I would like to discuss an approach to the mind that considers language and similar phenomena to be elements of the natural world, to be studied by ordinary methods of empirical inquiry. I will be using the terms “mind” and “mental” here with no metaphysical import. Thus I understand “mental” to be on a par with “chemical,” “optical,” or “electrical.” Certain phenomena, events, processes, and states are informally called “chemical” (etc.), but no metaphysical divide is suggested thereby. The terms are used to select certain aspects of the world as a focus of inquiry. We do not seek to determine the true criterion of the chemical, or the mark of the electrical, or the boundaries of the optical. I will use “mental” the same way, with something like ordinary coverage, but no deeper implications. By “mind” I just mean the mental aspects of the world, with no more interest in sharpening the boundaries or finding a criterion than in other cases.

I'll use the terms “linguistic” and “language” in much the same way. We focus attention on aspects of the world that fall under this informal rubric, and try to understand them better. In the course of doing so we may – and apparently do – develop a concept that more or less resembles the informal notion of “language,” and postulate that such objects are among the things in the world, alongside of complex molecules, electrical fields, the human visual system, and so on.