The aim of this book is to develop the metaphysics of scientific realism to the point where it begins to take on the characteristics of a first philosophy, that is, as a theory of the nature of reality that can reasonably adjudicate between theories in any field of enquiry that makes assumptions about what there is in the real world. As most people understand it, scientific realism is not yet such a theory. Nevertheless, the original arguments that led to scientific realism may be deployed more widely than they were originally to fill out a more complete picture of what there is. This picture is still neither clear nor comprehensive enough to be accepted as definitive. It is not clear enough, because there is an ongoing dispute about what kinds of properties or relations there must be supposed to be in the world, and it is not at present comprehensive enough to deal with quantum mechanics, non-locality or the phenomena of temporal passage. But if, as I believe, these and a few other important problems can all be dealt with satisfactorily, perhaps the ontology of scientific realism can at last be seen as a plausible candidate for the role of first philosophy.

In Chapter 1, I discuss the relationship between science and metaphysics. This chapter draws heavily on my own history as a philosopher of science working on metaphysical issues. I have included it here because the relationship between science and metaphysics is central to the issues being discussed.