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9 - CHOICE OF TAXATION

Arye L. Hillman
Arye L. Hillman
Affiliation:
Bar-Ilan University, Israel
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Summary

Taxation has been present in our investigation of public goods, externalities, paternalism, social justice, and entitlements: public spending requires that governments have tax revenue to spend, and taxes affect incentives and are the sources of efficiency losses through the excess burden of taxation. We also studied tax evasion as an application of the prisoners' dilemma of voluntary payment for public goods (people who evade payment of taxes are free riding on tax payments of honest taxpayers). We observed how the Laffer curve constrains the amount of tax revenue that governments can collect and that a leviathan government would seek to maximize tax revenue without regard for benefit for taxpayers (in which case, we might want to rethink judgments about tax evasion). In the different instances where we considered taxation, (1) there was a single tax rate, (2) there was a designated tax base, and (3) one government was involved in taxation and public spending. In section 1 of this chapter, we depart from a single tax to look at the structure of tax rates. Section 2 considers choice of the tax base – or choice of what to tax. On a number of occasions, beginning with the Tiebout locational-choice mechanism, we encountered fiscal federalism, that is, taxation and public spending in the context of intergovernmental fiscal relations. Section 3 brings together our prior observations on fiscal federalism and adds further perspectives and questions.

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Chapter
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Public Finance and Public Policy
Responsibilities and Limitations of Government
 , pp. 665 - 738
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2009

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References

Ramsey, F. P., 1929. A contribution to the theory of taxation. Economic Journal 37:47–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hamermesh, D. S., and Biddle, J. E., 1994. Beauty and the labor market. American Economic Review 84:1174–94.Google Scholar
Fernández, R., Fogli, A., and Olivetti, C., 2004. Mothers and sons: Preference formation and female labor-force participation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 119:1249–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grossbard-Shechtman, S., and Neuman, S., 2003. Marriage and work for pay. In Grossbard-Shechtman, S. (Ed.), Marriage and the Economy: Theory and Evidence from Advanced Industrial Societies. Cambridge University Press, New York, pp. 222–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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Mitra, T., and Ok, E. A., 1996. Personal income taxation and the principle of equal sacrifice revisited. International Economic Review 37:925–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mitra, T., and Ok, E. A., 1997. On the equitability of progressive taxation. Journal of Economic Theory 73:316–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ok, E. A., 1995. On the principle of equal sacrifice in income taxation. Journal of Public Economics 58:453–68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Samuelson, P., 1947. Foundations of Economic Analysis. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA.Google Scholar
Young, H. P., 1987. Progressive taxation and the equal-sacrifice principle. Journal of Public Economics 32:203–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Young, H. P., 1990. Progressive taxation and equal sacrifice. American Economic Review 80:253–66.Google Scholar
Layard, R., Nickell, S., and Mayraz, G., 2008. The marginal utility of income. Journal of Public Economics 92:1846–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ihori, T., 1987. The optimal linear income tax: A diagrammatic analysis. Journal of Public Economics 34:379–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sheshinski, E., 1972. The optimal linear income tax. Review of Economic Studies 39:297–302.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mirrlees, J. A., 1971. An exploration in the theory of optimal income taxation. Review of Economic Studies 38:175–208.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mirrlees, J. A., 1976. Optimal tax theory: A synthesis. Journal of Public Economics 6:327–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mirrlees, J. A., 1999. Information and incentives: The economics of carrots and sticks. Nobel Prize Lecture. Economic Journal 107:1311–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Diamond, P. A., 1998. Optimal income taxation: An example with a U-shaped pattern of optimal marginal tax rates. American Economic Review 88:83–95.Google Scholar
Ferguson, N., 2001. The Cash Nexus. Penguin Books, London.Google Scholar
Saez, E., 2001. Using elasticities to derive optimal income tax rates. Review of Economic Studies 68:205–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Boskin, M. J. (Ed.), 1996. Frontiers of Tax Reform. Hoover Institution Press, Stanford CA.Google Scholar
Hall, R. E., and Rabushka, A., 1995. The Flat Tax (2nd Edition). Hoover Institution Press, Stanford CA.Google Scholar
Boskin, M. J., and Sheshinski, E., 1978. Optimal redistributive taxation when individual welfare depends upon relative income. Quarterly Journal of Economics 92:589–601.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rubin, P. H., 2002. Darwinian Politics: The Evolutionary Origins of Freedom. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick NJ.Google Scholar
