INTRODUCTION

Between 2007 and 2009, Burma experienced two major political crises that have drawn international focus and criticism upon the country and its military junta. In the aftermath of the September 2007 demonstrations and the passage of Cyclone Nargis in May 2008, European Union countries, both individually and as a whole through EU institutions (Council, Parliament and Commission), have had little leverage, let alone influence, over the gridlocked state of Burmese affairs (Selth 2008). A critical dilemma is caused by the tension between the EU's normative stance and its selfproclaimed willingness to assist, springing from its position as the world's largest provider of ODA. In practice, the easiest option has been followed since the 1990s; namely, that of isolating the regime on ethical grounds, rather than considering and elaborating another approach. Yet, strict implementation of the EU Common Position, first defined in October 1996 and reinforced several times since, which imposes restrictions on further aid and development assistance — albeit one that is little observed on the ground — has achieved little.

In spite of a few successes since the first sanctions decided by Brussels in the early 1990s, EU policies towards Burma have failed, both in encouraging a political breakthrough and in fostering economic growth, let alone socio-economic development. Even progress on the EU's bottomline humanitarian agenda has been limited. Seen from Naypyitaw, Europeans are considered by the Burmese regime more as a potential threat than as a source of much-needed financial or humanitarian assistance, as Japan is. How can the EU's limited success be explained? We suggest that the present diplomatic and political configuration, both internally within the individual twenty-seven EU member states and the European Union as a whole, has neither facilitated in the past nor augurs well in the near future for any concrete policy change towards Burma. This is despite the fact that a change of approach to the Burmese conundrum undertaken by the Obama Administration may have a direct impact on other Western countries. Unfortunately, there are too many diplomatic obstacles, political constraints and internal EU divisions to revise the current EU Common Position significantly, including in a post-2010 elections context.