Aizawa K. 2007: “The Biochemistry of Memory Consolidation: A Model System for the Philosophy of Mind.” Synthese, 155, pp. 65–98.
Aizawa K., and Gillett C. 2009a: “Levels, Individual Variation and Massive Multiple Realization in Neurobiology.” In Bickle (2009), pp. 539–81.
Aizawa K., & Gillett C. 2009b: “The (Multiple) Realization of Psychological and Other Properties in the Sciences.” Mind & Language, 24(2), pp. 181–208.
Aizawa K., & Gillett C. 2011: “The Autonomy of Psychology in the Age of Neuroscience.” In McKay Illari P., Russo F., and Williamson J. (eds.), Causality in the Sciences. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Aizawa K., & Gillett C. (eds.) 2016: Scientific Composition and Metaphysical Ground. London: Palgrave MacMillan.
Aizawa K., & Gillett C. Forthcoming: The Parts of Sciences: Scientific Composition and Compositional Explanation. London: Routledge.
Aizawa K., & Gillett C. Unpublished: “Multiple Realization and Methodology in Neuroscience and Psychology.”
Alexander S. 1920: Space, Time and Deity. 2 vols. The Gifford Lectures 1916–18. Toronto: Macmillan.
Anderson P. 1972: “More is Different: Broken Symmetry and the Nature of the Hierarchical Structure of Science.” Science, 177, pp. 393–6.
Anderson P. 1990: “Solid-State Experimentalists: Theory Should Be on Tap, Not on Top.” Physics Today, 43(9), pp. 9–11.
Anderson P. 1995: “Historical Overview of the Twentieth Century in Physics.” In Brown, Pais, and Pippard (1995), vol. 3, pp. 2017–33.
Andersen P., Christiansen P., Emmeche C., and Finnemann N. (eds.) 2000: Downward Causation: Minds, Bodies and Matter. Aarhus: Aarhus University Press.
Armstrong D.M. 1997: A World of States of Affairs. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Atkins P. 1995: “The Limitless Power of Science.” In Cornwell (ed.) (1995), pp. 122–31.
Atmanspacher H., and Bishop R. 2006: “Contextual Emergence in the Description of Properties.” Foundations of Physics, 36, pp. 1753–77.
Auyang S. 1998: Foundations of Complex-Systems Theories in Economics, Evolutionary Biology, and Statistical Physics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ayala F., and Arp R. (eds.) 2009: Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Biology. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
Ayala F., and Dobzhansky T. (eds.) 1974: Studies in the Philosophy of Biology: Reduction and Related Problems. New York: Macmillan.
Bechtel W., and Mundale J. 1999: “Multiple Realizability Revisited.” Philosophy of Science, v.66, pp. 175–207.
Bechtel W., and Richardson R. 1993: Discovering Complexity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Beckermann A., Flohr H., and Kim J. (eds.) 1992: Emergence or Reduction? New York: de Gruyter.
Bedau M. 1997: “Weak Emergence.” Philosophical Perspectives, 11, pp. 375–99.
Bedau M. 2002: “Downward Causation and the Autonomy of Weak Emergence.” Principia, 6, pp. 5–50.
Bedau M. 2008: “Is Weak Emergence Just in the Mind?” Minds and Machines, 18, pp. 443–59.
Bennett K. 2003: “Why the Exclusion Problem Seems Intractable, and How, Just Maybe, to Tract it.” Noûs, 37(3), pp. 471–97.
Bennett K. 2011: “Construction Area: No Hard Hat Required.” Philosophical Studies, 154, pp. 79–104.
Bertalanffy V. 1950: “An Outline of General System Theory.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1, pp. 134–65.
Bickle J. 1998: Psychoneural Reduction: The New Wave. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Bickle J. 2003: Philosophy and Neuroscience: A Ruthlessly Reductive Account. Boston: Kluwer.
Bickle J. 2006: “Reducing Mind to Molecular Pathways.” Synthese, v.151, pp. 411–34
Bickle J. 2008: “Real Reduction in Real Neuroscience: Metascience, Not Philosophy of Science (and Certainly Not Metaphysics!).” In Hohwy and Kallestrup (2008), pp. 34–51.
Bickle J. (ed.) 2009: The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bishop R. 2005: “Patching Physics and Chemistry Together.” Philosophy of Science, 72, pp. 710–22.
Bishop R. 2006a: “The Hidden Premise in the Causal Argument for Physicalism.” Analysis, 66, pp. 44–52.
Bishop R. 2006b: “Downward Causation in Fluid Convection.” Synthese, 160, pp. 229–48.
Blitz D. 1992: Emergent Evolution. New York: Kluwer.
Boogerd F., Bruggeman F., Hofmeyr S., and Westerhoff H. 2007: Systems Biology: Philosophical Foundations. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Boogerd F., Bruggeman F., Richardson R., Stephan A., and Westerhoff H. 2005: “Emergence and its Place in Nature: A Case Study of Biochemical Networks.” Synthese, 145, pp. 131–64.
