An Introduction to Population Structure Theory’, Philosophy of Science 72: 1–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1996). The Shaky Game: Einstein and the Quantum Theory, 2nd edn. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1989). ‘Identity and Individuality in Classical and Quantum Physics’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67: 432–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
French, S.(1998). ‘On the Withering Away of Physical Objects’, in (ed.), Interpreting Bodies: Classical and Quantum Objects in Modern Physics, pp. 93–113. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
French, S.(1999). ‘Models and Mathematics in Physics: The Role of Group Theory’, in and (eds.), From Physics to Philosophy, pp. 187–207. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(2003). ‘Scribbling on the Blank Sheet: Eddington's Structuralist Conception of Objects’, Studies In History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 34: 227–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, and (eds.) (1993). Correspondence, Invariance and Heuristics. Dordrecht: Kluwer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, and (1999). ‘Reinflating the Semantic Approach’, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13: 103–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, and (2003). ‘Remodeling Structural Realism: Quantum Mechanics and the Metaphysics of Structure’, Synthese 136: 31–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, and (1988). ‘Quantum Physics and the Identity of Indiscernibles’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39: 233–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1974). ‘A Radical Solution to the Species Problem’, Systematic Zoology 23: 536–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1988). Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1976). Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, 2nd edn. Indianapolis: Hackett.Google Scholar
(2000). ‘Cassirer, Schlick and “Structural” Realism: The Philosophy of the Exact Sciences in the Background to Early Logical Positivism’, British Journal for the History of Science 8: 71–106.Google Scholar
Greenberg, C. (2003/1939). ‘Avant-Garde and Kitsch’, in and (eds.), Art in Theory, 1900–2000: An Anthology of Changing Ideas. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Griffiths, P. E. (1999). ‘Squaring the Circle: Natural Kinds with Historical Essences’, in (ed.), Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays, pp. 209–28. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
(1982). ‘Experimentation and Scientific Realism’, Philosophical Topics 13: 71–87.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hacking, I.(2007). ‘Natural Kinds: Rosy Dawn, Scholastic Twilight’, in (ed.), The Philosophy of Science, pp. 203–39. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Hacking(forthcoming): The Tradition of Natural Kinds.
, and (1982). ‘In Defence of Convergent Realism’, Philosophy of Science 49: 604–15.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1987). Asymmetries in Time: Problems in the Philosophy of Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Hume, D. (1975/1777). Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, (ed.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
(1990). Russell, Idealism, and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon.Google Scholar
Jones, M. R. (2005). ‘Idealization and Abstraction: A Framework’, in and (eds.), Idealization XII: Correcting the Model, Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 86: 173–217.Google Scholar
(1993). The Advancement of Science: Science Without Legend, Objectivity without Illusions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
(1993). Inductive Inference and Its Natural Ground: An Essay in Naturalistic Epistemology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
(1970/1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
(1977/1971). ‘Concepts of Cause in the Development of Physics’, in The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change, pp. 21–30. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
(1998). ‘What is Structural Realism?’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 29: 409–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Laudan, L. (1981). ‘A Confutation of Convergent Realism’, Philosophy of Science 48: 19–48. Reprinted in (ed.) (1996). The Philosophy of Science, pp. 107–38. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
(1983). ‘New Work for a Theory of Universals’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61: 343–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1993). ‘Is the Best Good Enough?’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93: 89–104.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Locke, J. (1975/1689). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, (ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
(1985). ‘Galilean Idealization’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 16: 247–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(trans.) (1996). The Skeptic Way: Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism.Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Maxwell, G. (1970a). ‘Theories, Perception, and Structural Realism’, in (ed.), The Nature and Function of Scientific Theories, pp. 3–34. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.Google Scholar
Maxwell, G.(1970b). ‘Structural Realism and the Meaning of Theoretical Terms’, in and (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. IV. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.Google Scholar
(1991/1974). ‘In Defence of Dispositions’, in Matters of Metaphysics, pp. 104–22. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Originally published in Philosophical Review 83: 157–81.Google Scholar
Mellor, D. H.(1991/1980). ‘Necessities and Universals in Natural Laws’, in Matters of Metaphysics, pp. 136–53. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Originally published in (ed.), Science, Belief and Behaviour, pp. 105–25. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Mellor, D. H., and T. Crane (1991/1990). ‘There is No Question of Physicalism’, in : Matters of Metaphysics, pp. 82–103. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Originally published in Mind 99: 185–206.Google Scholar
