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3 - What Is Biological Knowledge?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 September 2020

By
Kevin McCain
Edited by
Kostas Kampourakis  and
Tobias Uller
Kostas Kampourakis
Affiliation:
Université de Genève
Tobias Uller
Affiliation:
Lunds Universitet, Sweden
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Summary

As biologists can certainly appreciate, it can be helpful to think of biological knowledge as a species belonging to the genus knowledge. A good starting point for understanding the features of biological knowledge is therefore to ask what features all instances of knowledge have in common.

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Chapter
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Philosophy of Science for Biologists , pp. 36 - 54
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2020

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