Borchert D. (ed.) 2006: Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2nd edition. New York: Gale Research.
Bowler P. 2001: Reconciling Science and Religion: The Debate in Early Twentieth-Century Britain. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Broad C. D. 1925: The Mind and its Place in Nature. London: Routledge Kegan Paul.
Brown J. 1991: Laboratory of the Mind: Thought Experiments in the Natural Sciences. London: Routledge.
Brown J. 2004: “Why Thought Experiments Transcend Experience.” In Hitchcock (2004), pp. 23–43.
Brown L., Pais A., and Pippard B. (eds.) 1995: Twentieth Century Physics. Second Edition. New York: CRC Press.
Brown W., Murphy N., and Malony H. 1998: Whatever Happened to the Soul? Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress Press.
Camazine S., Deneubourg J., Franks N., Sneyd J., Theraulaz G., and Bonabeau E. 2001: Self-Organization in Biological Systems. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Campbell D. 1974: “‘Downward Causation’ in Hierarchically Organized Biological Systems.” In Ayala and Dobzhansky (1974), pp. 179–86.
Cartwright N. 1983: How the Laws of Physics Lie. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Cartwright N. 1994: “Fundamentalism vs. the Patchwork of Laws.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 103, pp. 279–92.
Cartwright N. 1999: The Dappled World. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Cat J. 1998: “The Physicists’ Debates on Unification in Physics at the End of the 20th Century.” Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences, 28, pp. 253–99.
Chalmers D. 1997: The Conscious Mind. New York: Oxford University Press.
Chalmers D. 2006: “Strong and Weak Emergence.” In Clayton and Davies (2004, pp. 244–54.
Churchland P.M. 1985: “Reduction, Qualia and the Direct Introspeciton of Brain States.” Journal of Philosophy, v.82, pp. 8–28.
Churchland P.S. 1986: Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Clapp L. 2001: “Disjunctive Properties: Multiple Realizations.” Journal of Philosophy, 98, pp. 111–36.
Clayton P. 1997: God and Contemporary Science. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.
Clayton P. 2004: Mind and Emergence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Clayton P. (ed.) 2006: Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Clayton P., and Davies P. (eds.) 2004: The Re-Emergence of Emergence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Corning P. 2002: “The Re-Emergence of ‘Emergence’: A Venerable Concept in Search of a Theory.” Complexity, 7, pp. 18–30.
Cornwell J. (ed.) 1995: Nature’s Imagination. New York Oxford University Press.
Corradini A., and O’Connor T. (eds.) 2011: Emergence in Science and Philosophy. New York: Routledge.
Couzin I., and Krause J. 2003: “Self-Organization and Collective Behavior in Vertebrates.” Advances in the Studies of Behavior, 33, pp. 1–75.
Crane T. 2001: The Elements of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Craver C. 2007: Explaining the Brain. New York: Oxford University Press.
Craver C., and Bechtel B. 2007: “Top-Down Causation without Top-Down Causes.” Biology and Philosophy, 22, pp. 547–63.
Craver C., and Darden L. 2001: “Discovering Mechanisms in Neurobiology: The Case of Spatial Memory.” In P. Machamer et al. (eds.), Theory and Method in Neuroscience. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Crick F. 1966: Of Mice and Molecules. Seattle, WA: University of Washington.
Crick F. 1994: The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul. New York: Scribner.
Crook S., and Gillett C. 2001: “Why Physics Alone Cannot Define the ‘Physical’.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 31, pp. 333–60.
Crutchfield J., Farmer J., Packard N., and Shaw R. 1986: “Chaos.” Scientific American, 255, pp. 46–57.
Cummins R. 1975: “Functional Analysis.” Journal of Philosophy, 72, pp. 741–65.
Cummins R. 1983: The Nature of Psychological Explanation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Darden L., and Maull N. 1977: “Interfield Theories.” Philosophy of Science, 44, pp. 43–64.
Dawkins R. 1982: The Extended Phenotype. San Francisco, CA: W. H. Freeman.
Dawkins R. 1985: “Editorial.” In Dawkins and Ridley (1985).
Dawkins R. 1987: The Blind Watchmaker. New York: Norton.
Dawkins R., and Ridley M. 1985: Oxford Surveys in Evolutionary Biology, vol. 2. New York: Oxford University Press.
Delehanty M. 2005: “Emergent Properties and the Context Objection to Reduction.” Biology and Philosophy, 20, pp. 715–34.
Dennett D. 1969: Content and Consciousness. London: Routledge Kegan Paul.
Dennett D. 1978: Brainstorms. Montgomery, VT: Bradford Books.
Dennett D. 1991: “Real Patterns.” Journal of Philosophy, 88, pp. 27–51.
Dennett D. 1996: Darwin’s Dangerous Idea. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Dupré J. 1993: The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science. Boston, MA: Harvard University Press.
