Book contents
- Newcomb’s Problem
- Classic Philosophical Arguments
- Newcomb’s Problem
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 Does Newcomb’s Problem Actually Exist?
- 2 Newcomb’s Problem, Rationality, and Restraint
- 3 The “Why Ain’cha Rich?” Argument
- 4 Epistemic Time Bias in Newcomb’s Problem∗
- 5 Newcomb’s Problem is Everyone’s Problem: Making Political and Economic Decisions when Behavior is Interdependent
- 6 Success-First Decision Theories
- 7 Deliberation and Stability in Newcomb Problems and Pseudo-Newcomb Problems1
- 8 “Click!” Bait for Causalists
- 9 Game Theory and Decision Theory (Causal and Evidential)
- 10 Diagnosing Newcomb’s Problem with Causal Graphs
- References
- Index
- References
References
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 15 October 2018
Edited by
Book contents
- Newcomb’s Problem
- Classic Philosophical Arguments
- Newcomb’s Problem
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 Does Newcomb’s Problem Actually Exist?
- 2 Newcomb’s Problem, Rationality, and Restraint
- 3 The “Why Ain’cha Rich?” Argument
- 4 Epistemic Time Bias in Newcomb’s Problem∗
- 5 Newcomb’s Problem is Everyone’s Problem: Making Political and Economic Decisions when Behavior is Interdependent
- 6 Success-First Decision Theories
- 7 Deliberation and Stability in Newcomb Problems and Pseudo-Newcomb Problems1
- 8 “Click!” Bait for Causalists
- 9 Game Theory and Decision Theory (Causal and Evidential)
- 10 Diagnosing Newcomb’s Problem with Causal Graphs
- References
- Index
- References
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Newcomb's Problem , pp. 221 - 231Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2018
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