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Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 July 2018

Nicola Acocella
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Sapienza Università di Roma
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References

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  • References
  • Nicola Acocella, Sapienza Università di Roma
  • Book: Rediscovering Economic Policy as a Discipline
  • Online publication: 16 July 2018
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  • References
  • Nicola Acocella, Sapienza Università di Roma
  • Book: Rediscovering Economic Policy as a Discipline
  • Online publication: 16 July 2018
Available formats
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Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • References
  • Nicola Acocella, Sapienza Università di Roma
  • Book: Rediscovering Economic Policy as a Discipline
  • Online publication: 16 July 2018
Available formats
×