Dupré J. 2001: Human Nature and the Limits of Science. New York: Oxford University Press.
Dupré J. 2008: The Constituents of Life. Assen: Van Gorcum.
Dupré J. 2009: “It Is Not Possible to Reduce Biological Explanations to Explanations in Chemistry and/or Physics.” In Varela and Arp (2009), pp. 32–47.
Dyke C. 1988: The Evolutionary Dynamics of Complex Systems: A Study in Biological Complexity. New York: Oxford University Press.
Elkana Y. 1974: The Discovery of the Conservation of Energy. London: Hutchinson.
Ellis B. 2002: The Philosophy of Nature. Montreal: McGill University Press.
Endicott R. 2006: “Multiple Realizability.” In Borchert (2006).
Esfeld M., and Sachse C. 2011: Conservative Reductionism. New York: Routledge.
Fodor J. 1968: Psychological Explanation. New York: Random House.
Fodor J. 1974: “Special Sciences: Or, the Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis.” Synthese, 28, pp. 97–115.
Fodor J. 1975: The Language of Thought. New York: Crowell.
Fodor J. 1997: “Special Sciences: Still Autonomous after All These Years.” Philosophical Perspectives, 11.
Fodor J. 1998: “Look! Review of E.O.Wilson’s Consilience.” London Review of Books, v.20, No.21, 29 October, pp. 3–6.
Foster J. 1991: The Immaterial Self: A Defence of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of the Mind. London: Routledge.
Freeman W. 1995: Societies of Brains. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Freeman W. 1999: “Consciousness, Intentionality and Causality.” In Nunez and Freeman (1999), pp. 143–72.
Freeman W. 2000a: How Brains Make Up Their Minds. New York: Columbia University Press.
Freeman W. 2000b: Neurodynamics: An Exploration of Mescopic Brain Dynamics. London: Springer-Verlag.
Garfinkel A. 1987: “The Slime Mold Dictyostelium as a Model of Self-Organization in Social Systems.” In Yates (1987), pp. 181–212.
Gilbert S., and Sarkar S. 2000: “Embracing Complexity: Organicism for the 21st Century.” Developmental Dynamics, 219, pp. 1–9.
Gillett C. 2002a: “The Varieties of Emergence: Their Purposes, Obligations and Importance.” Grazer Philosophische Studien, 65, pp. 89–115.
Gillett C. 2002b: “The Dimensions of Realization: A Critique of the Standard View.” Analysis, 62, pp. 316–23.
Gillett C. 2003a: “Non-Reductive Realization and Non-Reductive Identity: What Physicalism Does Not Entail.” In S. Walter and H.-D. Heckmann (eds.) Physicalism and Mental Causation. Bowling Green, OH: Imprint Academic, pp. 31–58.
Gillett C. 2003b: “Strong Emergence as a Defense of Non-Reductive Physicalism.” Special issue on emergence. Principia, 6, pp. 83–114.
Gillett C. 2003c: “The Metaphysics of Realization, Multiple Realizability and the Special Sciences.” Journal of Philosophy, 100, pp. 591–603.
Gillett C. 2006a: “Samuel Alexander’s Emergentism: Or, Higher Causation for Physicalists.” Synthese, 153, pp. 261–96.
Gillett C. 2006b: “The Hidden Battles over Emergence.” In Clayton (1996).
Gillett C. 2006c: “Special Sciences.” In Borchert (2006).
Gillett C. 2006d: “The Metaphysics of Mechanisms and the Challenge of the New Reductionism.” In Schouten and de Joong (2006).
Gillett C. 2007a: “Understanding the New Reductionism: The Metaphysics of Science and Compositional Reduction.” The Journal of Philosophy, 104, pp. 193–216.
Gillett C. 2007b: “A Mechanist Manifesto for the Philosophy of Mind: A Third Way for Functionalists.” Journal of Philosophical Research, 32, pp. 21–42.
Gillett C. 2007c: “Hyper-Extending the Mind? Setting Boundaries in the Special Sciences.” Philosophical Topics, 351, pp. 161–88.
Gillett C. 2010: “Moving Beyond the Subset Model of Realization.” Synthese, 177, pp. 165–92.
Gillett C. 2011a: “Multiply Realizing Scientific Properties and their Instances: A Response to Polger and Shapiro.” Philosophical Psychology, v.24, pp. 727–38.
Gillett C. 2011b: “On the Implications of Scientific Composition and Completeness: Or, the Troubles, and Troubles, of Non-Reductive Physicalism.” In Corradini and O’Connor (2011).
Gillett C. 2012: “Understanding the Sciences through the Fog of ‘Functionalism(s)’.” In Hunneman (2012), pp. 159–81.
Gillett C. 2013: “Constitution, and Multiple Constitution, in the Sciences: Using the Neuron as a Guide.” Minds and Machines, v.23, pp. 309–37.
