The Emergence of Incentives as Explanatory Concepts

Like Chapter 4, this chapter deals with the situational determinants of behavior. All of the theories to be discussed assume that the organism is able to anticipate events and that behavior is guided by anticipatory goal states. The underlying assumption is that goal states are involved in the “reinforcement” of behavior. When our actions meet with success, the respective goal states are associated with positive affect. When we fail, or in the case of negative reinforcement, they are associated with negative affect. The anticipation of the affect associated with goal states activates a behavioral tendency to either approach or avoid specific goal states. Situational stimuli that alert the organism to affectively charged goal states are known as incentives. Hence, the present chapter deals with incentive theories of motivation.

The striving for affectively charged goal states is a core component of motivation. There are evidently two preconditions for this striving. First, it must be possible to anticipate the occurrence of the goal state; there must be an expectation. Second, the goal state must have some subjective significance or value for the organism.

• Incentive theories of motivation assume that behavior is goal directed. Its regulation is forward looking, as though the organism were constantly asking itself what leads to what. Behavior is proactive, and is attracted to future goal states by the incentive-like promises and threats of the present situation.

1. The explanatory models covered in Chapter 4, such as Hull's (1943) reinforcement theory, are rather reactive by comparison. Here, the general energizing of behavior is attributed to a nonspecific drive, and behavior is assumed to be guided by previously established stimulus-response bonds (habits).