Hettich, W., and Winer, S. L., 1999. Democratic Choice and Taxation: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis. Cambridge University Press, New York.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dalton, H., 1920. The measurement of the inequality of income. Economic Journal 30:348–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Guesnerie, R., 1995. A Contribution to the Pure Theory of Taxation. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge U.K.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kydland, F., and Prescott, E., 1980. Dynamic optimal taxation, rational expectations, and optimal control. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 2:79–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harberger, A. C., 1962. The incidence of the corporation income tax. Journal of Political Economy 70:215–40.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bernheim, D. B., and Wantz, A., 1995. A tax-based test of the dividend signaling hypothesis. American Economic Review 85:532–51.Google Scholar
Graham, J. R., 1999. Do personal taxes affect corporate financing decisions?Journal of Public Economics 73:147–85.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gordon, R. H., 1985. Taxation of corporate capital income: Tax revenues versus tax distortions. Quarterly Journal of Economics 100:1–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Modigliani, F., and Miller, M., 1958. The cost of capital, corporation finance, and the theory of investment. American Economic Review 48:261–99.Google Scholar
Feldstein, M. S., and Horiaka, C., 1980. Domestic savings and international capital flows. Economic Journal 90:314–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Batina, R. G., and Ihori, T., 2000. Consumption Tax Policy and the Taxation of Capital. Oxford University Press, Oxford.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Haig, R. M., 1921. The Federal Income Tax. Columbia University Press, New York.Google Scholar
Simons, H. C., 1938. Personal Income Taxation. University of Chicago Press, Chicago IL.Google Scholar
Fullerton, D., Shoven, J. B., and Whalley, J., 1983. Replacing the U.S. income tax with a progressive consumption tax: A sequenced general equilibrium approach. Journal of Public Economics 20:3–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kaldor, N., 1955. An Expenditure Tax. George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London.Google Scholar
Pechman, J. E., 1990. The future of the income tax. American Economic Review 80:1–20.Google Scholar
Erreygers, G., and Vandevelde, T., 1997. Is Inheritance Legitimate? Ethical and Economic Aspects of Wealth Transfers. Springer, Heidelberg.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Poterba, J. M., 2001. Estate and gift taxes and inter vivos giving in the U.S. Journal of Public Economics 79:237–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Barro, R. J., 1972. Inflationary finance and the welfare cost of inflation. Journal of Political Economy 80:978–1001.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Phelps, E. S., 1973. Inflation in the theory of public finance. Swedish Journal of Economics 75:67–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Beenstock, M., Goldin, E., and Haitovsky, Y., 2000. What jackpot? The optimal lottery tax. European Journal of Political Economy 16:655–71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gully, O. D., and Scott, F. A., 1993. The demand for wagering on state-operated lotto games. National Tax Journal 46:13–22.Google Scholar
Walker, I., 1998. The economic analysis of lotteries. Economic Policy 27:357–402.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fry, M., 1982. Models of financially repressed developing economies. World Development 10:731–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Giovannini, A., and Melo, M., 1993. Government revenue from financial repression. American Economic Review 83:953–63.Google Scholar
Atkinson, A. B., and Stiglitz, J., 1976. The design of tax structure: Direct versus indirect taxation. Journal of Public Economics 6:55–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Christiansen, V. A., 1984. Which commodity taxes should supplement the income tax?Journal of Public Economics 24:195–220.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Saez, E., 2002. The desirability of commodity taxation under non-linear income taxation and heterogeneous tastes. Journal of Public Economics 83:217–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Boadway, R., Marchand, M., and Pestieau, P., 1994. Towards a theory of direct-indirect tax mix. Journal of Public Economics 55:71–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Marco, , deViti, Antonio, 1936/1950. First Principles of Public Finance. Jonathan Cape, London.Google Scholar
Sandford, C., 2000. Why Tax Systems Differ: A Comparative Study of the Political Economy of Taxation. Fiscal Publications, Bath.Google Scholar
Oates, W. E., 1972. Fiscal Federalism. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York.Google Scholar
Inman, R. P., and Rubinfeld, D. L., 1997. Rethinking federalism. Journal of Economic Perpsectives 11:43–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hirschman, A., 1970. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA.Google Scholar
Asdrubali, P., Sørensen, B. E., and Yosha, O., 1996. Channels of interstate risk sharing: United States 1963–90. Quarterly Journal of Economics 111, 1081–110.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldberg, M. A., and Levi, M. D., 2000. The European Union as a country portfolio. European Journal of Political Economy 16:411–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ihori, T., 1991. Capital income taxation in a world economy: A territorial system versus a residence system. Economic Journal 101:958–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brown, C. C., and Oates, W. E., 1987. Assistance to the poor in a federal system. Journal of Public Economics 32:307–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Buchanan, J. M., 1950. Federalism and fiscal equity. American Economic Review 40:583–99.Google Scholar