Gillett C. 2016: “The Metaphysics of Nature, Science and the Rules of Engagement” in Aizawa and Gillett (2016).
Gillett C. Unpublished: “Making Sense of Levels in the Sciences.”
Gillett C., and Loewer B. (eds.) 2001: Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gillett C., and Rives B. 2001: “Does the Argument from Realization Generalize? Responses to Kim.” Southern Journal of Philosophy, 39, pp. 79–98.
Gillett C., and Rives B. 2005: “The Non-Existence of Determinables: Or, a World of Absolute Determinates as Default Hypothesis.” Nous, 39, pp. 483–504.
Glennan S. 1996: “Mechanisms and the Nature of Causation.” Erkenntnis, 44, pp. 49–71.
Goldbeter A. 1997: Biochemical Oscillations and Cellular Rhythms: The Molecular Basis of Periodic and Chaotic Behavior. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Goldbeter A., Gonze D., Houart G., Leloup J., Halloy J., and Dupont G. 2001: “From Simple to Complex Oscillatory Behavior in Metabolic and Genetic Control Network.” Chaos, 11, pp. 247–60.
Goldstein J. 1999: “Emergence as a Construct: History and Issues.” Emergence, 1, pp. 49–72.
Goodwin B. 2001: How the Leopard Changed its Spots: The Evolution of Complexity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Gregory R., 1994: “DNA in the Mind’s Eye”. Nature, 368, pp. 359–60.
Groff R., and Greco J. 2012: Powers and Capacities in Philosophy: The New Aristotelianism. New York: Routledge.
Hall N. 2004: “Two Concepts of Causation.” In J. Collins, N. Hall and L. Paul (eds.) Causation and Counterfactuals, pp. 225–76. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Haraway D. 1976: Crystals, Fabrics and Fields. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Harold F. 2001: The Way of the Cell. New York: Oxford University Press.
Hasker W. 1999: The Emergent Self. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Healey R. 2013: “Physical Composition.” Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science Part B, 44, pp. 48–62.
Heil J. 1999: “Multiple Realizability.” American Philosophical Quarterly, 36, pp. 189–208.
Heil J. 2003: From an Ontological Point of View. New York: Oxford University Press.
Hempel C. 1965: Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. New York: Free Press.
Hempel C., and Oppenheim P. 1965: “On the Idea of Emergence.” In Hempel (1965), pp. 258–64.
Hendry R. 1998: “Models and Approximations in Quantum Chemistry.” In Shanks N. (ed.), Idealization in Contemporary Physics. Amsterdam: Rodopoi.
Hendry R. 2006: “Is There Downward Causation in Chemistry?” In Baird et al. (eds.) Philosophy of Chemistry, pp. 173–89. Dordrecht: Springer.
Hendry R. 2010: “Emergence vs. Reduction in Chemistry.” In MacDonald and MacDonald (2010a), pp. 205–21.
Hendry R., and Needham P. 2007: “Le Poidevin on the Reduction of Chemistry.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 58, pp. 339–53.
Hitchcock C. (ed.) 2004: Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Science. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Hohwy J., and Kallestrup J. (eds.) 2008: Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation and Causation. New York: Oxford University Press.
Holland J. 1999: Emergence: From Chaos to Order. New York: Basic Books.
Holldobler B., and Wilson E. 1990: The Ants. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Holldobler B., and Wilson E. 2009: The Superorganism: The Beauty, Elegance and Strangeness of Insect Societies. New York: Norton
Hooker C. A. 1981: “Towards a General Theory of Reduction. Part I: Historical and Scientific Settings. Part II: Identity. Part III: Cross Categorial Reduction.” Dialogue, 20, pp. 38–59, 201–36, 496–529.
Horgan J. 1997: The End of Science. New York: Broadway Books.
Horgan T. 1993a: “From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World.” Mind, 102, pp. 555–86.
Horgan T. 1993b: “Nonreductive Materialism and the Explanatory Autonomy of Psychology.” In Wagner, S. and Warner, R. (eds.) Naturalism. South Bend: Notre Dame University Press.
Horst S. 2007: Beyond Reduction: Philosophy of Mind and Post-Reductionist Philosophy of Science. New York: Oxford University Press.
Howard D. 2007: “Reduction and Emergence in the Physical Sciences: Some Lessons from the Particle Physics and Condensed Matter Debate.” In Murphy and Stoeger (2007).
Huemer M. 2009: “When Is Parsimony a Virtue?” Philosophical Quarterly, 59, pp. 216–36.
Hull D. 2002: “Varieities of Reductionism.” In Regenmortel and Hull (2002), pp. 161–72.
Humphreys P. 1997: “How Properties Emerge”. Philosophy of Science, 64, pp. 1–17.
Humphreys P. 2008a: “Synchronic and Diachronic Emergence.” Minds and Machines, 18, pp. 431–42.
Humphreys P. 2008b: “Computational and Conceptual Emergence.” Philosophy of Science, 75, pp. 584–94.