(1974). ‘Popper's Qualitative Theory of Verisimilitude’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 25: 166–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1976). ‘Verisimilitude Redeflated’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27: 363–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1995). ‘Ellis and Lierse on Dispositional Essentialism’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73: 606–12.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1998). ‘Verisimilitude: The Third Period’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49: 1–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1986a). ‘The Poverty of the Popperian Program for Truthlikeness’, Philosophy of Science 53: 163–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1990). ‘Verisimilitude by Power Relations’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41: 129–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(2002). ‘Darwinian Metaphysics: Species and the Question of Essentialism’, Synthese 131: 191–213.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(2000). Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
(1972). Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Knowledge, 4th edn. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.Google Scholar
(1971). ‘Correspondence, Invariance and Heuristics: In Praise of Conservative Induction’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 2: 213–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1995). ‘Is Structural Realism the Best of Both Worlds?’, Dialectica 49: 15–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(2001). ‘Is Structural Realism Possible?’, Philosophy of Science Proceedings, 68: S13–S24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Quine, W. V. O. (1976). ‘Whither Physical Objects?’, in , , and (eds.), Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos, pp. 497–504. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1984). ‘Unification in Science’, review of C. F. von Weizsäcker, The Unity of Nature, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35: 274–79.Google Scholar
(2001a). ‘Quests of a Realist’, review of S. Psillos 1999, Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth, in Metascience 10: 341–7.Google Scholar
, and (1992). ‘Particle Labels and the Theory of Indistinguishable Particles in Quantum Mechanics’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43: 201–18.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1984). ‘Mackie and Shoemaker on Dispositions and Properties’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9: 77–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1987). ‘Biological Species: Natural Kinds, Individuals, or What?’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38: 225–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1953/1918). ‘On the Notion of Cause’, in Mysticism and Logic, pp. 171–96. London: Penguin. Originally published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1912–13.Google Scholar
(2005). ‘Reconsidering the Fresnel-Maxwell Theory Shift: How the Realist Can Have Her Cake and EAT It Too’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 36: 509–38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1984). Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
(1997). ‘Causality and Explanation: A Reply to Two Critics’, Philosophy of Science 64: 461–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1998/1994). ‘Causality without Counterfactuals’, in Causality and Explanation, pp. 248–60. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Originally published in Philosophy of Science 61: 297–312.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1967). What Is Life?: The Physical Aspect of the Living Cell, with Mind and Matter and Autobiographical Sketches. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
(1982). ‘The Concept of Observation in Science and Philosophy’, Philosophy of Science 49: 485–525.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shoemaker, S. (1980). ‘Causality and Properties’, in (ed.), Time and Cause: Essays Presented to Richard Taylor, pp. 109–35. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. Reprinted in D. H. Mellor and A. Oliver (eds.) 1997: Properties, pp. 228–54. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1998). ‘Causal and Metaphysical Necessity’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79: 59–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1998). ‘Approximate Truth and Dynamical Theories’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49: 253–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1980). ‘Evolution, Population Thinking, and Essentialism’, Philosophy of Science 47: 350–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1995). ‘For Pluralism and Against Realism About Species’, Philosophy of Science 62: 70–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(2003). ‘Scientific Representation: Against Similarity and Isomorphism’, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17: 225–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1989). The Semantic Conception of Theories and Scientific Realism. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.Google Scholar
Swinburne, R. G. (1980). ‘Properties, Causation, and Projectibility: Reply to Shoemaker’, in and (eds.), Applications of Inductive Logic, pp. 313–20. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
(1982). ‘The Nature of Natural Laws’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 60: 203–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1995). An Interpretative Introduction to Quantum Field Theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
(1974). ‘On Popper's Definitions of Verisimilitude’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 25: 155–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1976). ‘Verisimilitude Redefined’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27: 25–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
van Fraassen, B. C.(1985). ‘Empiricism in the Philosophy of Science’, in and (eds.), Images of Science: Essays on Realism and Empiricism, with a Reply from Bas C. van Fraassen, pp. 245–308. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