Genser, B., 1992. Tax competition and harmonization in federal economies. In Viscera, H.-J. (Ed.), European Integration in the World Economy. Springer, Heidelberg, pp. 184–205.Google Scholar
Sørensen, P. B., 2000. Tax coordination: Its desirability and redistribution implications. Economic Policy 31:431–72.Google Scholar
Edwards, J., and Keen, M., 1996. Tax competition and Leviathan. European Economic Review 40:113–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Eggert, W., 2001. Capital tax competition with socially wasteful government consumption. European Journal of Political Economy 17:517–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rauscher, M., 1998. Leviathan and competition among jurisdictions: The case of benefit taxation. Journal of Urban Economics 44:59–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wilson, J. D., 1986. A theory of interregional tax competition. Journal of Urban Economics 19:296–315.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Caplan, B., 2001. Standing Tiebout on his head: Tax capitalization and the monopoly power of local governments. Public Choice 108:101–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Besley, T., and Case, A., 1995. Incumbent behavior: Vote-seeking, tax-setting and yardstick competition. American Economic Review 85:25–45.Google Scholar
Salmon, P., 1987. Decentralization as an incentive scheme. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 3:24–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goodspeed, T., 2002. Bailouts in a federation. International Tax and Public Finance 9:409–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Arikan, G. G., 2004. Fiscal decentralization: A remedy for corruption. International Tax and Public Finance 11:175–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fisman, R., and Gatti, R., 2002. Decentralization and corruption: Evidence across countries. Journal of Public Economics 83:325–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Seabright, P., 1996. Accountability and decentralization in government: An incomplete contracts model. European Economic Review 40:61–89.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wärneryd, K., 1998. Distributional conflict and jurisdictional organization. Journal of Public Economics 69:435–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baqir, R., 2002. Districting and government overspending. Journal of Political Economy 110:1318–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Vaubel, R., 1996. Constitutional safeguards against centralization in federal states: An international cross-section analysis. Constitutional Political Economy 7:79–102.Google Scholar
Bolton, P., and Roland, G., 1997. The break-up of countries: A political economy analysis. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112:1057–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hillman, A. L., 2005. Political institutions, jurisdictional boundaries, and rent creation. Keio Economic Studies 42:25–37. Ethier, W. J. and Yano, M. (Eds.), special issue in honor of Professor Michihiro Ohyama.
Tanzi, V., 2008. The future of fiscal federalism. European Journal of Political Economy 24:705–12.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Vaubel, R., 2009. The future of fiscal federalism and the need for global government: A response to Vito Tanzi. European Journal of Political Economy 25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ramsey, F. P., 1929. A contribution to the theory of taxation. Economic Journal 37:47–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hamermesh, D. S., and Biddle, J. E., 1994. Beauty and the labor market. American Economic Review 84:1174–94.Google Scholar
Fernández, R., Fogli, A., and Olivetti, C., 2004. Mothers and sons: Preference formation and female labor-force participation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 119:1249–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grossbard-Shechtman, S., and Neuman, S., 2003. Marriage and work for pay. In Grossbard-Shechtman, S. (Ed.), Marriage and the Economy: Theory and Evidence from Advanced Industrial Societies. Cambridge University Press, New York, pp. 222–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
D'Antoni, M., 1999. Piecewise linear tax functions, progressivity, and the principle of equal sacrifice. Economic Letters 65:191–7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mill, J. S., 1848. Principles of Political Economy. Longmans Green, London.Google Scholar
Mitra, T., and Ok, E. A., 1996. Personal income taxation and the principle of equal sacrifice revisited. International Economic Review 37:925–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mitra, T., and Ok, E. A., 1997. On the equitability of progressive taxation. Journal of Economic Theory 73:316–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ok, E. A., 1995. On the principle of equal sacrifice in income taxation. Journal of Public Economics 58:453–68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Samuelson, P., 1947. Foundations of Economic Analysis. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA.Google Scholar
Young, H. P., 1987. Progressive taxation and the equal-sacrifice principle. Journal of Public Economics 32:203–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Young, H. P., 1990. Progressive taxation and equal sacrifice. American Economic Review 80:253–66.Google Scholar
