Introduction

It is possible to be able to do something, yet not be able to say exactly what it is that one is able to do. You may, for example, have bicycleriding abilities, but not have mastered the vocabulary that a technical writer would need in order to describe precisely what is being done. The converse is also possible. You may be able to say what is required to be able to do something, without having the ability to do that thing yourself. A skilled golf coach may be able to tell his charge precisely what she needs to do to improve her swing without having that ability himself (BSD I: 31).

It may be thought that neither of these possibilities applies where the abilities in question are those required to deploy a language. “If you can talk, then you can talk about talking, and if you can talk about talking, then you can talk”, goes the thought. Brandom denies the first half of this claim, at least one understanding of it. Whilst the abilities required to talk are required to be able to say what you need to do when talking, the converse is not the case. It is possible for someone to be able to talk, yet not be able to deploy a vocabulary that allows her to make these linguistic abilities explicit in the form of claims.

The vocabulary required to make linguistic abilities explicit will be called logical vocabulary and those able to deploy logical vocabulary will be called logical beings.