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6 - Ehud Barak: All or Nothing

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2014

Yael S. Aronoff
Affiliation:
Michigan State University
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Summary

Arguably, no Israeli leader better illustrates the importance to negotiation of an individual’s personality and psychology than Barak.

– Aharon Klieman, 2005

I compared our government to the people listening to the orchestra on the Titanic. We are sailing into an iceberg.

– Ehud Barak, 2004

We are facing a diplomatic-political tsunami that the majority of the public is unaware of that will peak in September.

– Ehud Barak, 2011

Many Israelis cried for joy, thinking Yitzhak Rabin had come back to life, when in July 1999, Rabin’s protégé Ehud Barak defeated Benjamin Netanyahu in a landslide to become Israel’s tenth prime minister. Madeleine Albright writes that “Barak entered office like a rooster at dawn,” and expectations that Barak could reach a peace agreement with the Palestinian Authority were high. Barak not only pledged to follow in the footsteps of his mentor, Yitzhak Rabin, but he had the faith of the majority of the Israeli population behind him. After all, he was the most decorated soldier in Israel’s history, having served thirty-five years in the military, including as IDF chief of staff; he was known to have a very high IQ and great analytic capabilities, and he even masterfully played the piano. Moshe Dayan had commented that Barak was too good to be true.

Frustrated by Netanyahu’s slow approach to carrying out the Wye Agreements, U.S. President Bill Clinton loaned three close political consultants to Barak to advise him in his campaign, and the celebration and high hopes were not just in the Israeli camp: when Netanyahu lost the election in May 1999, there were open celebrations in the office of Yasser Arafat. The late Faisal Husseini, PLO official in charge of Jerusalem affairs, explained that Palestinians favored Barak in the elections since they thought he would be more prepared to compromise on land. A Jordanian columnist wrote that only the “mentally lazy” would say there was no difference between Labor and Likud.

Type
Chapter
Information
The Political Psychology of Israeli Prime Ministers
When Hard-Liners Opt for Peace
, pp. 124 - 148
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2014

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References

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  • Ehud Barak: All or Nothing
  • Yael S. Aronoff, Michigan State University
  • Book: The Political Psychology of Israeli Prime Ministers
  • Online publication: 05 June 2014
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139814843.007
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  • Ehud Barak: All or Nothing
  • Yael S. Aronoff, Michigan State University
  • Book: The Political Psychology of Israeli Prime Ministers
  • Online publication: 05 June 2014
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139814843.007
Available formats
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Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Ehud Barak: All or Nothing
  • Yael S. Aronoff, Michigan State University
  • Book: The Political Psychology of Israeli Prime Ministers
  • Online publication: 05 June 2014
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139814843.007
Available formats
×