Introduction

Focal points for many of the case studies in this book are modality and deixis. We start in this chapter with selected examples of the development of epistemic from deontic meaning within the domain of modality relatively narrowly construed. Themes are developed that will be shown in later chapters to be relevant to modality more broadly construed.

There is little agreement on exactly how to define modality, beyond the observation quoted in 1.7: “The essence of ‘modality’ consists in the relativization of the validity of sentence meanings to a set of possible worlds” (Kiefer 1994: 2515). In work on logic, the fundamental types of modality are necessity and possibility in so far as they relate to the truth or falsity of the proposition. In work on linguistics, two related types, deontic (obligation) and epistemic (conclusion), have received most attention, but at least one other is also recognized: ability/capacity (see e.g. Leech 1971, Lyons 1977, Palmer 1990 [1979], 1986, Coates 1983, Sweetser 1990, Bybee, Perkins, and Pagliuca 1994, Kiefer 1994, 1997, Van der Auwera and Plungian 1998). Some brief working characterizations of the three types of modality follow; more detailed discussion of deontic and epistemic modality is provided in 3.2:

(i) Deontic modality (from the Gk. deon “what is binding”); also widely known as “root” modality (e.g. Coates 1983, Sweetser 1990). This centrally involves obligation or compulsion. In his ground-breaking study of modality in language Lyons identified several characteristics of deontic modality.