In 1978 I wrote in Human Rights that the decision by President Carter to postpone production of the enhanced radiation warhead or neutron bomb was, in the circumstances, absolutely right and thoroughly praiseworthy. Whatever the military attractions of a weapon of this kind, it was portrayed in the press as a weapon to hold up a massive Soviet tank incursion, encouraging the view that it was possible to have a limited battlefield nuclear exchange. It could in fact be represented not unfairly as a relatively minor piece of technological innovation in the nuclear weapons field, but there were obvious political dangers in introducing it into Europe at that time, when the fear that nuclear weapons might be used on German territory was starting to build up among Europeans.

It was right then that the leaders of the two superpowers should think very carefully before introducing qualitative or quantitative changes to their nuclear forces. President Carter had shown considerable courage already on the decision to cancel the B1 bomber programme. In the case of the neutron bomb, it would have been better if it had never been developed. The onus was being placed on the Soviet leaders to show restraint over those elements of their own forces, both nuclear and conventional, which caused apprehension in the minds of other countries. The neutron bomb was not a weapons system which came into the orbit of the then SALT talks. Nor did some of the other nuclear weapons – for example, the new Soviet SS-20 missile, which was arousing public concern.