Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-dfsvx Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-29T14:23:05.019Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

2 - Putnam's paradox

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 February 2010

David Lewis
Affiliation:
Princeton University, New Jersey
Get access

Summary

INTRODUCTION

Hilary Putnam has devised a bomb that threatens to devastate the realist philosophy we know and love. He explains how he has learned to stop worrying and love the bomb. He welcomes the new order that it would bring (RT&H, Preface). But we who still live in the target area do not agree. The bomb must be banned.

Putnam's thesis (the bomb) is that, in virtue of considerations from the theory of reference, it makes no sense to suppose that an empirically ideal theory, as verified as can be, might nevertheless be false because the world is not the way the theory says it is. The reason given is, roughly, that there is no semantic glue to stick our words onto their referents, and so reference is very much up for grabs; but there is one force constraining reference, and that is our intention to refer in such a way that we come out right; and there is no countervailing force; and the world, no matter what it is like (almost), will afford some scheme of reference that makes us come out right; so how can we fail to come out right?

Putnam's thesis is incredible. We are in the presence of paradox, as surely as when we meet the man who offers us a proof that there are no people, and in particular that he himself does not exist. It is out of the question to follow the argument where it leads.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1999

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

  • Putnam's paradox
  • David Lewis, Princeton University, New Jersey
  • Book: Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology
  • Online publication: 08 February 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625343.003
Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

  • Putnam's paradox
  • David Lewis, Princeton University, New Jersey
  • Book: Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology
  • Online publication: 08 February 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625343.003
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Putnam's paradox
  • David Lewis, Princeton University, New Jersey
  • Book: Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology
  • Online publication: 08 February 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625343.003
Available formats
×