The focus on Latin America, by both the US and Britain, gradually declined as the war came to an end. In January 1945 the wartime economic diplomacy between the two countries entered its final phase and there was a renewed focus on securing a general agreement aimed at reducing barriers to trade and establishing an international organisation to govern post-war commerce. Focus on these broad issues meant that concern over Anglo-American economic diplomacy in South America was largely usurped. More generally, European affairs increasingly came to dominate the attentions of US officials, to the detriment of sustained and concerted policy formation towards Latin America. When foreign competition in Latin America was considered by US officials, it was increasingly the Soviet Union that was viewed as the principal competitor in the region, rather than Britain. So what conclusions can be drawn from the relations between the US and Britain in South America that took place during the Second World War?

The basic conclusion of this book is that Anglo-American relations in South America during the Second World War failed to conform to the pattern of economic diplomacy whereby the US advocated multilateralism against British opposition. It was, in fact, Britain that eventually became the chief proponent of multilateralism in South America. Explaining the British promotion of multilateralism in this region is relatively straightforward. Following a lengthy evaluation of Britain's short – and long-term interests in South America, government departments formed a consensus around the belief that it was the promotion of such a system that would best serve those interests.