Skip to main content
Reduction and Emergence in Science and Philosophy
  • Get access
    Check if you have access via personal or institutional login
  • Cited by 1
  • Cited by
    This book has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Gillett, Carl 2016. Scientific Composition and Metaphysical Ground. p. 205.

  • Export citation
  • Recommend to librarian
  • Recommend this book

    Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this book to your organisation's collection.

    Reduction and Emergence in Science and Philosophy
    • Online ISBN: 9781139871716
    • Book DOI:
    Please enter your name
    Please enter a valid email address
    Who would you like to send this to? *
  • Buy the print book

Book description

Grand debates over reduction and emergence are playing out across the sciences, but these debates have reached a stalemate, with both sides declaring victory on empirical grounds. In this book, Carl Gillett provides new theoretical frameworks with which to understand these debates, illuminating both the novel positions of scientific reductionists and emergentists and the recent empirical advances that drive these new views. Gillett also highlights the flaws in existing philosophical frameworks and reorients the discussion to reflect the new scientific advances and issues, including the nature of 'parts' and 'wholes', the character of aggregation, and thus the continuity of nature itself. Most importantly, Gillett shows how disputes about concrete scientific cases are empirically resolvable and hence how we can break the scientific stalemate. Including a detailed glossary of key terms, this volume will be valuable for researchers and advanced students of the philosophy of science and metaphysics, and scientific researchers working in the area.


‘This impressive book by Carl Gillett offers a new perspective on an old idea, emergence, an idea that has refused to go away in spite of the many damaging criticisms over the years. It is noteworthy that the concept has found many champions among the practicing scientists working in fields such as physics, life science, cognitive neuroscience, and systems theory. Gillett's account is based in a deep knowledge of the history of emergence in both philosophy and science, presenting a formidable challenge to the critics and skeptics in the field. It should help to elevate the debates to a new level. Highly recommended to all who are interested in mind, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of science.'

Jaegwon Kim - Brown University, Rhode Island

‘Carl Gillett's masterful book is a comprehensive and original contribution to the philosophical discussion of emergence and reduction in science and philosophy.'

Barry Loewer - Rutgers University, New Jersey

    • Aa
    • Aa
Refine List
Actions for selected content:
Select all | Deselect all
  • View selected items
  • Export citations
  • Download PDF (zip)
  • Send to Kindle
  • Send to Dropbox
  • Send to Google Drive
  • Send content to

    To send content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to .

    To send content to your Kindle, first ensure is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle.

    Note you can select to send to either the or variations. ‘’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

    Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

    Please be advised that item(s) you selected are not available.
    You are about to send:

Save Search

You can save your searches here and later view and run them again in "My saved searches".

