Introduction

Crucial as they are, words and sentiments alone do not make the R2Provide ethos. This chapter examines the efforts Southeast Asian countries, more often than not under the rubric of ASEAN and through its various functional subsidiaries and its ‘Plus’ derivatives, have undertaken to develop the requisite capabilities – build their ‘response ability’ if you will – that would enable them to translate aspirations regarding responsible provision into reality. So far as the regional experience goes, the regionalization of responsibility in Southeast Asia is very much inextricably tied to the regionalization of defence and security in Southeast Asia, even though the latter has had a much longer developmental history. In this respect, the place and role of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting and the wider regional offshoot, the ADMM-Plus – whose respective formations are discussed in detail later – are rather central to any realization of the R2Provide.

Developing responsibility and ‘response ability’ in Southeast Asia

Significantly, the formation of the ADMM and then the ADMM-Plus were by no means a given, not least in a region whose historical instincts have been to eschew overt forms of defence regionalism. This section looks at the sources and drivers of an indigenous brand of regionalism in the form of ASEAN, as well as the numerous constraints and facilitating conditions that respectively hindered and helped the rise of the ADMM and ADMM-Plus. It bears reminding that the categorical rejection of collective defence, whether with or without the great powers, has long been a guiding principle of regional organization. This rejection of collective defence, according to Amitav Acharya, is one of three ‘path dependent’ dispositions common to regional institutions in Asia – the other two being a general acceptance of Westphalian norms of sovereignty, non-interference and territorial integrity, and a preference for ‘soft’ or non-legalistic and formalistic regional cooperation (Acharya, 2003b: 219). The existence of the ADMM and the ADMM-Plus reveal a contemporary Southeast Asia not averse to institutionalized multilateral defence dialogue and cooperation at the highest levels with major military powers. These forums form the apex of a burgeoning tangled web of disparate initiatives and modalities including meetings of senior officials and uniformed chiefs as well as military-to-military exercises and exchanges, not all centred upon or inspired by ASEAN.