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2 - INSTITUTIONS AND GOVERNANCE

Arye L. Hillman
Arye L. Hillman
Affiliation:
Bar-Ilan University, Israel
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Summary

A society's “institutions” determine norms and incentives of personal conduct. Legal institutions determine how or whether the rule of law is provided. Political institutions determine political behavior and how voters' collective decisions are made and implemented. Social institutions determine whether people make long-term commitments to one another. The market is an institution. Private property is an institution, as is collective property.

Institutions persist independently of the identity of individuals: congress or parliament is independent of the identity of incumbent political representatives; a government bureaucracy is independent of the identity of incumbent bureaucrats; and a judiciary or court system is independent of who the judges happen to be at any time. When incumbent judges, political representatives, or bureaucrats depart, the institutions remain. The market is independent of who buys and who sells, and the institution of private property is independent of who owns the property.

Governance is the activity of governing and exercising the authority of government. When taxpayer and voter interests are well served by governments, governance is described as good. Conversely, governance is inadequate or bad when the authority of government is exercised in ways that benefit the people in government, their family, and their friends rather than the taxpayers and voters.

Through consequences for the quality of governance, institutions determine whether public finance and public policy can improve on market outcomes when societies seek efficiency and social justice.

Information

Type
Chapter
Information
Public Finance and Public Policy
Responsibilities and Limitations of Government
 , pp. 71 - 134
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2009