Hunneman P. (ed.) 2012: Functions: Selection and Mechanisms. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Imbert C. 2007: “Why Diachronically Emergent Properties Must Also Be Salient.” In Gershenson, Aerts, and Edmonds (eds.), Worldviews, Science and Us, pp. 99–116. Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific Publishing Company.
Juarrero A. 1999: Dynamics in Action: Intentional Behavior as a Complex System. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Kandel E. 2006: In Search of Memory. New York: Norton.
Kauffman S. 1993: The Origins of Order: Self-Organization and Selection in Evolution. New York: Oxford University Press.
Kauffman S. 1995: At Home in the Universe. New York: Oxford University Press.
Kauffman S., and Clayton P. 2006: “On Emergence, Agency and Organization.” Biology and Philosophy, 21, pp. 501–21.
Kellert S. 1993: In the Wake of Chaos. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Kim J. 1972: “Phenomenal Properties, Psychological Laws, and Identity Theory.” Monist, 56, pp. 177–92.
Kim J. 1992a: “‘Downward Causation’ in Emergentism and Nonreductive Physicalism.” In Beckermann, Flohr, and Kim (1992).
Kim J. 1992b: “Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 52, pp. 1–26.
Kim J. 1993a: Supervenience and Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kim J. 1993b: “The Nonreductionist’s Troubles with Mental Causation.” In Kim (1993a).
Kim J. 1993c: “Dretske on How Reasons Explain Behaviour.” In Kim (1993a).
Kim J. 1993d: “Postscripts on Supervenient Causation.” In Kim (1993a).
Kim J. 1993e: “Mechanism, Purpose and Explanatory Exclusion.” In Kim (1993a).
Kim J. 1997: “The Mind–Body Problem: Taking Stock after Forty Years.” Philosophical Perspectives, 11.
Kim J. 1998: Mind in a Physical World. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Kim J. 1999: “Making Sense of Emergence.” Philosophical Studies, 95, pp. 3–44.
Kim J. 2003: “Blocking Causal Drainage and Other Maintenance Chores with Mental Causation.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 67, pp. 151–76.
Kim J. 2006: “Being Realistic about Emergence.” In Clayton and Davies (2004), pp. 189–202
Kistler M. 2010: “Mechanisms and Downward Causation.” Philosophical Psychology, 22, pp. 595–609.
Kitcher P. 1984: “1953 and All That: A Tale of Two Sciences.” Philosophical Review, 93, pp. 335–73. Reprinted in his (2003). All references are to the reprint.
Kitcher P. 2003: In Mendel’s Mirror. New York: Oxford University Press.
Kuhn T. 1970: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Ladyman J., and Ross D. 2007: Everything Must Go. New York: Oxford University Press.
Laughlin R. 2005: A Different Universe: Reinventing Physics from the Bottom Down. New York: Basic Books.
Laughlin R., and Pines D. 2000: “The Theory of Everything.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, 97, pp. 28–31.
Laughlin R., Pines D., Schmalien J., Stojkovic B., and Wolynes P. 2000: “The Middle Way,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, 97, pp. 32–7.
Levins R., and Lewontin R. 1987: The Dalectical Biologist. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Lewin R. 1992: Complexity: Life at the Edge of Chaos. New York: Macmillan.
Lewis David 1972: “Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, v.50, pp. 249–58.
Lewis David 1983: “New Work for a Theory of Universals.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, v.61, pp. 343–77.
Loewer B. 1995: “An Argument for Strong Supervenience.” In Savellos and Yalcin (1995).
Loewer B. 2001: “From Physics to Physicalism.” In Gillett and Loewer (eds.) (2001).
Loewer B. 2008: “Why There Is Anything Except Physics.” In Hohwy and Kallestrup (2008).
Lowe J. 1996: The Subjects of Experience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lowe J. 2008: Personal Agency: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action. New York: Oxford University Press.
Lowe J. 2009: “Dualism.” In McLaughlin, Beckermann, and Walter (2009), pp. 66–84.
Machamer P., Darden L., and Craver C. 2000: “Thinking about Mechanisms.” Philosophy of Science, 67, pp. 1–25.
Maturana H., and Varela F. 1973: “Autopoiesis and Cognition.” In Cohen R. S. and Wartofsky M. W. (eds.), Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 10, p. 42.
Mayr E. 1988a: “The Limits of Reductionism.” Nature, 33.
Mayr E. 1988b: Toward a New Philosophy of Biology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Mayr E. 2002: What Makes Biology Unique? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
MacDonald C., and MacDonald G. (eds.) 2010a: Emergence in Mind. New York: Oxford University Press.
MacDonald C., and MacDonald G. 2010b: “Emergence and Downward Causation.” In MacDonald and MacDonald (2010a), pp. 139–68.
McGinn C. 1993: The Problem of Consciousness: Essays Towards a Resolution. Oxford: Blackwell.