Please provide a title, maximum of 40 characters.
AizawaK. 2007: “The Biochemistry of Memory Consolidation: A Model System for the Philosophy of Mind.” Synthese, 155, pp. 6598.
AizawaK., and GillettC. 2009a: “Levels, Individual Variation and Massive Multiple Realization in Neurobiology.” In Bickle (2009), pp. 539–81.
AizawaK., & GillettC. 2009b: “The (Multiple) Realization of Psychological and Other Properties in the Sciences.” Mind & Language, 24(2), pp. 181208.
AizawaK., & GillettC. 2011: “The Autonomy of Psychology in the Age of Neuroscience.” In McKay Illari P., Russo F., and Williamson J. (eds.), Causality in the Sciences. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
AizawaK., & GillettC. (eds.) 2016: Scientific Composition and Metaphysical Ground. London: Palgrave MacMillan.
AizawaK., & GillettC. Forthcoming: The Parts of Sciences: Scientific Composition and Compositional Explanation. London: Routledge.
AizawaK., & GillettC. Unpublished: “Multiple Realization and Methodology in Neuroscience and Psychology.”
AlexanderS. 1920: Space, Time and Deity. 2 vols. The Gifford Lectures 1916–18. Toronto: Macmillan.
AndersonP. 1972: “More is Different: Broken Symmetry and the Nature of the Hierarchical Structure of Science.” Science, 177, pp. 393–6.
AndersonP. 1990: “Solid-State Experimentalists: Theory Should Be on Tap, Not on Top.” Physics Today, 43(9), pp. 911.
AndersonP. 1995: “Historical Overview of the Twentieth Century in Physics.” In Brown, Pais, and Pippard (1995), vol. 3, pp. 2017–33.
AndersenP., ChristiansenP., EmmecheC., and FinnemannN. (eds.) 2000: Downward Causation: Minds, Bodies and Matter. Aarhus: Aarhus University Press.
ArmstrongD.M. 1997: A World of States of Affairs. New York: Cambridge University Press.
AtkinsP. 1995: “The Limitless Power of Science.” In Cornwell (ed.) (1995), pp. 122–31.
AtmanspacherH., and BishopR. 2006: “Contextual Emergence in the Description of Properties.” Foundations of Physics, 36, pp. 1753–77.
AuyangS. 1998: Foundations of Complex-Systems Theories in Economics, Evolutionary Biology, and Statistical Physics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
AyalaF., and ArpR. (eds.) 2009: Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Biology. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
AyalaF., and DobzhanskyT. (eds.) 1974: Studies in the Philosophy of Biology: Reduction and Related Problems. New York: Macmillan.
BechtelW., and MundaleJ. 1999: “Multiple Realizability Revisited.” Philosophy of Science, v.66, pp. 175207.
BechtelW., and RichardsonR. 1993: Discovering Complexity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
BeckermannA., FlohrH., and KimJ. (eds.) 1992: Emergence or Reduction? New York: de Gruyter.
BedauM. 1997: “Weak Emergence.” Philosophical Perspectives, 11, pp. 375–99.
BedauM. 2002: “Downward Causation and the Autonomy of Weak Emergence.” Principia, 6, pp. 550.
BedauM. 2008: “Is Weak Emergence Just in the Mind?Minds and Machines, 18, pp. 443–59.
BennettK. 2003: “Why the Exclusion Problem Seems Intractable, and How, Just Maybe, to Tract it.” Noûs, 37(3), pp. 471–97.
BennettK. 2011: “Construction Area: No Hard Hat Required.” Philosophical Studies, 154, pp. 79104.
BennettK., and McLaughlinB. 2005: “Supervenience.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. <>.
BertalanffyV. 1950: “An Outline of General System Theory.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1, pp. 134–65.
BickleJ. 1998: Psychoneural Reduction: The New Wave. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
BickleJ. 2003: Philosophy and Neuroscience: A Ruthlessly Reductive Account. Boston: Kluwer.
BickleJ. 2006: “Reducing Mind to Molecular Pathways.” Synthese, v.151, pp. 411–34
BickleJ. 2008: “Real Reduction in Real Neuroscience: Metascience, Not Philosophy of Science (and Certainly Not Metaphysics!).” In Hohwy and Kallestrup (2008), pp. 34–51.
BickleJ. (ed.) 2009: The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
BishopR. 2005: “Patching Physics and Chemistry Together.” Philosophy of Science, 72, pp. 710–22.
BishopR. 2006a: “The Hidden Premise in the Causal Argument for Physicalism.” Analysis, 66, pp. 4452.
BishopR. 2006b: “Downward Causation in Fluid Convection.” Synthese, 160, pp. 229–48.
BlitzD. 1992: Emergent Evolution. New York: Kluwer.
BoogerdF., BruggemanF., HofmeyrS., and WesterhoffH. 2007: Systems Biology: Philosophical Foundations. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
BoogerdF., BruggemanF., RichardsonR., StephanA., and WesterhoffH. 2005: “Emergence and its Place in Nature: A Case Study of Biochemical Networks.” Synthese, 145, pp. 131–64.
BorchertD. (ed.) 2006: Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2nd edition. New York: Gale Research.
BowlerP. 2001: Reconciling Science and Religion: The Debate in Early Twentieth-Century Britain. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
BroadC. D. 1925: The Mind and its Place in Nature. London: Routledge Kegan Paul.
BrownJ. 1991: Laboratory of the Mind: Thought Experiments in the Natural Sciences. London: Routledge.
BrownJ. 2004: “Why Thought Experiments Transcend Experience.” In Hitchcock (2004), pp. 23–43.
BrownL., PaisA., and PippardB. (eds.) 1995: Twentieth Century Physics. Second Edition. New York: CRC Press.
BrownW., MurphyN., and MalonyH. 1998: Whatever Happened to the Soul? Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress Press.