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References

Acemoglu, D., and Robinson, J. A, 2005. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge University Press, New York.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Borooah, V. K., and Paldam, M., 2007. Why is the world short of democracy?: A cross-country analysis of barriers to representative government. European Journal of Political Economy 23:582–604.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hall, R. E., and Jones, C. I., 1999. Why do some countries produce so much more output per worker than others?Quarterly Journal of Economics 114:83–116.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Knack, S., and Keefer, P., 1995. Institutions and economic performance: Cross-country tests using alternative institutional measures. Economics and Politics 7:207–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R., 1999. The quality of government. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 15:222–79.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
North, D. C., 1981. Structure and Change in Economic History. W. W. Norton and Company, New York.Google Scholar
Downs, A., 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. Harper and Row, New York.Google Scholar
Barro, R. J., 1973. The control of politicians: An economic model. Public Choice 14:19–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ferejohn, J., 1986. Incumbent performance and electoral control. Public Choice 50:5–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Zupan, M., 1990. The last period problem in politics: Do congressional representatives not subject to a reelection constraint alter their voting behavior?Public Choice 65:167–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Besely, T., 2006. Principled Agents?: The Political Economy of Good Government. Oxford University Press, Oxford.Google Scholar
Djankov, S., McLiesh, C., Nenova, T., and Shleifer, A., 2003. Who owns the media?The Journal of Law and Economics 46:341–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gentzkow, M., and Shapiro, J. M., 2008. Competition and truth in the market for news. Journal of Economic Perspectives 22:133–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Leeson, P. T., 2008. Media freedom, political knowledge, and participation. Journal of Economic Perspectives 22:155–69.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dick, A. R., and Lott, J. R., 1993. Reconciling voters' behavior with legislative term limits. Journal of Public Economics 50:1–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hillman, A. L., 1982. Declining industries and political-support protectionist motives. American Economic Review 72:1180–7. Reprinted in Congleton, R. D., Hillman, A. L., and Konrad, K. A. (Eds.), 2008. Forty Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2: Applications: Rent Seeking in Practice. Springer, Berlin, pp. 105–12.Google Scholar
Peltzman, S., 1976. Toward a more general theory of regulation. Journal of Law and Economics 19:171–240.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Buchanan, J. M., 1980. Rent seeking and profit seeking. In Buchanan, J. M., Tollison, R. D., and Tullock, G. (Eds.), Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society. Texas A&M University Press, College Station, pp. 3–15.Google Scholar
Congleton, R. D., 1980. Competitive process, competitive waste, and institutions. In Buchanan, J. M., Tollison, R. D., and Tullock, G.s (Eds.), Toward a Theory of the Rent Seeking Society. Texas A&M University Press, College Station, pp. 153–79.Google Scholar
Hillman, A. L., and Ursprung, H. W., 2000. Political culture and economic decline. European Journal of Political Economy 16:189–212.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Krueger, A. O., 1974. The political economy of the rent-seeking society. American Economic Review 64:291–303.Google Scholar
Tullock, G., 1967. The welfare costs of monopoly, tariffs, and theft. Western Economic Journal 5:224–32.Google Scholar
Congleton, R. D., Hillman, A. L., and Konrad, K. A. (Eds.), 2008. Forty Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1: The Theory of Rent-Seeking. Springer, Berlin.
Congleton, R. D., Hillman, A. L., and Konrad, K. A. (Eds.), 2008. Forty Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2: Applications: Rent Seeking in Practice. Springer, Berlin.CrossRef
Park, H., Philippopoulos, A., and Vassilatos, V., 2005. Choosing the size of the public sector under rent seeking from state coffers. European Journal of Political Economy 21:830–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tullock, G., 1988. The Economics of Special Privilege and Rent Seeking. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston.Google Scholar
Willis, H. P., 1912. Political obstacles to anti-trust legislation. Journal of Political Economy 20:588–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Congleton, R. D., 1986. Rent-seeking aspects of political advertising. Public Choice 49:249–65. Reprinted in Congleton et al., 2008.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baye, M. R., Kovenock, D., and Vries, C. G., 2005. Comparative analysis of litigation systems: An auction-theoretic approach. Economic Journal 115:583–601.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Farmer, A., and Pecorino, P., 1999. Legal expenditure as a rent-seeking game. Public Choice 100:271–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Parisi, F., 2002. Rent seeking through litigation: Adversarial and inquisitorial systems compared. International Review of Law and Economics 22:193–216.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tullock, G., 1975. On the efficient organization of trials. Kyklos 28:745–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Appelbaum, E., and Katz, E., 1987. Seeking rents by setting rents: The political economy of rent seeking. Economic Journal 97:685–99. Reprinted in Congleton et al., 2008.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McChesney, F. S., 1997. Money for Nothing: Politicians, Rent Extraction, and Political Extortion. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA.Google Scholar
