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7 - Sector Theorists Should Expand Three-Failures Theory to Include the Family Sector and Varied Forms of Government

from Part II - Reflections and Refinements

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 January 2024

By
Richard Steinberg ,
Eleanor Brown  and
Liza L. Taylor
Edited by
Eva Witesman  and
Curtis Child
Eva Witesman
Affiliation:
Brigham Young University, Utah
Curtis Child
Affiliation:
Brigham Young University, Utah
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Summary

The authors of this chapter conceptualize the “three-failures” perspective in nonprofit-sector theorizing. They then propose the sectoral advantage framework, which revises and generalizes the three-failures approach. The revised framework offers a set of questions and a way of thinking about and interpreting diverse puzzles in the field. The framework uses consistent definitions and criteria so that it can be applied to a broad range of institutions, cultures, and historical periods. The authors develop three themes within the framework: First, they add the family sector and consider its comparative advantages, failures, and activities. Second, they generalize government failure to make it more comprehensive and applicable outside Western democracies. Third, they suggest the capability approach should be incorporated in the determination of sectoral advantages.

Keywords

three-failures theoryrole of nonprofitsfamily failuregovernment failurenonprofit theorynonprofit advantagescapability approachselectorate theoryfamily economicssectoral-advantage framework
Type
Chapter
Information
Reimagining Nonprofits
Sector Theory in the Twenty-First Century
 , pp. 133 - 153
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2024

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