Layard, R., Nickell, S., and Mayraz, G., 2008. The marginal utility of income. Journal of Public Economics 92:1846–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ihori, T., 1987. The optimal linear income tax: A diagrammatic analysis. Journal of Public Economics 34:379–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sheshinski, E., 1972. The optimal linear income tax. Review of Economic Studies 39:297–302.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mirrlees, J. A., 1971. An exploration in the theory of optimal income taxation. Review of Economic Studies 38:175–208.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mirrlees, J. A., 1976. Optimal tax theory: A synthesis. Journal of Public Economics 6:327–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mirrlees, J. A., 1999. Information and incentives: The economics of carrots and sticks. Nobel Prize Lecture. Economic Journal 107:1311–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Diamond, P. A., 1998. Optimal income taxation: An example with a U-shaped pattern of optimal marginal tax rates. American Economic Review 88:83–95.Google Scholar
Ferguson, N., 2001. The Cash Nexus. Penguin Books, London.Google Scholar
Saez, E., 2001. Using elasticities to derive optimal income tax rates. Review of Economic Studies 68:205–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Boskin, M. J. (Ed.), 1996. Frontiers of Tax Reform. Hoover Institution Press, Stanford CA.Google Scholar
Hall, R. E., and Rabushka, A., 1995. The Flat Tax (2nd Edition). Hoover Institution Press, Stanford CA.Google Scholar
Boskin, M. J., and Sheshinski, E., 1978. Optimal redistributive taxation when individual welfare depends upon relative income. Quarterly Journal of Economics 92:589–601.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rubin, P. H., 2002. Darwinian Politics: The Evolutionary Origins of Freedom. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick NJ.Google Scholar
Hettich, W., and Winer, S. L., 1999. Democratic Choice and Taxation: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis. Cambridge University Press, New York.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dalton, H., 1920. The measurement of the inequality of income. Economic Journal 30:348–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Guesnerie, R., 1995. A Contribution to the Pure Theory of Taxation. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge U.K.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kydland, F., and Prescott, E., 1980. Dynamic optimal taxation, rational expectations, and optimal control. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 2:79–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harberger, A. C., 1962. The incidence of the corporation income tax. Journal of Political Economy 70:215–40.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bernheim, D. B., and Wantz, A., 1995. A tax-based test of the dividend signaling hypothesis. American Economic Review 85:532–51.Google Scholar
Graham, J. R., 1999. Do personal taxes affect corporate financing decisions?Journal of Public Economics 73:147–85.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gordon, R. H., 1985. Taxation of corporate capital income: Tax revenues versus tax distortions. Quarterly Journal of Economics 100:1–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Modigliani, F., and Miller, M., 1958. The cost of capital, corporation finance, and the theory of investment. American Economic Review 48:261–99.Google Scholar
Feldstein, M. S., and Horiaka, C., 1980. Domestic savings and international capital flows. Economic Journal 90:314–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Batina, R. G., and Ihori, T., 2000. Consumption Tax Policy and the Taxation of Capital. Oxford University Press, Oxford.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Haig, R. M., 1921. The Federal Income Tax. Columbia University Press, New York.Google Scholar
Simons, H. C., 1938. Personal Income Taxation. University of Chicago Press, Chicago IL.Google Scholar
Fullerton, D., Shoven, J. B., and Whalley, J., 1983. Replacing the U.S. income tax with a progressive consumption tax: A sequenced general equilibrium approach. Journal of Public Economics 20:3–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kaldor, N., 1955. An Expenditure Tax. George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London.Google Scholar
Pechman, J. E., 1990. The future of the income tax. American Economic Review 80:1–20.Google Scholar
Erreygers, G., and Vandevelde, T., 1997. Is Inheritance Legitimate? Ethical and Economic Aspects of Wealth Transfers. Springer, Heidelberg.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Poterba, J. M., 2001. Estate and gift taxes and inter vivos giving in the U.S. Journal of Public Economics 79:237–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Barro, R. J., 1972. Inflationary finance and the welfare cost of inflation. Journal of Political Economy 80:978–1001.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Phelps, E. S., 1973. Inflation in the theory of public finance. Swedish Journal of Economics 75:67–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Beenstock, M., Goldin, E., and Haitovsky, Y., 2000. What jackpot? The optimal lottery tax. European Journal of Political Economy 16:655–71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gully, O. D., and Scott, F. A., 1993. The demand for wagering on state-operated lotto games. National Tax Journal 46:13–22.Google Scholar
Walker, I., 1998. The economic analysis of lotteries. Economic Policy 27:357–402.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fry, M., 1982. Models of financially repressed developing economies. World Development 10:731–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Giovannini, A., and Melo, M., 1993. Government revenue from financial repression. American Economic Review 83:953–63.Google Scholar
Atkinson, A. B., and Stiglitz, J., 1976. The design of tax structure: Direct versus indirect taxation. Journal of Public Economics 6:55–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Christiansen, V. A., 1984. Which commodity taxes should supplement the income tax?Journal of Public Economics 24:195–220.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Saez, E., 2002. The desirability of commodity taxation under non-linear income taxation and heterogeneous tastes. Journal of Public Economics 83:217–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Boadway, R., Marchand, M., and Pestieau, P., 1994. Towards a theory of direct-indirect tax mix. Journal of Public Economics 55:71–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Marco, , deViti, Antonio, 1936/1950. First Principles of Public Finance. Jonathan Cape, London.Google Scholar
