This chapter examines a second line of antifoundationalist thought that follows from the philosophical tradition of American pragmatism. I will focus on the work of Richard Rorty to see what his antifoundationalism might yield in moving normative theory beyond the epistemological impasse of the cosmopolitan/communitarian debate. Rorty, although trained in analytical philosophy, rejected its foundationalism to construct a variant of American pragmatism that professes an anti-philosophy: a turn away from philosophy and its truth-seeking methods, towards politics and literature. Unlike the poststructuralists discussed in the last chapter, with the possible exception of William Connolly, Rorty is not generally regarded as an IR theorist. In his writings, he is not concerned to address issues of sovereignty and statehood, which are typically deemed central to IR and its theorisation. Thus, the introduction to this chapter suggests reasons why Rorty's writings are relevant to IR.

His discussion of each of four issues – liberalism, antifoundationalism, the implications of liberalism and antifoundationalism for human rights, and the call to extend our ‘we’ group – holds significance for IR theory. Moreover, together, their consideration has particular import for normative IR theory and its two ethical approaches for two reasons. First, Rorty has contributed to a debate within political theory between liberals and communitarians which, as has been discussed, resonates with the debate in IR theory. Secondly, through his discussion of an issue central to IR theory, human rights, we may enquire where a liberal, yet antifoundationalist, ethic might take normative IR theory.