Baik, K. H., and Kim, I. G., 1997. Delegation in contests. European Journal of Political Economy 13:281–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hillman, A. L., and Katz, E., 1987. Hierarchical structure and the social costs of bribes and transfers. Journal of Public Economics 34:129–42. Reprinted in Congleton et al., 2008.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baysinger, B., Ekelund, R. B., and Tollison, R. D., 1980. Mercantilism as a rent-seeking society. In Buchanan, J. M., Tollison, R. D., and Tullock, G. (Eds.), Toward a Theory of the Rent Seeking Society. Texas A&M Press, College Station, pp. 235–68. Reprinted in Congleton et al., 2008.Google Scholar
Niskanen, W., 1971. Bureaucracy and Representative Government. Aldine, Chicago.Google Scholar
Tirole, J., 1994. The internal organization of government. Oxford Economic Papers 46:1–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Weber, M., 1947. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. W. Hodge, Edinburgh.Google Scholar
Ferejohn, J. A., and Shipan, C., 1990. Congressional influence on bureaucracy. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 6:1–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rowley, C. K., and Elgin, R., 1988. Government and its bureaucracy: A bilateral bargaining versus principal–agent approach. In Rowley, C. K., Tollison, R. D., and Tullock, G. (Eds.), The Political Economy of Rent Seeking. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, pp. 267–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Heckman, J., Heinrich, C., and Smith, J., 1997. Assessing the performance of performance standards in public bureaucracies. American Economic Review 87:389–95.Google Scholar
Engels, F., 1884/1972. The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State. Pathfinder Press, New York.Google Scholar
Lange, O., 1938. On the Economic Meaning of Socialism. Lippincott, B. E. (Ed.), University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.Google Scholar
Marx, K., 1887/1994. Capital: A Critical Analysis of Capitalist Production. Engels, F. (Ed.), Progress Publishers, Moscow.Google Scholar
Caldwell, B., 1998. Hayek and socialism. Journal of Economic Literature 35:1856–90.Google Scholar
Hayek, F. A., 1944/1972. The Road to Serfdom. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.Google Scholar
Hayek, F. A., 1988. The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism. Bartley, W. W. III (Ed.), Routledge, London.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pejovich, S., 1987. Freedom, property rights, and innovation in socialism. Kyklos 40:461–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mises, L., 1951. Socialism. Yale University Press, New Haven CT.Google Scholar
Anderson, G. M., and Boettke, P. J., 1997. Soviet venality: A rent-seeking model of the communist state. Public Choice 93:37–53.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hillman, A. L., and Schnytzer, A., 1986. Illegal activities and purges in a Soviet-type economy: A rent-seeking perspective. International Review of Law and Economics 6:87–99. Reprinted in Congleton et al., 2008.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Levy, D., 2007. Price adjustment under the table: Evidence on efficiency-enhancing corruption. European Journal of Political Economy 23:423–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hillman, A. L., and Katz, E., 1984. Risk-averse rent-seekers and the social cost of monopoly power. Economic Journal 94:104–10.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hillman, A. L., and Riley, J., 1989. Politically contestable rents and transfers. Economics and Politics 1:17–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hillman, A. L., and Samet, D., 1987. Dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders. Public Choice 54:63–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tullock, G., 1980. Efficient rent-seeking. In Buchanan, J. M., Tollison, R. D., and Tullock, G. (Eds.), Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society. Texas A&M University Press, College Station, pp. 97–112.Google Scholar
Aidt, T. S., and Hillman, A. L., 2008. Enduring rents. European Journal of Political Economy 24:454–3.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Demsetz, H., 1968. Why regulate utilities?Journal of Law and Economics 11:55–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stigler, G. J., 1971. The theory of economic regulation. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2:3–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bonin, J. P., and Putterman, L., 1987. Economics of Cooperation and the Labor-Managed Economy. Harwood, Chur, Switzerland.Google Scholar
Cheung, S., 1983. The contractual nature of the firm. Journal of Law and Economics 26:1–21.Google Scholar
Bogetiç, Ž., 1982. Is there a case for employee ownership? In Hillman, A. L. and Milanovic, B. (Eds.), The Transition from Socialism in Eastern Europe: Domestic Restructuring and Foreign Trade. The World Bank, Washington DC, pp. 83–104.Google Scholar
Hinds, M., 1992. Policy effectiveness in reforming socialist economies. In Hillman, A. L. and Milanovic, B. (Eds.), The Transition from Socialism in Eastern Europe: Domestic Restructuring and Foreign Trade. The World Bank, Washington DC, pp. 13–39.Google Scholar
Kornai, J., 1983. Contradictions and Dilemmas: Studies on the Socialist Economy and Society. Corvina, Budapest, and MIT Press, Cambridge MA.Google Scholar
Abramitzsky, R., 2008. The limits of equality: Insights into the Israeli kibbutz. Quarterly Journal of Economics 123:1111–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Barkai, H., 1987. Kibbutz efficiency and the incentive conundrum. In Hedlund, S. (Ed.), Incentives and Economic Systems. New York University Press, New York, pp. 228–63.Google Scholar
