To say that x is F because of the F or Fness is elliptical or incomplete: the relationship between x and the F by virtue of which x is F remains unspecified. The Socratic dialogues we are examining are quite unselfconscious about that relationship, by contrast with Phaedo 100cd, where we shall find Socrates using a variety of terms for the relationship between a Form and the things here below that partake of it and expressing a studious indifference about which is the right one. Back where we are, he also uses a variety of terms for the relationship between the F and the things that are F. He does not say much about this variety of terms (but see §§ 8.2.3 and 8.2.4.1). He frequently speaks of the relationship as one of presence: temperance is-present-to someone or something (παρει̃ναί τινι); common variants have the virtue or character being-added-to (προσγίγνεσθαι) or being in (εἶναι ʾεν or ʾενεῖναι) that which has it, or of someone or something as partaking of or getting a share of (μετέχειν) that virtue or character.

Does this mean that Socrates has in these dialogues a theory of forms according to which they are immanent in things? Well, he talks of forms, and he talks as if they were present in things. But does he have a theory, or is he just talking that way?