CamazineS., DeneubourgJ., FranksN., SneydJ., TheraulazG., and BonabeauE. 2001: Self-Organization in Biological Systems. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
CampbellD. 1974: “‘Downward Causation’ in Hierarchically Organized Biological Systems.” In Ayala and Dobzhansky (1974), pp. 179–86.
CartwrightN. 1983: How the Laws of Physics Lie. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
CartwrightN. 1994: “Fundamentalism vs. the Patchwork of Laws.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 103, pp. 279–92.
CartwrightN. 1999: The Dappled World. New York: Cambridge University Press.
CatJ. 1998: “The Physicists’ Debates on Unification in Physics at the End of the 20th Century.” Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences, 28, pp. 253–99.
ChalmersD. 1997: The Conscious Mind. New York: Oxford University Press.
ChalmersD. 2006: “Strong and Weak Emergence.” In Clayton and Davies (2004, pp. 244–54.
ChurchlandP.M. 1985: “Reduction, Qualia and the Direct Introspeciton of Brain States.” Journal of Philosophy, v.82, pp. 8–28.
ChurchlandP.S. 1986: Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
ClappL. 2001: “Disjunctive Properties: Multiple Realizations.” Journal of Philosophy, 98, pp. 111–36.
ClaytonP. 1997: God and Contemporary Science. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.
ClaytonP. 2004: Mind and Emergence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
ClaytonP. (ed.) 2006: Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
ClaytonP., and DaviesP. (eds.) 2004: The Re-Emergence of Emergence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
CorningP. 2002: “The Re-Emergence of ‘Emergence’: A Venerable Concept in Search of a Theory.” Complexity, 7, pp. 1830.
CornwellJ. (ed.) 1995: Nature’s Imagination. New York Oxford University Press.
CorradiniA., and O’ConnorT. (eds.) 2011: Emergence in Science and Philosophy. New York: Routledge.
CouzinI., and KrauseJ. 2003: “Self-Organization and Collective Behavior in Vertebrates.” Advances in the Studies of Behavior, 33, pp. 175.
CraneT. 2001: The Elements of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
CraverC. 2007: Explaining the Brain. New York: Oxford University Press.
CraverC., and BechtelB. 2007: “Top-Down Causation without Top-Down Causes.” Biology and Philosophy, 22, pp. 547–63.
CraverC., and DardenL. 2001: “Discovering Mechanisms in Neurobiology: The Case of Spatial Memory.” In P. Machamer et al. (eds.), Theory and Method in Neuroscience. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
CrickF. 1966: Of Mice and Molecules. Seattle, WA: University of Washington.
CrickF. 1994: The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul. New York: Scribner.
CrookS., and GillettC. 2001: “Why Physics Alone Cannot Define the ‘Physical’.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 31, pp. 333–60.
CrutchfieldJ., FarmerJ., PackardN., and ShawR. 1986: “Chaos.” Scientific American, 255, pp. 4657.
CumminsR. 1975: “Functional Analysis.” Journal of Philosophy, 72, pp. 741–65.
CumminsR. 1983: The Nature of Psychological Explanation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
DardenL., and MaullN. 1977: “Interfield Theories.” Philosophy of Science, 44, pp. 4364.
DawkinsR. 1982: The Extended Phenotype. San Francisco, CA: W. H. Freeman.
DawkinsR. 1985: “Editorial.” In Dawkins and Ridley (1985).
DawkinsR. 1987: The Blind Watchmaker. New York: Norton.
DawkinsR., and RidleyM. 1985: Oxford Surveys in Evolutionary Biology, vol. 2. New York: Oxford University Press.
DelehantyM. 2005: “Emergent Properties and the Context Objection to Reduction.” Biology and Philosophy, 20, pp. 715–34.
DennettD. 1969: Content and Consciousness. London: Routledge Kegan Paul.
DennettD. 1978: Brainstorms. Montgomery, VT: Bradford Books.
DennettD. 1991: “Real Patterns.” Journal of Philosophy, 88, pp. 2751.
DennettD. 1996: Darwin’s Dangerous Idea. New York: Simon and Schuster.
DupréJ. 1993: The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science. Boston, MA: Harvard University Press.
DupréJ. 2001: Human Nature and the Limits of Science. New York: Oxford University Press.
DupréJ. 2008: The Constituents of Life. Assen: Van Gorcum.
DupréJ. 2009: “It Is Not Possible to Reduce Biological Explanations to Explanations in Chemistry and/or Physics.” In Varela and Arp (2009), pp. 32–47.
DykeC. 1988: The Evolutionary Dynamics of Complex Systems: A Study in Biological Complexity. New York: Oxford University Press.
ElkanaY. 1974: The Discovery of the Conservation of Energy. London: Hutchinson.
EllisB. 2002: The Philosophy of Nature. Montreal: McGill University Press.
EndicottR. 2006: “Multiple Realizability.” In Borchert (2006).
EsfeldM., and SachseC. 2011: Conservative Reductionism. New York: Routledge.
FodorJ. 1968: Psychological Explanation. New York: Random House.
FodorJ. 1974: “Special Sciences: Or, the Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis.” Synthese, 28, pp. 97115.
FodorJ. 1975: The Language of Thought. New York: Crowell.
FodorJ. 1997: “Special Sciences: Still Autonomous after All These Years.” Philosophical Perspectives, 11.
FodorJ. 1998: “Look! Review of E.O.Wilson’s Consilience.London Review of Books, v.20, No.21, 29 October, pp. 36.
