That the psychology of science has produced new knowledge about the nature of the scientific enterprise, and is on the verge of producing even more, is a claim that the reader of this volume will by now appreciate. The emergence of psychology of science is part of the broader trend by which cognitive psychologists are seeking to understand successively richer examples of “natural cognition” (Neisser, 1982). What may be less clear is that the psychology of science is presently in a position to clarify problems and issues that arise within other disciplines. One intent of the present chapter is to argue that such applications are possible if the appropriate strategies are adopted. Specifically, I will argue that we must give careful attention to the exact way in which the scientific findings of the psychology of science are to be used in the interpretation of real-world science. In effect, we must be careful to distinguish between the generation of two kinds of knowledge about science: that which relies upon the usual scientific strategies of experimentation, observation, and the generation and testing of hypotheses; and that which interprets the richness of real science by using concepts derived from the first sort of activities. In the latter case, we must use certain interpretive strategies common to the historical disciplines and to the psychological analysis of complex cognition.

To make the argument, I first describe the general assumptions that I bring to the task. These assumptions are consistent with the work of Wilhelm Wundt, and I use his ideas as a framework and a justification for my own.