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One - Introduction: why we need a better connection between morality and public policy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 September 2022

Clem Henricson
Affiliation:
University of East Anglia
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Summary

For a materialist largely secular society the surge in public statements concerning morality has been surprisingly loud in the early 21st century. Contentious positioning can be witnessed not only in relation to condoning or opposing specific behaviours, but also in terms of analysing and pronouncing on the causes and functions that underpin morality. The latter dimension, the derivation and purpose of morality, has had a potent fillip as a consequence of concerns over a dwindling spirituality. Added grist to the mill has been the crusade to put a final nail in the coffin of God and metaphysical beliefs by Dawkins and others. There are quests to reinstate the significance of a spiritual dimension to life in a godless world ranging from atheistic Sunday assemblies, creaming the celebratory and moralistic aspects of religion, to the institution of fundamentalist beliefs and behaviours across the faith spectrum.

As potent as these multiple oppositional trends around the issue of spirituality have been, we have also witnessed scientific investigations into the operation of the brain and instincts that have had a significant impact on public debate. Darwin's (1871) identification of the social and other instincts has been revisited following the deciphering of the functions and intricacies of the brain. One could almost hear the collective sigh of relief, certainly within the secular lobby, as empathy, the pathway to pro-social behaviour, found a locus in verifiable physical matter (Singer and Lamm, 2009; Zaki and Ochsner, 2012). But contrary to expectations, the imperative to agonise through the tortuous corridors of concept and reasoning in moral philosophy has not receded. There has been much picking and choosing as to which parts of the brain, which impulses to promote in a process of ceaseless human imaging. For some, the majority perhaps, empathy has been chosen as the star human trait and feature of the brain meriting emphasis at the cost of giving a host of other impulses due recognition. Some philosophers, such as Mary Midgley in Are you an Illusion? (2014), query an over reliance on scientific interpretations of the brain. There are limitations as to how much we know as unquestionable truths.

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Publisher: Bristol University Press
Print publication year: 2016

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