Introduction

Our discussion of linguistic practice has identified three types of being with regard to the gameplaying practice: simple, rational and logical beings. Simple practitioners, exemplified by the parrots of Chapter 1, are outsiders to the practice, although some of their performances can be treated by practitioners as having significance within the practice. Rational beings, the gameplayers-cum-scorekeepers of Chapter 2, are insiders to the practice, as they are able to practically treat both their own performances and the performances of others as significant moves within the practice. Logical beings, considered in Chapter 3, are rational beings who have additionally mastered the vocabulary that allows them to be self-consciously aware of the role played by such performances within this linguistic practice.

There is yet a fourth type of being that has been lurking in the wings of this discussion, and even emerging into the limelight on occasion: ourselves, the author and reader of this book. It was we who interpreted the gameplaying practice described in Chapter 2, and it was we who interpreted the doings of logical beings in Chapter 3. Indeed, we were the first type of being introduced into the discussion, on the assumption that its goal is to make sense of ourselves as sapient beings.

How are we to understand the relationship between ourselves and the rational and logical beings considered until now? According to Brandom's bold conjecture put forward towards the end of Chapter 2, the relationship is straightforward: we should not treat ourselves as an additional type of being, over and above logical beings.