McLaughlin B. 1992: “The Rise and Fall of British Emergentism.” In Beckermann, Flohr, and Kim (1992).
McLaughlin B. 1995: “The Varieties of Supervenience.” In Savellos and Yalcin (1995).
McLaughlin B., Beckermann A., and Walter S. 2009: The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. New York: Oxford University Press.
Mellor H. 2008: “Micro-Composition”. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements, v.83, pp.81-106.
Melnyk A. 1995: “Two Cheers for Reductionism; Or, The Dim Prospects for Nonreductive Materialism.” Philosophy of Science, 62, pp. 370–88.
Melnyk A. 1997: “How to Keep the ‘Physical’ in Physicalism.” Journal of Philosophy, 94, pp. 622–37.
Melnyk A. 2003: A Physicalist Manifesto. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Merricks T. 2001: Objects and Persons. New York: Oxford University Press.
Midgley M. 1995: “Reductive Megalomania.” In Cornwell (1995), pp. 133–47.
Mitchell S. 2003: Biological Complexity and Integrative Pluralism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mitchell S. 2009: Unsimple Truths: Science, Complexity and Policy. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Mitchell S. 2012: “Emergence: Logical, Functional and Dynamical.” Synthese, v.185, pp. 171–86.
Morowitz H. 2002: The Emergence of Everything: How the World Became Complex. New York: Oxford University Press.
Mulligan K., Simons P., and Smith B. 2006: “What’s Wrong with Contemporary Philosophy?” Topoi, 25, pp. 63–7.
Murphy N., and Brown W. 2007: Did My Neurons Make Me Do It? New York: Oxford University Press.
Murphy N., and Stoeger W. 2007: Evolution and Emergence: Systems, Organisms, Persons. New York: Oxford University Press.
Nagel E. 1952: “Wholes, Sums and Organic Unities.” Philosophical Studies, 2, pp. 16–32.
Nagel E. 1961: The Structure of Science. New York: Harcourt Brace.
Newman D. 1996: “Emergence and Strange Attractors.” Philosophy of Science, 63, pp. 245–61.
Newton-Smith W. 1981: The Rationality of Science. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Nicolis G., and Prigogine I. 1989: Exploring Complexity. New York: Freeman.
Norton J., 2004: “Why Thought Experiments Do Not Transcend Empiricism.” In Hitchcock (2004), pp. 44–66.
Nunez R., and Freeman W. (eds.) 1999: Reclaiming Cognition: The Primacy of Action, Intention and Emotion. Bowling Green, OH: Imprint Academic.
O’Connor T. 1994: “Emergent Properties.” American Philosophical Quarterly, 31, pp. 91–104.
O’Connor T., and Churchill J. 2010: “Is Non-Reductive Physicalism Viable within a Causal Powers Metaphysics?” In MacDonald and MacDonald (2010a), pp. 43–60.
O’Connor T., and Jacobs J. 2003: “Emergent Individuals.” Philosophical Quarterly, 53, pp. 540–55.
O’Connor T., and Wong H. 2003: “The Metaphysics of Emergence.” Noûs, 39, pp. 659–79.
O’Malley M., and Dupré J. 2005: “Fundamental Issues in Systems Biology.” BioEssays, 27, pp. 1270–6.
Papineau D. 1993: Philosophical Naturalism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Papineau D. 1995: “Arguments for Supervenience and Physical Realization.” In Savellos and Yalcin (1995).
Papineau D. 2001: “The Rise of Physicalism.” In Gillett and Loewer (2001).
Papineau D. 2002: Thinking about Consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press.
Pattee H. 1970: “The Problem of Biological Hierarchy.” In Waddington (1970), vol. 3, pp. 117–36.
Pattee H. 1973a: “The Physical Basis and Origin of Hierarchical Control.” In Pattee (1973b).
Pattee H. (ed.) 1973b: Hierarchy Theory. New York: George Braziller.
Peacocke A. 1990: Theology for a Scientific Age. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Peacocke A. 1995: “God’s Interaction with the World.” In Russell et al. (1995).
Peacocke A. 1999: “The Sound of Sheer Silence: How Does God Communicate with Humanity?” In Russell et al. (1999).
Pereboom D. 2011: Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism. New York: Oxford University Press
Pfeifer J., and Sarkar S. 2006: Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia. New York: Routledge.
Piccinini G. 2004: “Functionalism, Computationalism, and Mental States.” Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 35, pp. 811–33.
Poland J. 1994: Physicalism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Polanyi M. 1968: “Life’s Irreducible Structure.” Science, 160, pp. 1308–12.
Polger T. 2007: “Realization and the Metaphysics of Mind.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 85, pp. 233–59.
Prigogine I. 1968: Introduction to Thermodynamics of Irreversible Processes. New York: Wiley.
Prigogine I. 1997: End of Certainty. New York: The Free Press.