Sandford, C., 2000. Why Tax Systems Differ: A Comparative Study of the Political Economy of Taxation. Fiscal Publications, Bath.Google Scholar
Oates, W. E., 1972. Fiscal Federalism. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York.Google Scholar
Inman, R. P., and Rubinfeld, D. L., 1997. Rethinking federalism. Journal of Economic Perpsectives 11:43–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hirschman, A., 1970. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA.Google Scholar
Asdrubali, P., Sørensen, B. E., and Yosha, O., 1996. Channels of interstate risk sharing: United States 1963–90. Quarterly Journal of Economics 111, 1081–110.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldberg, M. A., and Levi, M. D., 2000. The European Union as a country portfolio. European Journal of Political Economy 16:411–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ihori, T., 1991. Capital income taxation in a world economy: A territorial system versus a residence system. Economic Journal 101:958–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brown, C. C., and Oates, W. E., 1987. Assistance to the poor in a federal system. Journal of Public Economics 32:307–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Buchanan, J. M., 1950. Federalism and fiscal equity. American Economic Review 40:583–99.Google Scholar
Genser, B., 1992. Tax competition and harmonization in federal economies. In Viscera, H.-J. (Ed.), European Integration in the World Economy. Springer, Heidelberg, pp. 184–205.Google Scholar
Sørensen, P. B., 2000. Tax coordination: Its desirability and redistribution implications. Economic Policy 31:431–72.Google Scholar
Edwards, J., and Keen, M., 1996. Tax competition and Leviathan. European Economic Review 40:113–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Eggert, W., 2001. Capital tax competition with socially wasteful government consumption. European Journal of Political Economy 17:517–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rauscher, M., 1998. Leviathan and competition among jurisdictions: The case of benefit taxation. Journal of Urban Economics 44:59–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wilson, J. D., 1986. A theory of interregional tax competition. Journal of Urban Economics 19:296–315.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Caplan, B., 2001. Standing Tiebout on his head: Tax capitalization and the monopoly power of local governments. Public Choice 108:101–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Besley, T., and Case, A., 1995. Incumbent behavior: Vote-seeking, tax-setting and yardstick competition. American Economic Review 85:25–45.Google Scholar
Salmon, P., 1987. Decentralization as an incentive scheme. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 3:24–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goodspeed, T., 2002. Bailouts in a federation. International Tax and Public Finance 9:409–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Arikan, G. G., 2004. Fiscal decentralization: A remedy for corruption. International Tax and Public Finance 11:175–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fisman, R., and Gatti, R., 2002. Decentralization and corruption: Evidence across countries. Journal of Public Economics 83:325–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Seabright, P., 1996. Accountability and decentralization in government: An incomplete contracts model. European Economic Review 40:61–89.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wärneryd, K., 1998. Distributional conflict and jurisdictional organization. Journal of Public Economics 69:435–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baqir, R., 2002. Districting and government overspending. Journal of Political Economy 110:1318–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Vaubel, R., 1996. Constitutional safeguards against centralization in federal states: An international cross-section analysis. Constitutional Political Economy 7:79–102.Google Scholar
Bolton, P., and Roland, G., 1997. The break-up of countries: A political economy analysis. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112:1057–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hillman, A. L., 2005. Political institutions, jurisdictional boundaries, and rent creation. Keio Economic Studies 42:25–37. Ethier, W. J. and Yano, M. (Eds.), special issue in honor of Professor Michihiro Ohyama.
Tanzi, V., 2008. The future of fiscal federalism. European Journal of Political Economy 24:705–12.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Vaubel, R., 2009. The future of fiscal federalism and the need for global government: A response to Vito Tanzi. European Journal of Political Economy 25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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  • CHOICE OF TAXATION
  • Arye L. Hillman, Bar-Ilan University, Israel
  • Book: Public Finance and Public Policy
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511813788.010
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  • CHOICE OF TAXATION
  • Arye L. Hillman, Bar-Ilan University, Israel
  • Book: Public Finance and Public Policy
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511813788.010
Available formats
×

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  • CHOICE OF TAXATION
  • Arye L. Hillman, Bar-Ilan University, Israel
  • Book: Public Finance and Public Policy
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511813788.010
Available formats
×