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4 - The principle–policy puzzle: the paradox of American racial attitudes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2010

Paul M. Sniderman
Affiliation:
Stanford University, California
Richard A. Brody
Affiliation:
Stanford University, California
Phillip E. Tetlock
Affiliation:
University of California, Berkeley
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Summary

Hypocrisy is a strategic form of inconsistency. The appearance of saying two things, one at odds with the other, dissolves once it is realized that one is not meant – indeed, is said in order to cover up the other.

It is widely believed that white Americans commonly succumb to just this form of inconsistency on the issue of race. The most compelling empirical evidence for this belief comes from studies of the “principle–policy puzzle.” As Jackman (1978) first noted and as others have since confirmed (e.g., Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo, 1985), Americans show far higher support for the principle of racial equality than for policies to realize it – a disparity easily read as evidence that their support for the principle is insincere or superficial. It is, obviously, of some importance to determine whether the gap between principle and policy is evidence of insincerity. If it is, much of the appearance of a decline in racism is no more than appearance, a sham.

The chapter that follows presents a solution for the principle–policy puzzle. The puzzle arises not because education fails to engender genuine respect for mainstream values – as Jackman maintains – but for just the opposite reason: More deeply respecting and understanding these values, well-educated citizens are more likely to appreciate when they come into conflict with one another.

Americans seemingly have a weak grip on democratic values. The root difficulty is not that people reject such values – on the contrary, nearly all accept them, stated in the abstract – but that they are not ready to stand by basic principles in specific controversies.

Type
Chapter
Information
Reasoning and Choice
Explorations in Political Psychology
, pp. 58 - 69
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1991

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