Prigogine I., and Stengers I. 1984: Order out of Chaos: Man’s New Dialogue with Nature. New York: Bantam Books.
Primas H. 1983: Chemistry, Quantum Mechanics, and Reductionism. Berlin: Springer- Verlag.
Putnam H. 1967: “Psychological Predicates.” In Capitan W. and Merrill D. (eds.), Art, Mind and Religion. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press. Reprinted as “The Nature of Mental States” in Putnam (1975b). (All references are to the reprint.)
Putnam H. 1975a: “Philosophy and Our Mental Life.” In Putnam (1975b).
Putnam H. 1975b: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Regenmortel M., and Hull D. 2002: Promises and Limits of Reductionism in the Biomedical Sciences. Chichester: John Wiley and Sons.
Richardson R., and Stephan A. 2007: “Mechanisms and Mechanical Explanation in Systems Biology.” In Boogerd et al. (2007), pp. 123–44.
Rosenberg A. 2006: Darwinian Reductionism: Or, How to Stop Worrying and Love Molecular Biology. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.
Ross D., and Spurrett D. 2004: “What to Say to a Skeptical Metaphysician? A Defense Manual for Cognitive and Behavioral Scientists.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 27, pp. 603–27.
Rueger A. 2000: “Robust Supervenience and Emergence.” Philosophy of Science, 67, pp. 466–91.
Russell B. 1911: “Le Réalisme Analytique.” Bulletin de la Société Française de Philosophie, 11, pp. 53–61.
Russell J., Murphy N., Meyering T., and Arbib A. (eds.) 1999: Neuroscience and the Person: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action. Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory Publications.
Russell J., Murphy N., and Peacocke A. (ed.) 1995: Chaos and Complexity: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action. Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory Publications.
Salthe S. 1985: Evolving Hierarchical Systems: Their Representation and Structure. New York: Columbia University Press.
Sarkar S. 2005: Molecular Models of Life. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Savellos E., and Yalcin U. (eds.) 1995: Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Scerri E. 1994: “Has Chemistry Been at Least Approximately Reduced to Quantum Mechanics?” In Hull D., Forbes M., and Burian R. M. (eds.), PSA vol. 1, pp. 160–70.
Scerri E. 1997: “Has the Periodic Table Been Successfully Axiomitized?” Erkentnis, 47, pp. 229–43.
Scerri E. 1998a: “Popper’s Naturalized Approach to the Reduction of Chemistry.” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 12, pp. 33–44.
Scerri E. 1998b: “How Good is the Quantum Mechanical Explanation of the Periodic Table?” Journal of Chemical Education, 75, pp. 1384–5.
Scerri E. 2007: “Reduction and Emergence in Chemistry: Two Recent Approaches.” Philosophy of Science, 74, pp. 920–31.
Schaffer J. 2007: “From Nihilism to Monism.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 85, pp. 175–91.
Schaffer J. 2010: “Monism: The Priority of the Whole.” Philosophical Review, 119, pp. 31–76.
Schaffner K. 1967: “Approaches to Reduction”. Philosophy of Science, v.34, pp. 137–47.
Schaffner K. 1993: Discovery and Explanation in Biology and Medicine. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Schaffner K. 2002: “Reductionism, Complexity and Molecular Medicine: Genetic Chips and the ‘Globalization’ of the Genome.” In Regenmortel and Hull (2002), pp. 323–51.
Schaffner K. 2006: “Reduction: The Cheshire Cat Problem and a Return to Roots.” Synthese, 151, pp. 377–402.
Schouten M., and de Joong H. 2006: The Matter of Mind: Philosophical Essays on Psychology, Neuroscience and Reduction. Oxford: Blackwell.
Scott A. 2007: The Non-Linear Universe: Chaos, Emergence, Life. New York: Springer.
Seeley T. 1989: “Social Foraging in Honey Bees: How Nectar Foragers Assess Their Colony’s Nutritional Status.” Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology, 24, pp. 181–99.
Seeley T. 1995: The Wisdom of the Hive: The Social Physiology of Honey Bee Colonies. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Sellars W. 1963: “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man.” In Colodny R. (ed.), pp. 35–78, Science, Perception, and Reality. New York: Humanities Press/Ridgeview.
Shapiro L. 2000: “Multiple Realizations”. Journal of Philosophy, 97, pp. 635–54.
Shapiro L. 2004: The Mind Incarnate. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Shapiro L. 2010: “Lessons from Causal Exclusion.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 88, pp. 594–604.
Shapiro L. 2011: “Mental Manipulations and the Problem of Causal Exclusion.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 90, pp. 1–18.
Shoemaker S. 1980: “Causality and Properties.” In Van Inwagen (1980).
Shoemaker S. 2001: “Realization and Mental Causation.” In Gillett and Loewer (2001).
Shoemaker S. 2003a: “Realization, Micro-Realization and Coincidence.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 67, pp. 1–23.