FosterJ. 1991: The Immaterial Self: A Defence of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of the Mind. London: Routledge.
FreemanW. 1995: Societies of Brains. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
FreemanW. 1999: “Consciousness, Intentionality and Causality.” In Nunez and Freeman (1999), pp. 143–72.
FreemanW. 2000a: How Brains Make Up Their Minds. New York: Columbia University Press.
FreemanW. 2000b: Neurodynamics: An Exploration of Mescopic Brain Dynamics. London: Springer-Verlag.
GarfinkelA. 1987: “The Slime Mold Dictyostelium as a Model of Self-Organization in Social Systems.” In Yates (1987), pp. 181–212.
GilbertS., and SarkarS. 2000: “Embracing Complexity: Organicism for the 21st Century.” Developmental Dynamics, 219, pp. 19.
GillettC. 2002a: “The Varieties of Emergence: Their Purposes, Obligations and Importance.” Grazer Philosophische Studien, 65, pp. 89115.
GillettC. 2002b: “The Dimensions of Realization: A Critique of the Standard View.” Analysis, 62, pp. 316–23.
GillettC. 2003a: “Non-Reductive Realization and Non-Reductive Identity: What Physicalism Does Not Entail.” In S. Walter and H.-D. Heckmann (eds.) Physicalism and Mental Causation. Bowling Green, OH: Imprint Academic, pp. 31–58.
GillettC. 2003b: “Strong Emergence as a Defense of Non-Reductive Physicalism.” Special issue on emergence. Principia, 6, pp. 83114.
GillettC. 2003c: “The Metaphysics of Realization, Multiple Realizability and the Special Sciences.” Journal of Philosophy, 100, pp. 591–603.
GillettC. 2006a: “Samuel Alexander’s Emergentism: Or, Higher Causation for Physicalists.” Synthese, 153, pp. 261–96.
GillettC. 2006b: “The Hidden Battles over Emergence.” In Clayton (1996).
GillettC. 2006c: “Special Sciences.” In Borchert (2006).
GillettC. 2006d: “The Metaphysics of Mechanisms and the Challenge of the New Reductionism.” In Schouten and de Joong (2006).
GillettC. 2007a: “Understanding the New Reductionism: The Metaphysics of Science and Compositional Reduction.” The Journal of Philosophy, 104, pp. 193216.
GillettC. 2007b: “A Mechanist Manifesto for the Philosophy of Mind: A Third Way for Functionalists.” Journal of Philosophical Research, 32, pp. 2142.
GillettC. 2007c: “Hyper-Extending the Mind? Setting Boundaries in the Special Sciences.” Philosophical Topics, 351, pp. 161–88.
GillettC. 2010: “Moving Beyond the Subset Model of Realization.” Synthese, 177, pp. 165–92.
GillettC. 2011a: “Multiply Realizing Scientific Properties and their Instances: A Response to Polger and Shapiro.” Philosophical Psychology, v.24, pp. 727–38.
GillettC. 2011b: “On the Implications of Scientific Composition and Completeness: Or, the Troubles, and Troubles, of Non-Reductive Physicalism.” In Corradini and O’Connor (2011).
GillettC. 2012: “Understanding the Sciences through the Fog of ‘Functionalism(s)’.” In Hunneman (2012), pp. 159–81.
GillettC. 2013: “Constitution, and Multiple Constitution, in the Sciences: Using the Neuron as a Guide.” Minds and Machines, v.23, pp. 309–37.
GillettC. 2016: “The Metaphysics of Nature, Science and the Rules of Engagement” in Aizawa and Gillett (2016).
GillettC. Unpublished: “Making Sense of Levels in the Sciences.”
GillettC., and LoewerB. (eds.) 2001: Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
GillettC., and RivesB. 2001: “Does the Argument from Realization Generalize? Responses to Kim.” Southern Journal of Philosophy, 39, pp. 7998.
GillettC., and RivesB. 2005: “The Non-Existence of Determinables: Or, a World of Absolute Determinates as Default Hypothesis.” Nous, 39, pp. 483504.
GlennanS. 1996: “Mechanisms and the Nature of Causation.” Erkenntnis, 44, pp. 4971.
GoldbeterA. 1997: Biochemical Oscillations and Cellular Rhythms: The Molecular Basis of Periodic and Chaotic Behavior. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
GoldbeterA., GonzeD., HouartG., LeloupJ., HalloyJ., and DupontG. 2001: “From Simple to Complex Oscillatory Behavior in Metabolic and Genetic Control Network.” Chaos, 11, pp. 247–60.
GoldsteinJ. 1999: “Emergence as a Construct: History and Issues.” Emergence, 1, pp. 4972.
GoodwinB. 2001: How the Leopard Changed its Spots: The Evolution of Complexity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
GregoryR., 1994: “DNA in the Mind’s Eye”. Nature, 368, pp. 359–60.
GroffR., and GrecoJ. 2012: Powers and Capacities in Philosophy: The New Aristotelianism. New York: Routledge.
HallN. 2004: “Two Concepts of Causation.” In J. Collins, N. Hall and L. Paul (eds.) Causation and Counterfactuals, pp. 22576. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
HarawayD. 1976: Crystals, Fabrics and Fields. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
HaroldF. 2001: The Way of the Cell. New York: Oxford University Press.
HaskerW. 1999: The Emergent Self. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
HealeyR. 2013: “Physical Composition.” Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science Part B, 44, pp. 4862.
HeilJ. 1999: “Multiple Realizability.” American Philosophical Quarterly, 36, pp. 189208.
HeilJ. 2003: From an Ontological Point of View. New York: Oxford University Press.
HempelC. 1965: Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. New York: Free Press.
HempelC., and OppenheimP. 1965: “On the Idea of Emergence.” In Hempel (1965), pp. 258–64.
HendryR. 1998: “Models and Approximations in Quantum Chemistry.” In Shanks N. (ed.), Idealization in Contemporary Physics. Amsterdam: Rodopoi.
