The (Im)personal Nature of Dialectic

The dialectical discussion into the nature of σωϕροσύνη is initiated in the dialogue as an investigation into whether Charmides possesses that virtue. But soon Critias assumes the role of Socrates’ chief interlocutor, and by far the greater part of the discussion is conducted with him. What significance are we to attribute to this fact? Although this question may be treated as a relatively formal point about the design of the dialogue, it also has implications not only for the nature of Plato’s representation of dialectical discussion but also for the nature and goal of such discussion itself.

According to one interpretation, the switch from Charmides to Critias represents a serious moral failure on Charmides’ part. On this view, the switch is actually the natural consequence of what, on this interpretation, counts as the true moment of failure: Charmides’ offering of an account of σωϕροσύνη that, it becomes clear, he earlier heard from Critias. This interpretation points to the fact that (1) Socrates takes some care to establish that, if σωϕροσύνη is present in Charmides, it should produce some awareness of itself in him on the basis of which he could form beliefs about its nature and attributes, which he could then formulate in words (159a1–7), and that (2) after the failure of Charmides’ first account, Socrates asks Charmides to try once more with the words: