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8 - Ideological reasoning

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2010

Paul M. Sniderman
Affiliation:
Stanford University, California
Richard A. Brody
Affiliation:
Stanford University, California
Phillip E. Tetlock
Affiliation:
University of California, Berkeley
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Summary

A syllogism dominated research on ideological reasoning as our own research got under way. Its major premise – ideological reasoning centered on abstract categorization and deductive inference; its minor premise – mass publics were neither able nor motivated to handle abstraction or deduction, at any rate so far as politics was concerned. And from these two premises, the familiar conclusion – that ordinary Americans were innocent of ideology – followed naturally, it seemed inevitably.

This chapter reports a different view of ideological reasoning. It is a view that is deliberately less cognitive, less cerebral. Political thought is not just thought: It excites and expresses people's gut feelings, their anxieties and their aspirations, their likes and their dislikes. And when attention is paid to the affective as well as the cognitive character of political thinking, we want to suggest, it will become clear that more of the mass public can respond to ideological reasoning than is customarily supposed.

A widely accepted conclusion of research on political behavior – indeed, perhaps the most widely accepted conclusion – is that most Americans are “innocent of ideology” (Kinder and Sears, 1985). The average citizen pays little attention to politics, so not surprisingly knows little about it; takes inconsistent positions on issues or fails to take one altogether; and has an understanding of abstract political ideas that is egregiously superficial and impoverished (e.g., Wolfinger, Shapiro, and Greenstein, 1980; Erikson, Luttbeg, and Tedin 1988) Consequently, political ideologies like liberalism and conservatism exceed the reach of all but a small minority – perhaps no more than a tenth – of the American public (e.g., Campbell et al., 1960; Converse, 1964, 1975).

Type
Chapter
Information
Reasoning and Choice
Explorations in Political Psychology
, pp. 140 - 163
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1991

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