HendryR. 2006: “Is There Downward Causation in Chemistry?” In Baird et al. (eds.) Philosophy of Chemistry, pp. 173–89. Dordrecht: Springer.
HendryR. 2010: “Emergence vs. Reduction in Chemistry.” In MacDonald and MacDonald (2010a), pp. 205–21.
HendryR., and NeedhamP. 2007: “Le Poidevin on the Reduction of Chemistry.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 58, pp. 339–53.
HitchcockC. (ed.) 2004: Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Science. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
HohwyJ., and KallestrupJ. (eds.) 2008: Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation and Causation. New York: Oxford University Press.
HollandJ. 1999: Emergence: From Chaos to Order. New York: Basic Books.
HolldoblerB., and WilsonE. 1990: The Ants. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
HolldoblerB., and WilsonE. 2009: The Superorganism: The Beauty, Elegance and Strangeness of Insect Societies. New York: Norton
HookerC. A. 1981: “Towards a General Theory of Reduction. Part I: Historical and Scientific Settings. Part II: Identity. Part III: Cross Categorial Reduction.” Dialogue, 20, pp. 3859, 201–36, 496529.
HorganJ. 1997: The End of Science. New York: Broadway Books.
HorganT. 1993a: “From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World.” Mind, 102, pp. 555–86.
HorganT. 1993b: “Nonreductive Materialism and the Explanatory Autonomy of Psychology.” In Wagner, S. and Warner, R. (eds.) Naturalism. South Bend: Notre Dame University Press.
HorstS. 2007: Beyond Reduction: Philosophy of Mind and Post-Reductionist Philosophy of Science. New York: Oxford University Press.
HowardD. 2007: “Reduction and Emergence in the Physical Sciences: Some Lessons from the Particle Physics and Condensed Matter Debate.” In Murphy and Stoeger (2007).
HuemerM. 2009: “When Is Parsimony a Virtue?Philosophical Quarterly, 59, pp. 216–36.
HullD. 2002: “Varieities of Reductionism.” In Regenmortel and Hull (2002), pp. 161–72.
HumphreysP. 1997: “How Properties Emerge”. Philosophy of Science, 64, pp. 1–17.
HumphreysP. 2008a: “Synchronic and Diachronic Emergence.” Minds and Machines, 18, pp. 431–42.
HumphreysP. 2008b: “Computational and Conceptual Emergence.” Philosophy of Science, 75, pp. 584–94.
HunnemanP. (ed.) 2012: Functions: Selection and Mechanisms. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
ImbertC. 2007: “Why Diachronically Emergent Properties Must Also Be Salient.” In Gershenson, Aerts, and Edmonds (eds.), Worldviews, Science and Us, pp. 99–116. Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific Publishing Company.
JuarreroA. 1999: Dynamics in Action: Intentional Behavior as a Complex System. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
KandelE. 2006: In Search of Memory. New York: Norton.
KauffmanS. 1993: The Origins of Order: Self-Organization and Selection in Evolution. New York: Oxford University Press.
KauffmanS. 1995: At Home in the Universe. New York: Oxford University Press.
KauffmanS., and ClaytonP. 2006: “On Emergence, Agency and Organization.” Biology and Philosophy, 21, pp. 501–21.
KellertS. 1993: In the Wake of Chaos. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
KimJ. 1972: “Phenomenal Properties, Psychological Laws, and Identity Theory.” Monist, 56, pp. 177–92.
KimJ. 1992a: “‘Downward Causation’ in Emergentism and Nonreductive Physicalism.” In Beckermann, Flohr, and Kim (1992).
KimJ. 1992b: “Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 52, pp. 126.
KimJ. 1993a: Supervenience and Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
KimJ. 1993b: “The Nonreductionist’s Troubles with Mental Causation.” In Kim (1993a).
KimJ. 1993c: “Dretske on How Reasons Explain Behaviour.” In Kim (1993a).
KimJ. 1993d: “Postscripts on Supervenient Causation.” In Kim (1993a).
KimJ. 1993e: “Mechanism, Purpose and Explanatory Exclusion.” In Kim (1993a).
KimJ. 1997: “The Mind–Body Problem: Taking Stock after Forty Years.” Philosophical Perspectives, 11.
KimJ. 1998: Mind in a Physical World. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
KimJ. 1999: “Making Sense of Emergence.” Philosophical Studies, 95, pp. 344.
KimJ. 2003: “Blocking Causal Drainage and Other Maintenance Chores with Mental Causation.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 67, pp. 151–76.
KimJ. 2006: “Being Realistic about Emergence.” In Clayton and Davies (2004), pp. 189–202
KistlerM. 2010: “Mechanisms and Downward Causation.” Philosophical Psychology, 22, pp. 595–609.
KitcherP. 1984: “1953 and All That: A Tale of Two Sciences.” Philosophical Review, 93, pp. 335–73. Reprinted in his (2003). All references are to the reprint.
KitcherP. 2003: In Mendel’s Mirror. New York: Oxford University Press.
KuhnT. 1970: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
LadymanJ., and RossD. 2007: Everything Must Go. New York: Oxford University Press.
LaughlinR. 2005: A Different Universe: Reinventing Physics from the Bottom Down. New York: Basic Books.
LaughlinR., and PinesD. 2000: “The Theory of Everything.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, 97, pp. 2831.
LaughlinR., PinesD., SchmalienJ., StojkovicB., and WolynesP. 2000: “The Middle Way,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, 97, pp. 32–7.
LevinsR., and LewontinR. 1987: The Dalectical Biologist. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