Shoemaker S. 2003b: “Kim on Emergence.” Philosophical Studies, 108, pp. 53–63.
Shoemaker S. 2007: Physical Realization. New York: Oxford University Press.
Siderits M. 2007: Buddhism as Philosophy: An Introduction. Cambridge: Hackett.
Silberstein M., and McGeever J. 1999: “The Search for Ontological Emergence.” The Philosophical Quarterly, 49, pp. 183–200.
Simon H. 1969: The Sciences of the Artificial. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Sklar L. 1967: “Types of Inter-Theoretic Reduction.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 18, pp. 109–24.
Sklar L. 1995: Physics and Chance: Philosophical Issues in the Foundations of Statistical Mechanics. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Sorenson A., Busch T., and Vinson S. 1985: “Control of Food Influx by Temporal Subcastes in the Fire Ant, Solenopsis invicta.” Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology, 17, pp. 191–8.
Sorger P. 2005: “A Reductionist’s Systems Biology.” Current Opinion in Cell Biology, 17, pp. 9–11.
Sperry R. 1986: “Macro-Determinism vs. Microdeterminism.” Philosophy of Science, 53, pp. 265–70.
Sperry R. 1992: “Turnabout on Consciousness: A Mentalist View.” Journal of Mind and Behaviour, 13, pp. 259–80.
Spurrett D. 1999: The Completeness of Physics. Phd thesis: University of Natal.
Stephan A. 1999: “Varieties of Emergentism.” Evolution and Cognition, 5, pp. 49–59.
Stump E. 2012: “Emergence, Causal Powers, and Aristotelianism in Metaphysics.” In Groff and Greco (2012).
Teller P. 1992: “A Contemporary Look at Emergence.” In Beckermann et al. (1992), pp. 139–53.
Van Fraassen B. 1980: The Scientific Image. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Van Gulick R. 1993: “Who’s in Charge Here? And Who’s Doing All the Work?” In Heil and Mele (eds.) Mental Causation. New York: Clarendon Press.
Van Gulick R. 2001: “Reduction, Emergence and Other Options on the Mind/Body Problem.” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8, pp. 1–34.
Van Inwagen P. (ed.) 1980: Time and Cause. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Van Inwagen P. 1990: Material Beings. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Waddington C. 1970: Towards a Theoretical Biology. 4 vols. Chicago, IL: Aldine Publishing.
Weinberg S. 1992: Dreams of a Final Theory. New York: Random House.
Weinberg S. 2001: Facing Up: Science and its Cultural Adversaries. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Weiner N. 1948: Cybernetics or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Whitehead A. N. 1925: Science and the Modern World. London: Free Press.
Wilkes K. 1988: Real People: Personal Identity without Thought Experiments. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Williams G. C. 1985: “A Defense of Reductionism in Evolutionary Biology.” In Dawkins and Ridley (1985), pp. 1–27.
Wilson E. 1998: Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge. New York: Knopf.
Wilson E., and Holldobler B. 1988: “Dense Heterarchies and Mass Communication as the Basis of Organization in Ant Colonies.” Trends in Ecology and Evolution, 3, pp. 65–84.
Wilson J. 1999: “How Superduper Does a Physicalist Supervenience Need to Be?” Philosophical Quarterly, 49, pp. 33–52.
Wilson J. 2005: “Supervenience-Based Formulations of Physicalism.” Nous, 29, pp. 426–59.
Wilson J. 2010: “Non-Reductive Physicalism and Degrees of Freedom.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 61, pp. 279–311.
Wilson J. 2014: “No Work for a Theory of Grounding.” Inquiry, 57, pp. 1–45.
Wilson J. Forthcoming: “Metaphysical Emergence: Weak and Strong.” In T. Bigaj and C. Wuthrich (eds.) Metaphysics in Contemporary Physics. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities.
Wimsatt W. 1976: “Reductionism, Levels of Organization and the Mind–Body Problem.” In Conciousness and the Brain, ed. by Globus G., Maxwell G., and Savodnik I.. New York: Plenum Press.
Wimsatt W. 1997: “Aggregativity: Reductive Heuristics for Finding Emergence.” Philosophy of Science, 64, pp. S372–S384.
Wimsatt W. 2000: “Emergence as Nonaggregativity and the Biases of Reductionisms.” Foundations of Science, 5, pp. 269–97.
Wimsatt W. 2007: Re-Engineering Philosophy for Limited Beings. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Wimsatt W., and Sarkar S. 2006: “Reductionism.” In Pfeifer and Sarkar (2006), vol. 2, pp. 696–703.
Woolley R. 1985 “The Molecular Structure Conundrum”. Journal of Chemical Education, v.62.
Woolley R and Sutcliffe B. 1977: “Molecular Structure and the Born-Oppenheimer Approximation”. Chemical Physics Letters, v.45.
Yates F. (ed.) 1987: Self-Organizing Systems: The Emergence of Order. New York: Plenum Press.