That we all are, or can be, victims of physics inscribes an agential form to a classical understanding of ideas such as gravity and force. It invokes a reversal of who and what can behave. As Mel Y. Chen writes in Animacies, there is the possibility of a linguistic “conceptual order of things, an animate hierarchy of possible acts” that they trouble significantly as they ponder the borders between the inanimate and the animate (3). In Chen’s early example of “the hikers that rocks crush,” they engage with the problem that “the hikers … play an object role” (2). The solution to the linguistic difficulty emerges when we animate the object, when the traditionally inanimate rock is given the free agency and subjecthood quality to crush the hikers. Upon this animation, the object becomes a thing, described by Robin Bernstein as when “the amateur’s knife should slip and cut a finger … that knife suddenly becomes a thing that has leapt up and asserted itself, a thing that demands to be reckoned with” (69), which centres her idea of “dances with things” as the kind of interplay between a human and the substantive things that they interact with daily. Bernstein borrows heavily from thing theorist Bill Brown’s assertion that “[t]he story of objects asserting themselves as things, then, is the story of a changed relation to the human subject” (4).