LewinR. 1992: Complexity: Life at the Edge of Chaos. New York: Macmillan.
LewisDavid 1972: “Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, v.50, pp. 249–58.
LewisDavid 1983: “New Work for a Theory of Universals.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, v.61, pp. 343–77.
LoewerB. 1995: “An Argument for Strong Supervenience.” In Savellos and Yalcin (1995).
LoewerB. 2001: “From Physics to Physicalism.” In Gillett and Loewer (eds.) (2001).
LoewerB. 2008: “Why There Is Anything Except Physics.” In Hohwy and Kallestrup (2008).
LoweJ. 1996: The Subjects of Experience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
LoweJ. 2008: Personal Agency: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action. New York: Oxford University Press.
LoweJ. 2009: “Dualism.” In McLaughlin, Beckermann, and Walter (2009), pp. 66–84.
MachamerP., DardenL., and CraverC. 2000: “Thinking about Mechanisms.” Philosophy of Science, 67, pp. 125.
MaturanaH., and VarelaF. 1973: “Autopoiesis and Cognition.” In Cohen R. S. and Wartofsky M. W. (eds.), Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 10, p. 42.
MayrE. 1988a: “The Limits of Reductionism.” Nature, 33.
MayrE. 1988b: Toward a New Philosophy of Biology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
MayrE. 2002: What Makes Biology Unique? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
MacDonaldC., and MacDonaldG. (eds.) 2010a: Emergence in Mind. New York: Oxford University Press.
MacDonaldC., and MacDonaldG. 2010b: “Emergence and Downward Causation.” In MacDonald and MacDonald (2010a), pp. 139–68.
McGinnC. 1993: The Problem of Consciousness: Essays Towards a Resolution. Oxford: Blackwell.
McLaughlinB. 1992: “The Rise and Fall of British Emergentism.” In Beckermann, Flohr, and Kim (1992).
McLaughlinB. 1995: “The Varieties of Supervenience.” In Savellos and Yalcin (1995).
McLaughlinB., BeckermannA., and WalterS. 2009: The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. New York: Oxford University Press.
MellorH. 2008: “Micro-Composition”. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements, v.83, pp.81-106.
MelnykA. 1995: “Two Cheers for Reductionism; Or, The Dim Prospects for Nonreductive Materialism.” Philosophy of Science, 62, pp. 370–88.
MelnykA. 1997: “How to Keep the ‘Physical’ in Physicalism.” Journal of Philosophy, 94, pp. 622–37.
MelnykA. 2003: A Physicalist Manifesto. New York: Cambridge University Press.
MerricksT. 2001: Objects and Persons. New York: Oxford University Press.
MidgleyM. 1995: “Reductive Megalomania.” In Cornwell (1995), pp. 133–47.
MitchellS. 2003: Biological Complexity and Integrative Pluralism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
MitchellS. 2009: Unsimple Truths: Science, Complexity and Policy. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
MitchellS. 2012: “Emergence: Logical, Functional and Dynamical.” Synthese, v.185, pp. 171–86.
MorowitzH. 2002: The Emergence of Everything: How the World Became Complex. New York: Oxford University Press.
MulliganK., SimonsP., and SmithB. 2006: “What’s Wrong with Contemporary Philosophy?Topoi, 25, pp. 63–7.
MurphyN., and BrownW. 2007: Did My Neurons Make Me Do It? New York: Oxford University Press.
MurphyN., and StoegerW. 2007: Evolution and Emergence: Systems, Organisms, Persons. New York: Oxford University Press.
NagelE. 1952: “Wholes, Sums and Organic Unities.” Philosophical Studies, 2, pp. 1632.
NagelE. 1961: The Structure of Science. New York: Harcourt Brace.
NewmanD. 1996: “Emergence and Strange Attractors.” Philosophy of Science, 63, pp. 245–61.
Newton-SmithW. 1981: The Rationality of Science. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
NicolisG., and PrigogineI. 1989: Exploring Complexity. New York: Freeman.
NortonJ., 2004: “Why Thought Experiments Do Not Transcend Empiricism.” In Hitchcock (2004), pp. 44–66.
NunezR., and FreemanW. (eds.) 1999: Reclaiming Cognition: The Primacy of Action, Intention and Emotion. Bowling Green, OH: Imprint Academic.
O’ConnorT. 1994: “Emergent Properties.” American Philosophical Quarterly, 31, pp. 91104.
O’ConnorT., and ChurchillJ. 2010: “Is Non-Reductive Physicalism Viable within a Causal Powers Metaphysics?” In MacDonald and MacDonald (2010a), pp. 43–60.
O’ConnorT., and JacobsJ. 2003: “Emergent Individuals.” Philosophical Quarterly, 53, pp. 540–55.
O’ConnorT., and WongH. 2003: “The Metaphysics of Emergence.” Noûs, 39, pp. 659–79.
O’MalleyM., and DupréJ. 2005: “Fundamental Issues in Systems Biology.” BioEssays, 27, pp. 1270–6.
PapineauD. 1993: Philosophical Naturalism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
PapineauD. 1995: “Arguments for Supervenience and Physical Realization.” In Savellos and Yalcin (1995).
PapineauD. 2001: “The Rise of Physicalism.” In Gillett and Loewer (2001).
PapineauD. 2002: Thinking about Consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press.
PatteeH. 1970: “The Problem of Biological Hierarchy.” In Waddington (1970), vol. 3, pp. 117–36.
PatteeH. 1973a: “The Physical Basis and Origin of Hierarchical Control.” In Pattee (1973b).
PatteeH. (ed.) 1973b: Hierarchy Theory. New York: George Braziller.
PeacockeA. 1990: Theology for a Scientific Age. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
PeacockeA. 1995: “God’s Interaction with the World.” In Russell et al. (1995).