(2000). ‘The False Hopes of Traditional Epistemology’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60: 253–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(2005). ‘Replies to Discussion on The Empirical Stance’, Philosophical Studies 121: 171–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(2003). Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Worrall, J. (1989). ‘Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds?’, Dialectica 43: 99–124. Reprinted in D. Papineau (ed.) 1996: The Philosophy of Science, pp. 139–65. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRef
Worrall, J.(1994). ‘How to Remain (Reasonably) Optimistic: Scientific Realism and the “Luminiferous Ether” ’, in , , and (eds.), PSA 1994, vol. I, pp. 334–42. East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association.Google Scholar
Worrall, J., and E. G. Zahar (2001). ‘Ramseyfication and Structural Realism’, in , Poincaré's Philosophy: From Conventionalism to Phenomenology, Appendix IV, pp. 236–51. Chicago: Open Court.Google Scholar
Zahar, E. G. (1996). ‘Poincaré's Structural Realism and His Logic of Discovery’, in , , and (eds.), Henri Poincaré: Science and Philosophy, pp. 45–68. Berlin: Akademie Verlag and A. Blanchard.Google Scholar
(1999). ‘The Causal Theory of Properties: Properties According to Shoemaker, Ellis, and Others’, Philosophical Topics 26: 25–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Armstrong, D. M., C. B. Martin, and U. T. Place (1996). Dispositions: A Debate, (ed.). London: Routledge.Google Scholar
, , and (1994). Realism Rescued: How Scientific Progress Is Possible. London: Duckworth.Google Scholar
, , and (eds.) (1992). Emergence or Reduction? Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism. Berlin: de Gruyter.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(2005). ‘The Dispositionalist Conception of Laws’, Foundations of Science 10: 353–70.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1993). ‘Hume and Thick Connexions’, in Essays in Quasi-Realism, pp. 94–107. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Boyd, R. (1981). ‘Scientific Realism and Naturalistic Epistemology’, in and (eds.), PSA 1980, vol. II, pp. 613–62. East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association.Google Scholar
Boyd, R. N. (1999). ‘Homeostasis, Species, and Higher Taxa’, in (ed.), Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays, pp. 141–85. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
(1950). ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’, Revue Intérnationale de Philosophie 4: 20–40. Reprinted in R. Carnap 1956: Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantic and Modal Logic. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
(1987). ‘Ontology and the Laws of Nature’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65: 261–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(ed.) (1998). Interpreting Bodies: Classical and Quantum Objects in Modern Physics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
(2001). ‘Getting Real With Quanta’, review of C. Norris, Quantum Theory and the Flight from Realism: Philosophical Responses to Quantum Mechanics, Metascience 10: 483–7.Google Scholar
(1989). ‘Hume and Causal Realism’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67: 172–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Craig, E.(2000). ‘Hume on Causality – Projectivist and Realist?’, in and (eds.), The New Hume Debate, pp. 113–21. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
(1989). ‘Kinds of Kinds: Individuality and Biological Species’, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 3: 119–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, and (1985). ‘Critical Notice: Bertrand Russell's The Analysis of Matter: Its Historical Context and Contemporary Interest’, Philosophy of Science 52: 621–39.Google Scholar
(1992). ‘Wesley Salmon's Process Theory of Causality and the Conserved Quantity Theory’, Philosophy of Science 59: 195–216.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1993). The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
(1994). ‘Laws, Natures, and Contingent Necessities’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54: 649–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ellis, B. (1999). Contributions to (ed.), Causation and Laws of Nature. Dordrecht: Kluwer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(2000). ‘Causal Laws and Singular Causation’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61: 329–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, and (1994). ‘Dispositional Essentialism’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72: 27–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1973). ‘Underdetermination: Craig and Ramsey’, Journal of Philosophy 70: 453–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1998). ‘Species Pluralism and Anti–Realism’, Philosophy of Science 65: 103–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(2001). The Poverty of the Linnaean Hierarchy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, and (2005). ‘Taxonomy, Polymorphism, and History: An Introduction to Population Structure Theory’, Philosophy of Science 72: 1–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1996). The Shaky Game: Einstein and the Quantum Theory, 2nd edn. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1989). ‘Identity and Individuality in Classical and Quantum Physics’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67: 432–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
French, S.(1998). ‘On the Withering Away of Physical Objects’, in (ed.), Interpreting Bodies: Classical and Quantum Objects in Modern Physics, pp. 93–113. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
