Nietzsche's philosophy has recently generated a significant amount of interest and excitement, much of it centered around his position on truth. Considerable hope exists, and much conviction, that Nietzsche has something important to say about truth. This study begins with the problem that confronts anyone with such hopes, namely, that Nietzsche's claims about truth seem hopelessly confused and contradictory. This chapter sets out the problem and gives an overview of the four most influential ways in which those sympathetic to Nietzsche have tried to solve it. After explaining why these solutions seem unsatisfactory, it sketches a solution to the problem that will be defended in the remainder of this book. This solution stresses the development in Nietzsche's position. It will be argued that Nietzsche's position was contradictory in its early and middle formulations, but that he progressed toward and finally arrived at a coherent and defensible position in the works of his final two years.

The problem of truth

Nietzsche's position on truth seems to amount to a denial that any human belief is, or could be, true. He proclaims, for example, that “truths are illusions we have forgotten are illusions” (TL 84; WL 880–1), that “truth is the kind of error without which a certain kind of being could not live” (WP 493), and that there are “no facts,” but “only interpretations” (WP 481).