Acemoglu, D., and Robinson, J. A, 2005. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge University Press, New York.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Borooah, V. K., and Paldam, M., 2007. Why is the world short of democracy?: A cross-country analysis of barriers to representative government. European Journal of Political Economy 23:582–604.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hall, R. E., and Jones, C. I., 1999. Why do some countries produce so much more output per worker than others?Quarterly Journal of Economics 114:83–116.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Knack, S., and Keefer, P., 1995. Institutions and economic performance: Cross-country tests using alternative institutional measures. Economics and Politics 7:207–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R., 1999. The quality of government. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 15:222–79.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
North, D. C., 1981. Structure and Change in Economic History. W. W. Norton and Company, New York.Google Scholar
Downs, A., 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. Harper and Row, New York.Google Scholar
Barro, R. J., 1973. The control of politicians: An economic model. Public Choice 14:19–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ferejohn, J., 1986. Incumbent performance and electoral control. Public Choice 50:5–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Zupan, M., 1990. The last period problem in politics: Do congressional representatives not subject to a reelection constraint alter their voting behavior?Public Choice 65:167–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Besely, T., 2006. Principled Agents?: The Political Economy of Good Government. Oxford University Press, Oxford.Google Scholar
Djankov, S., McLiesh, C., Nenova, T., and Shleifer, A., 2003. Who owns the media?The Journal of Law and Economics 46:341–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gentzkow, M., and Shapiro, J. M., 2008. Competition and truth in the market for news. Journal of Economic Perspectives 22:133–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Leeson, P. T., 2008. Media freedom, political knowledge, and participation. Journal of Economic Perspectives 22:155–69.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dick, A. R., and Lott, J. R., 1993. Reconciling voters' behavior with legislative term limits. Journal of Public Economics 50:1–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hillman, A. L., 1982. Declining industries and political-support protectionist motives. American Economic Review 72:1180–7. Reprinted in Congleton, R. D., Hillman, A. L., and Konrad, K. A. (Eds.), 2008. Forty Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2: Applications: Rent Seeking in Practice. Springer, Berlin, pp. 105–12.Google Scholar
Peltzman, S., 1976. Toward a more general theory of regulation. Journal of Law and Economics 19:171–240.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Buchanan, J. M., 1980. Rent seeking and profit seeking. In Buchanan, J. M., Tollison, R. D., and Tullock, G. (Eds.), Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society. Texas A&M University Press, College Station, pp. 3–15.Google Scholar
Congleton, R. D., 1980. Competitive process, competitive waste, and institutions. In Buchanan, J. M., Tollison, R. D., and Tullock, G.s (Eds.), Toward a Theory of the Rent Seeking Society. Texas A&M University Press, College Station, pp. 153–79.Google Scholar
Hillman, A. L., and Ursprung, H. W., 2000. Political culture and economic decline. European Journal of Political Economy 16:189–212.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Krueger, A. O., 1974. The political economy of the rent-seeking society. American Economic Review 64:291–303.Google Scholar
Tullock, G., 1967. The welfare costs of monopoly, tariffs, and theft. Western Economic Journal 5:224–32.Google Scholar
Congleton, R. D., Hillman, A. L., and Konrad, K. A. (Eds.), 2008. Forty Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1: The Theory of Rent-Seeking. Springer, Berlin.
Congleton, R. D., Hillman, A. L., and Konrad, K. A. (Eds.), 2008. Forty Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2: Applications: Rent Seeking in Practice. Springer, Berlin.CrossRef
Park, H., Philippopoulos, A., and Vassilatos, V., 2005. Choosing the size of the public sector under rent seeking from state coffers. European Journal of Political Economy 21:830–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tullock, G., 1988. The Economics of Special Privilege and Rent Seeking. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston.Google Scholar
Willis, H. P., 1912. Political obstacles to anti-trust legislation. Journal of Political Economy 20:588–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Congleton, R. D., 1986. Rent-seeking aspects of political advertising. Public Choice 49:249–65. Reprinted in Congleton et al., 2008.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baye, M. R., Kovenock, D., and Vries, C. G., 2005. Comparative analysis of litigation systems: An auction-theoretic approach. Economic Journal 115:583–601.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Farmer, A., and Pecorino, P., 1999. Legal expenditure as a rent-seeking game. Public Choice 100:271–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Parisi, F., 2002. Rent seeking through litigation: Adversarial and inquisitorial systems compared. International Review of Law and Economics 22:193–216.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tullock, G., 1975. On the efficient organization of trials. Kyklos 28:745–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Appelbaum, E., and Katz, E., 1987. Seeking rents by setting rents: The political economy of rent seeking. Economic Journal 97:685–99. Reprinted in Congleton et al., 2008.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McChesney, F. S., 1997. Money for Nothing: Politicians, Rent Extraction, and Political Extortion. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA.Google Scholar
