One of the ways in which Okin's liberalism becomes more explicit in JGF is via her endorsement of the Rawlsian theory of justice. This chapter maps the main contours of the exchange between Okin and Rawls initiated by JGF. It begins by outlining Okin's critical but ultimately enthusiastic reception of Rawls's first major work, TJ. It moves on to her less enthusiastic reaction to its successor, PL. In writings published after PL, Rawls spells out for the first time how justice as fairness deals with questions of women and the family in a way that, it shall be argued, ultimately vindicates Okin's original assessment of the feminist potential of his liberalism.

A RAWLSIAN THEORY OF JUSTICE

As we saw in the previous chapter, JGF deems the major contemporary theorists of justice to offer little to those concerned with the situation of women in liberal societies. However, of those Okin surveys, Rawls's theory of justice as fairness emerges as the most promising. Yet while her reservations about the value of Rawls's thought for her feminist purposes are ultimately outweighed by its positive potential, those reservations are not minor.

Okin's first complaint is that Rawls neglects gender as a source of injustice: TJ gives no indication that “modern liberal society … is deeply and pervasively gender-structured” (JGF: 89; cf. 91).