PeacockeA. 1999: “The Sound of Sheer Silence: How Does God Communicate with Humanity?” In Russell et al. (1999).
PereboomD. 2011: Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism. New York: Oxford University Press
PfeiferJ., and SarkarS. 2006: Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia. New York: Routledge.
PiccininiG. 2004: “Functionalism, Computationalism, and Mental States.” Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 35, pp. 811–33.
PolandJ. 1994: Physicalism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
PolanyiM. 1968: “Life’s Irreducible Structure.” Science, 160, pp. 1308–12.
PolgerT. 2007: “Realization and the Metaphysics of Mind.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 85, pp. 233–59.
PrigogineI. 1968: Introduction to Thermodynamics of Irreversible Processes. New York: Wiley.
PrigogineI. 1997: End of Certainty. New York: The Free Press.
PrigogineI., and StengersI. 1984: Order out of Chaos: Man’s New Dialogue with Nature. New York: Bantam Books.
PrimasH. 1983: Chemistry, Quantum Mechanics, and Reductionism. Berlin: Springer- Verlag.
PutnamH. 1967: “Psychological Predicates.” In Capitan W. and Merrill D. (eds.), Art, Mind and Religion. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press. Reprinted as “The Nature of Mental States” in Putnam (1975b). (All references are to the reprint.)
PutnamH. 1975a: “Philosophy and Our Mental Life.” In Putnam (1975b).
PutnamH. 1975b: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
RegenmortelM., and HullD. 2002: Promises and Limits of Reductionism in the Biomedical Sciences. Chichester: John Wiley and Sons.
RichardsonR., and StephanA. 2007: “Mechanisms and Mechanical Explanation in Systems Biology.” In Boogerd et al. (2007), pp. 123–44.
RosenbergA. 2006: Darwinian Reductionism: Or, How to Stop Worrying and Love Molecular Biology. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.
RossD., and SpurrettD. 2004: “What to Say to a Skeptical Metaphysician? A Defense Manual for Cognitive and Behavioral Scientists.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 27, pp. 603–27.
RuegerA. 2000: “Robust Supervenience and Emergence.” Philosophy of Science, 67, pp. 466–91.
RussellB. 1911: “Le Réalisme Analytique.” Bulletin de la Société Française de Philosophie, 11, pp. 5361.
RussellJ., MurphyN., MeyeringT., and ArbibA. (eds.) 1999: Neuroscience and the Person: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action. Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory Publications.
RussellJ., MurphyN., and PeacockeA. (ed.) 1995: Chaos and Complexity: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action. Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory Publications.
SaltheS. 1985: Evolving Hierarchical Systems: Their Representation and Structure. New York: Columbia University Press.
SarkarS. 2005: Molecular Models of Life. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
SavellosE., and YalcinU. (eds.) 1995: Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
ScerriE. 1994: “Has Chemistry Been at Least Approximately Reduced to Quantum Mechanics?” In Hull D., Forbes M., and Burian R. M. (eds.), PSA vol. 1, pp. 160–70.
ScerriE. 1997: “Has the Periodic Table Been Successfully Axiomitized?Erkentnis, 47, pp. 229–43.
ScerriE. 1998a: “Popper’s Naturalized Approach to the Reduction of Chemistry.” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 12, pp. 3344.
ScerriE. 1998b: “How Good is the Quantum Mechanical Explanation of the Periodic Table?Journal of Chemical Education, 75, pp. 1384–5.
ScerriE. 2007: “Reduction and Emergence in Chemistry: Two Recent Approaches.” Philosophy of Science, 74, pp. 920–31.
SchafferJ. 2007: “From Nihilism to Monism.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 85, pp. 175–91.
SchafferJ. 2010: “Monism: The Priority of the Whole.” Philosophical Review, 119, pp. 3176.
SchaffnerK. 1967: “Approaches to Reduction”. Philosophy of Science, v.34, pp. 137–47.
SchaffnerK. 1993: Discovery and Explanation in Biology and Medicine. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
SchaffnerK. 2002: “Reductionism, Complexity and Molecular Medicine: Genetic Chips and the ‘Globalization’ of the Genome.” In Regenmortel and Hull (2002), pp. 323–51.
SchaffnerK. 2006: “Reduction: The Cheshire Cat Problem and a Return to Roots.” Synthese, 151, pp. 377402.
SchoutenM., and de JoongH. 2006: The Matter of Mind: Philosophical Essays on Psychology, Neuroscience and Reduction. Oxford: Blackwell.
ScottA. 2007: The Non-Linear Universe: Chaos, Emergence, Life. New York: Springer.
SeeleyT. 1989: “Social Foraging in Honey Bees: How Nectar Foragers Assess Their Colony’s Nutritional Status.” Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology, 24, pp. 181–99.
SeeleyT. 1995: The Wisdom of the Hive: The Social Physiology of Honey Bee Colonies. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
SellarsW. 1963: “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man.” In Colodny R. (ed.), pp. 3578, Science, Perception, and Reality. New York: Humanities Press/Ridgeview.
ShapiroL. 2000: “Multiple Realizations”. Journal of Philosophy, 97, pp. 635–54.
ShapiroL. 2004: The Mind Incarnate. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
ShapiroL. 2010: “Lessons from Causal Exclusion.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 88, pp. 594–604.
