Basic to the idea of nationality is the belief that individuals have special ties and loyalties to their fellow nationals, and that these ties and loyalties can generate certain special obligations among co-nationals. This claim of national allegiances presents an obvious challenge for global distributive justice. The challenge is most acute when global justice is conceived in cosmopolitan terms. On the cosmopolitan view, individuals are entitled to equal consideration regardless of nationality (e.g., Beitz, 1979, 1983; Nussbaum, 1996, 2000; Pogge, 1989, 1998b). A cosmopolitan conception of justice is thus impartial with respect to people's particular national membership. With respect to distributive justice, which is my focus here, this view suggests that what counts as a just global distribution of resources and goods is to be determined independently of the actual national allegiances that people have. Yet this understanding of distributive justice seems to be radically at odds with the widely and deeply held commonsense moral belief that individuals may, or are even required to, show special concern for their co-nationals. The requirements of cosmopolitan justice and the fact of national allegiances thus seem to impose conflicting claims on individuals.

If the cosmopolitan idea of justice is to have any appeal for human beings, it must acknowledge the local attachments and commitments people have that are characteristic of most meaningful and rewarding human lives. Among the special ties and commitments that people share are those of nationality.