In late 1963, after several years of limited interest, the Chinese increased their activity in the Middle East to an unprecedented level. The fact that at that time there was no particular development in the Middle East to have justified such an offensive reinforces the view that China's Middle East policy reflected primarily its perception of the global situation, rather than the local one.

In the summer of 1963 there were indications of a serious deterioration in China's relations with the Soviet Union. Disagreements with Moscow were as old as the Chinese communist movement. Yet, despite their growing misgivings, the Chinese had always tried to uphold the concept of unity and to follow Moscow's twists and turns, as far as was publicly possible. Even after 1960, when the controversy intensified, Mao still emphasised unity: ‘We must unite with the Soviet Union, with fraternal parties … no matter what charges they make against us… No matter what their attitude, we should adopt a policy of unity.’

However, in the summer of 1963, after the Soviets together with the United States had signed the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Chinese began to perceive Moscow as their enemy, though not yet as a short-term threat to China's security. The immediate threat came from the growing US involvement in Southeast Asia, particularly in Vietnam and Laos. This involvement, and what the Chinese believed to be the Soviets’ tacit approval, made the world situation explosive. Consequently, the United States and the Soviet Union were seen as the chief enemies of China as well as of the rest of the world and were, therefore, to be firmly resisted: ‘We are now principally in a struggle against imperialism and revisionism.’