French, S.(1999). ‘Models and Mathematics in Physics: The Role of Group Theory’, in and (eds.), From Physics to Philosophy, pp. 187–207. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(2003). ‘Scribbling on the Blank Sheet: Eddington's Structuralist Conception of Objects’, Studies In History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 34: 227–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, and (eds.) (1993). Correspondence, Invariance and Heuristics. Dordrecht: Kluwer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, and (1999). ‘Reinflating the Semantic Approach’, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13: 103–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, and (2003). ‘Remodeling Structural Realism: Quantum Mechanics and the Metaphysics of Structure’, Synthese 136: 31–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, and (1988). ‘Quantum Physics and the Identity of Indiscernibles’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39: 233–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1974). ‘A Radical Solution to the Species Problem’, Systematic Zoology 23: 536–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1988). Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1976). Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, 2nd edn. Indianapolis: Hackett.Google Scholar
(2000). ‘Cassirer, Schlick and “Structural” Realism: The Philosophy of the Exact Sciences in the Background to Early Logical Positivism’, British Journal for the History of Science 8: 71–106.Google Scholar
Greenberg, C. (2003/1939). ‘Avant-Garde and Kitsch’, in and (eds.), Art in Theory, 1900–2000: An Anthology of Changing Ideas. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Griffiths, P. E. (1999). ‘Squaring the Circle: Natural Kinds with Historical Essences’, in (ed.), Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays, pp. 209–28. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
(1982). ‘Experimentation and Scientific Realism’, Philosophical Topics 13: 71–87.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hacking, I.(2007). ‘Natural Kinds: Rosy Dawn, Scholastic Twilight’, in (ed.), The Philosophy of Science, pp. 203–39. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Hacking(forthcoming): The Tradition of Natural Kinds.
, and (1982). ‘In Defence of Convergent Realism’, Philosophy of Science 49: 604–15.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1987). Asymmetries in Time: Problems in the Philosophy of Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Hume, D. (1975/1777). Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, (ed.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
(1990). Russell, Idealism, and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon.Google Scholar
Jones, M. R. (2005). ‘Idealization and Abstraction: A Framework’, in and (eds.), Idealization XII: Correcting the Model, Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 86: 173–217.Google Scholar
(1993). The Advancement of Science: Science Without Legend, Objectivity without Illusions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
(1993). Inductive Inference and Its Natural Ground: An Essay in Naturalistic Epistemology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
(1970/1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
(1977/1971). ‘Concepts of Cause in the Development of Physics’, in The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change, pp. 21–30. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
(1998). ‘What is Structural Realism?’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 29: 409–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Laudan, L. (1981). ‘A Confutation of Convergent Realism’, Philosophy of Science 48: 19–48. Reprinted in (ed.) (1996). The Philosophy of Science, pp. 107–38. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
(1983). ‘New Work for a Theory of Universals’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61: 343–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1993). ‘Is the Best Good Enough?’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93: 89–104.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Locke, J. (1975/1689). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, (ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
(1985). ‘Galilean Idealization’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 16: 247–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(trans.) (1996). The Skeptic Way: Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism.Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Maxwell, G. (1970a). ‘Theories, Perception, and Structural Realism’, in (ed.), The Nature and Function of Scientific Theories, pp. 3–34. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.Google Scholar
Maxwell, G.(1970b). ‘Structural Realism and the Meaning of Theoretical Terms’, in and (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. IV. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.Google Scholar
(1991/1974). ‘In Defence of Dispositions’, in Matters of Metaphysics, pp. 104–22. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Originally published in Philosophical Review 83: 157–81.Google Scholar
Mellor, D. H.(1991/1980). ‘Necessities and Universals in Natural Laws’, in Matters of Metaphysics, pp. 136–53. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Originally published in (ed.), Science, Belief and Behaviour, pp. 105–25. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Mellor, D. H., and T. Crane (1991/1990). ‘There is No Question of Physicalism’, in : Matters of Metaphysics, pp. 82–103. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Originally published in Mind 99: 185–206.Google Scholar
(1974). ‘Popper's Qualitative Theory of Verisimilitude’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 25: 166–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1976). ‘Verisimilitude Redeflated’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27: 363–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1995). ‘Ellis and Lierse on Dispositional Essentialism’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73: 606–12.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1998). ‘Verisimilitude: The Third Period’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49: 1–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1986a). ‘The Poverty of the Popperian Program for Truthlikeness’, Philosophy of Science 53: 163–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1990). ‘Verisimilitude by Power Relations’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41: 129–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(2002). ‘Darwinian Metaphysics: Species and the Question of Essentialism’, Synthese 131: 191–213.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(2000). Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
