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8 - Moral status and intellectual disability

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 August 2009

Pekka Louhiala
Affiliation:
University of Helsinki
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Summary

What is moral status?

The concept of moral status is used widely, yet there are no clear-cut definitions for it. People, animals, things, ideas and the like are referred to as having moral status. It may be low or high and it can be compared (i.e. there are various degrees of moral status). Moral status can also be thought of as intrinsic or conferred.

The vagueness of the concept of moral status is obvious when one looks at the following examples:

  • X has moral status → It is always wrong to destroy X.

  • X has moral status → It is prima facie wrong to destroy X.

  • X has moral status → X has a right to respect (life, help, care, etc.).

  • X has moral status → Y has a moral obligation with regard to X.

Although moral status seems to escape an exact definition, it is plausible that people in general think along the following lines. If something has moral status it is worthy of moral consideration (Edwards 1997), and we have, or can have, moral obligations towards it (Warren 1997).

The concept of moral status can be thought of as ‘a means of specifying those entities towards which we believe ourselves to have moral obligations, as well as something of what we take those obligations to be’ (Warren 1997, p. 9). The concept is general by nature. We usually ascribe moral status to members of a group, not merely to specific individuals (Warren 1997).

Type
Chapter
Information
Preventing Intellectual Disability
Ethical and Clinical Issues
, pp. 117 - 135
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2003

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