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    • Publisher:
      Cambridge University Press
      Publication date:
      29 August 2020
      24 September 2020
      ISBN:
      9781108581295
      9781108706544
      Dimensions:
      Weight & Pages:
      Dimensions:
      (229 x 152 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.12kg, 70 Pages
    • Subjects:
      Ethics, Philosophy
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  • Selected: Digital
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    Subjects:
    Ethics, Philosophy

    Book description

    This Element critically surveys the full range of G. E. Moore's ethical thought, including: (1) his rejection of naturalism in favor of the view that 'good' designates a simple, indefinable property, which cannot be identified with or reduced to any other property; (2) his understanding of intrinsic value, his doctrine of organic wholes, his repudiation of hedonism, and his substantive account of the most important goods and evils; and (3) his critique of egoism and subjectivism and his elaboration of a non-hedonistic variant of utilitarianism that, among other things, creatively blends aspects of act- and rule-oriented versions of that theory.

    References

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