(1972). Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Knowledge, 4th edn. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.Google Scholar
(1971). ‘Correspondence, Invariance and Heuristics: In Praise of Conservative Induction’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 2: 213–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1995). ‘Is Structural Realism the Best of Both Worlds?’, Dialectica 49: 15–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(2001). ‘Is Structural Realism Possible?’, Philosophy of Science Proceedings, 68: S13–S24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Quine, W. V. O. (1976). ‘Whither Physical Objects?’, in , , and (eds.), Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos, pp. 497–504. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1984). ‘Unification in Science’, review of C. F. von Weizsäcker, The Unity of Nature, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35: 274–79.Google Scholar
(2001a). ‘Quests of a Realist’, review of S. Psillos 1999, Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth, in Metascience 10: 341–7.Google Scholar
, and (1992). ‘Particle Labels and the Theory of Indistinguishable Particles in Quantum Mechanics’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43: 201–18.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1984). ‘Mackie and Shoemaker on Dispositions and Properties’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9: 77–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1987). ‘Biological Species: Natural Kinds, Individuals, or What?’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38: 225–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1953/1918). ‘On the Notion of Cause’, in Mysticism and Logic, pp. 171–96. London: Penguin. Originally published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1912–13.Google Scholar
(2005). ‘Reconsidering the Fresnel-Maxwell Theory Shift: How the Realist Can Have Her Cake and EAT It Too’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 36: 509–38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1984). Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
(1997). ‘Causality and Explanation: A Reply to Two Critics’, Philosophy of Science 64: 461–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1998/1994). ‘Causality without Counterfactuals’, in Causality and Explanation, pp. 248–60. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Originally published in Philosophy of Science 61: 297–312.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1967). What Is Life?: The Physical Aspect of the Living Cell, with Mind and Matter and Autobiographical Sketches. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
(1982). ‘The Concept of Observation in Science and Philosophy’, Philosophy of Science 49: 485–525.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shoemaker, S. (1980). ‘Causality and Properties’, in (ed.), Time and Cause: Essays Presented to Richard Taylor, pp. 109–35. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. Reprinted in D. H. Mellor and A. Oliver (eds.) 1997: Properties, pp. 228–54. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1998). ‘Causal and Metaphysical Necessity’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79: 59–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1998). ‘Approximate Truth and Dynamical Theories’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49: 253–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1980). ‘Evolution, Population Thinking, and Essentialism’, Philosophy of Science 47: 350–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1995). ‘For Pluralism and Against Realism About Species’, Philosophy of Science 62: 70–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(2003). ‘Scientific Representation: Against Similarity and Isomorphism’, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17: 225–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1989). The Semantic Conception of Theories and Scientific Realism. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.Google Scholar
Swinburne, R. G. (1980). ‘Properties, Causation, and Projectibility: Reply to Shoemaker’, in and (eds.), Applications of Inductive Logic, pp. 313–20. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
(1982). ‘The Nature of Natural Laws’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 60: 203–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1995). An Interpretative Introduction to Quantum Field Theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
(1974). ‘On Popper's Definitions of Verisimilitude’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 25: 155–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1976). ‘Verisimilitude Redefined’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27: 25–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
van Fraassen, B. C.(1985). ‘Empiricism in the Philosophy of Science’, in and (eds.), Images of Science: Essays on Realism and Empiricism, with a Reply from Bas C. van Fraassen, pp. 245–308. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
(2000). ‘The False Hopes of Traditional Epistemology’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60: 253–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(2005). ‘Replies to Discussion on The Empirical Stance’, Philosophical Studies 121: 171–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(2003). Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Worrall, J. (1989). ‘Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds?’, Dialectica 43: 99–124. Reprinted in D. Papineau (ed.) 1996: The Philosophy of Science, pp. 139–65. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRef
Worrall, J.(1994). ‘How to Remain (Reasonably) Optimistic: Scientific Realism and the “Luminiferous Ether” ’, in , , and (eds.), PSA 1994, vol. I, pp. 334–42. East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association.Google Scholar
Worrall, J., and E. G. Zahar (2001). ‘Ramseyfication and Structural Realism’, in , Poincaré's Philosophy: From Conventionalism to Phenomenology, Appendix IV, pp. 236–51. Chicago: Open Court.Google Scholar
Zahar, E. G. (1996). ‘Poincaré's Structural Realism and His Logic of Discovery’, in , , and (eds.), Henri Poincaré: Science and Philosophy, pp. 45–68. Berlin: Akademie Verlag and A. Blanchard.Google Scholar