ShapiroL. 2011: “Mental Manipulations and the Problem of Causal Exclusion.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 90, pp. 118.
ShoemakerS. 1980: “Causality and Properties.” In Van Inwagen (1980).
ShoemakerS. 2001: “Realization and Mental Causation.” In Gillett and Loewer (2001).
ShoemakerS. 2003a: “Realization, Micro-Realization and Coincidence.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 67, pp. 1–23.
ShoemakerS. 2003b: “Kim on Emergence.” Philosophical Studies, 108, pp. 5363.
ShoemakerS. 2007: Physical Realization. New York: Oxford University Press.
SideritsM. 2007: Buddhism as Philosophy: An Introduction. Cambridge: Hackett.
SilbersteinM., and McGeeverJ. 1999: “The Search for Ontological Emergence.” The Philosophical Quarterly, 49, pp. 183200.
SimonH. 1969: The Sciences of the Artificial. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
SklarL. 1967: “Types of Inter-Theoretic Reduction.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 18, pp. 109–24.
SklarL. 1995: Physics and Chance: Philosophical Issues in the Foundations of Statistical Mechanics. New York: Cambridge University Press.
SorensonA., BuschT., and VinsonS. 1985: “Control of Food Influx by Temporal Subcastes in the Fire Ant, Solenopsis invicta.” Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology, 17, pp. 191–8.
SorgerP. 2005: “A Reductionist’s Systems Biology.” Current Opinion in Cell Biology, 17, pp. 911.
SperryR. 1986: “Macro-Determinism vs. Microdeterminism.” Philosophy of Science, 53, pp. 265–70.
SperryR. 1992: “Turnabout on Consciousness: A Mentalist View.” Journal of Mind and Behaviour, 13, pp. 259–80.
SpurrettD. 1999: The Completeness of Physics. Phd thesis: University of Natal.
StephanA. 1999: “Varieties of Emergentism.” Evolution and Cognition, 5, pp. 4959.
StumpE. 2012: “Emergence, Causal Powers, and Aristotelianism in Metaphysics.” In Groff and Greco (2012).
TellerP. 1992: “A Contemporary Look at Emergence.” In Beckermann et al. (1992), pp. 139–53.
Van FraassenB. 1980: The Scientific Image. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Van GulickR. 1993: “Who’s in Charge Here? And Who’s Doing All the Work?” In Heil and Mele (eds.) Mental Causation. New York: Clarendon Press.
Van GulickR. 2001: “Reduction, Emergence and Other Options on the Mind/Body Problem.” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8, pp. 134.
Van InwagenP. (ed.) 1980: Time and Cause. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Van InwagenP. 1990: Material Beings. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
WaddingtonC. 1970: Towards a Theoretical Biology. 4 vols. Chicago, IL: Aldine Publishing.
WeinbergS. 1992: Dreams of a Final Theory. New York: Random House.
WeinbergS. 2001: Facing Up: Science and its Cultural Adversaries. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
WeinerN. 1948: Cybernetics or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
WhiteheadA. N. 1925: Science and the Modern World. London: Free Press.
WilkesK. 1988: Real People: Personal Identity without Thought Experiments. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
WilliamsG. C. 1985: “A Defense of Reductionism in Evolutionary Biology.” In Dawkins and Ridley (1985), pp. 1–27.
WilsonE. 1998: Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge. New York: Knopf.
WilsonE., and HolldoblerB. 1988: “Dense Heterarchies and Mass Communication as the Basis of Organization in Ant Colonies.” Trends in Ecology and Evolution, 3, pp. 6584.
WilsonJ. 1999: “How Superduper Does a Physicalist Supervenience Need to Be?Philosophical Quarterly, 49, pp. 3352.
WilsonJ. 2005: “Supervenience-Based Formulations of Physicalism.” Nous, 29, pp. 426–59.
WilsonJ. 2010: “Non-Reductive Physicalism and Degrees of Freedom.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 61, pp. 279311.
WilsonJ. 2014: “No Work for a Theory of Grounding.” Inquiry, 57, pp. 145.
WilsonJ. Forthcoming: “Metaphysical Emergence: Weak and Strong.” In T. Bigaj and C. Wuthrich (eds.) Metaphysics in Contemporary Physics. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities.
WimsattW. 1976: “Reductionism, Levels of Organization and the Mind–Body Problem.” In Conciousness and the Brain, ed. by Globus G., Maxwell G., and Savodnik I.. New York: Plenum Press.
WimsattW. 1997: “Aggregativity: Reductive Heuristics for Finding Emergence.” Philosophy of Science, 64, pp. S372S384.
WimsattW. 2000: “Emergence as Nonaggregativity and the Biases of Reductionisms.” Foundations of Science, 5, pp. 269–97.
WimsattW. 2007: Re-Engineering Philosophy for Limited Beings. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
WimsattW., and SarkarS. 2006: “Reductionism.” In Pfeifer and Sarkar (2006), vol. 2, pp. 696–703.
WoolleyR. 1985 “The Molecular Structure Conundrum”. Journal of Chemical Education, v.62.
WoolleyR and SutcliffeB. 1977: “Molecular Structure and the Born-Oppenheimer Approximation”. Chemical Physics Letters, v.45.
YatesF. (ed.) 1987: Self-Organizing Systems: The Emergence of Order. New York: Plenum Press.


Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 15
Total number of PDF views: 1134 *
Loading metrics...

Book summary page views

Total views: 1882 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between 5th September 2016 - 24th October 2017. This data will be updated every 24 hours.