Baik, K. H., and Kim, I. G., 1997. Delegation in contests. European Journal of Political Economy 13:281–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hillman, A. L., and Katz, E., 1987. Hierarchical structure and the social costs of bribes and transfers. Journal of Public Economics 34:129–42. Reprinted in Congleton et al., 2008.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baysinger, B., Ekelund, R. B., and Tollison, R. D., 1980. Mercantilism as a rent-seeking society. In Buchanan, J. M., Tollison, R. D., and Tullock, G. (Eds.), Toward a Theory of the Rent Seeking Society. Texas A&M Press, College Station, pp. 235–68. Reprinted in Congleton et al., 2008.Google Scholar
Niskanen, W., 1971. Bureaucracy and Representative Government. Aldine, Chicago.Google Scholar
Tirole, J., 1994. The internal organization of government. Oxford Economic Papers 46:1–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Weber, M., 1947. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. W. Hodge, Edinburgh.Google Scholar
Ferejohn, J. A., and Shipan, C., 1990. Congressional influence on bureaucracy. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 6:1–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rowley, C. K., and Elgin, R., 1988. Government and its bureaucracy: A bilateral bargaining versus principal–agent approach. In Rowley, C. K., Tollison, R. D., and Tullock, G. (Eds.), The Political Economy of Rent Seeking. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, pp. 267–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Heckman, J., Heinrich, C., and Smith, J., 1997. Assessing the performance of performance standards in public bureaucracies. American Economic Review 87:389–95.Google Scholar
Engels, F., 1884/1972. The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State. Pathfinder Press, New York.Google Scholar
Lange, O., 1938. On the Economic Meaning of Socialism. Lippincott, B. E. (Ed.), University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.Google Scholar
Marx, K., 1887/1994. Capital: A Critical Analysis of Capitalist Production. Engels, F. (Ed.), Progress Publishers, Moscow.Google Scholar
Caldwell, B., 1998. Hayek and socialism. Journal of Economic Literature 35:1856–90.Google Scholar
Hayek, F. A., 1944/1972. The Road to Serfdom. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.Google Scholar
Hayek, F. A., 1988. The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism. Bartley, W. W. III (Ed.), Routledge, London.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pejovich, S., 1987. Freedom, property rights, and innovation in socialism. Kyklos 40:461–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mises, L., 1951. Socialism. Yale University Press, New Haven CT.Google Scholar
Anderson, G. M., and Boettke, P. J., 1997. Soviet venality: A rent-seeking model of the communist state. Public Choice 93:37–53.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hillman, A. L., and Schnytzer, A., 1986. Illegal activities and purges in a Soviet-type economy: A rent-seeking perspective. International Review of Law and Economics 6:87–99. Reprinted in Congleton et al., 2008.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Levy, D., 2007. Price adjustment under the table: Evidence on efficiency-enhancing corruption. European Journal of Political Economy 23:423–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hillman, A. L., and Katz, E., 1984. Risk-averse rent-seekers and the social cost of monopoly power. Economic Journal 94:104–10.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hillman, A. L., and Riley, J., 1989. Politically contestable rents and transfers. Economics and Politics 1:17–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hillman, A. L., and Samet, D., 1987. Dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders. Public Choice 54:63–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tullock, G., 1980. Efficient rent-seeking. In Buchanan, J. M., Tollison, R. D., and Tullock, G. (Eds.), Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society. Texas A&M University Press, College Station, pp. 97–112.Google Scholar
Aidt, T. S., and Hillman, A. L., 2008. Enduring rents. European Journal of Political Economy 24:454–3.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Demsetz, H., 1968. Why regulate utilities?Journal of Law and Economics 11:55–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stigler, G. J., 1971. The theory of economic regulation. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2:3–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bonin, J. P., and Putterman, L., 1987. Economics of Cooperation and the Labor-Managed Economy. Harwood, Chur, Switzerland.Google Scholar
Cheung, S., 1983. The contractual nature of the firm. Journal of Law and Economics 26:1–21.Google Scholar
Bogetiç, Ž., 1982. Is there a case for employee ownership? In Hillman, A. L. and Milanovic, B. (Eds.), The Transition from Socialism in Eastern Europe: Domestic Restructuring and Foreign Trade. The World Bank, Washington DC, pp. 83–104.Google Scholar
Hinds, M., 1992. Policy effectiveness in reforming socialist economies. In Hillman, A. L. and Milanovic, B. (Eds.), The Transition from Socialism in Eastern Europe: Domestic Restructuring and Foreign Trade. The World Bank, Washington DC, pp. 13–39.Google Scholar
Kornai, J., 1983. Contradictions and Dilemmas: Studies on the Socialist Economy and Society. Corvina, Budapest, and MIT Press, Cambridge MA.Google Scholar
Abramitzsky, R., 2008. The limits of equality: Insights into the Israeli kibbutz. Quarterly Journal of Economics 123:1111–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Barkai, H., 1987. Kibbutz efficiency and the incentive conundrum. In Hedlund, S. (Ed.), Incentives and Economic Systems. New York University Press, New York, pp. 228–63.Google Scholar

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