Can self-control be improved through daily practice or better technique? In this chapter, I show that the popular idea that self-control is “like a muscle” that can be strengthened through exercise is not supported by recent research. Teaching people “self-control techniques” is no solution either, as it may even widen the gap between those who are good at self-control and those who are not. How about new techniques such as “commitment devices” and “nudging”? Unfortunately, although some nudges seem promising, they cover only a small subset of the situations that call for good self-control. The conclusion of this chapter is that “some people simply have more talent for self-control than others, and therefore some people will have better prospects at achieving health, wealth, and happiness than others. We may have no choice but to accept this reality.”

This chapter turns to the motivation to exert self-control. There is a crucial difference between being unable and being unwilling to exercise self-control. It is a grave mistake to confound the two, as many psychologists and behavioral economists do. In this chapter, I argue that the motivation to exert self-control derives from one’s overall time orientation: One’s general propensity to be moved and motivated by either immediate or future rewards (as indexed by one’s “delay discounting rate”). I show how differences in time orientation are correlated with differences in working memory capacity, and discuss two recent bodies of research that are particularly relevant: the psychology of “mental time travel” and “life history theory.” The conclusion is that people who grow up in harsh and unpredictable circumstances are more likely to develop a present-oriented personality, and thus tend to be less motivated to exert self-control.

The limited nature of self-control gives rise to awkward questions. Are people who get into trouble due to poor self-control really to blame, or simply the innocent victims of circumstances beyond their control? This long and pivotal chapter addresses what the limited nature of self-control means for moral responsibility. On the one hand, poor self-control might at times be a valid excuse, but on the other, we would not want a world in which everyone can claim to be nothing but the innocent victims of their endowments from birth and their social background. These considerations lead straight to one of the most vexing problems in philosophy: How is moral responsibility possible in a universe in which everything is caused by what came before? My strategy for tackling this question is to introduce three distinct epistemological standpoints to look at the problem and to consult two bodies of knowledge: the vast literature on free will and the scholarship on folk intuitions regarding criminal sentencing. Together, these three standpoints and two bodies of knowledge furnish the building blocks for guidelines to decide on matters of poor self-control and moral responsibility.

The opening chapter begins with the question why both in the academic literature and in real-world politics self-control has garnered so much less attention than intelligence. Due to the neglect of this crucial personality trait, the modern world has developed into an “iron cage” that poorly befits the realities of the human mind. The goal of this book is to correct this state of affairs. It details what psychology has learned about self-control and explores the implications of this knowledge for some key ideas underlying the current social order (i.e. moral responsibility and distributive justice) and for the ever-increasing emphasis on personal responsibility in politics. Having thus set the stage, this opening chapter gives an extensive overview of the main concepts, themes, and arguments of the book, including its conclusions and recommendations.

This chapter focuses on the currently popular idea that the distribution of scarce goods such as income and social benefits should reflect differences in “deservingness” and track “responsible behavior.” In philosophy, this idea lies at the heart of what is sometimes referred to as “luck egalitarianism,” while in politics the idea translates into an ever-increasing emphasis on “personal responsibility.” I argue that the psychological findings on self-control raise serious problems for this approach to distributive justice. In fact, the problems are so intractable that they leave us little choice but to entirely abandon this approach in favor of an alternative – a combination of sufficientarianism and relational equality – that better fits the psychological findings previously discussed. Put differently, these findings more or less force us to revise our views on “who should get what.” Especially for the United Kingdom and the United States, this would imply a significant change in both ideology and practical policies.

This is the first chapter of Part II, which covers the wider implications of the psychological findings. The chapter explains why good self-control used to be less relevant in earlier times, but has grown more and more important for successfully navigating life. The first half considers the longue durée. Building on the work of Norbert Elias and like-minded sociologists on the “civilizing process,” I argue that self-control has been growing increasingly important since the late Middle Ages. The second half focuses on the last fifty years and shows that the long-term trends identified by Elias have only accelerated, due to the “punitive turn” in the legal domain, the growing emphasis on conditionality in social benefits, and the advent of neoliberal policies in general. By recounting these sociohistorical developments, this chapter furnishes an explanation of why scholarly thinking and public policy have – to date – almost exclusively focused on cognitive capacities and neglected self-control.

This chapter explains why no one is perfectly self-controlled, and why even true champions of discipline will sooner or later give in to temptation. The reason is that people are bound by two hardwired constraints: limited working memory and limited mental energy. (Whether the latter constraint actually exists has recently become a subject of fierce debate, but I argue that the critics are mostly mistaken.) This chapter also explains why the capacity for self-control partly depends on the situation. I discuss five factors that may undermine self-control: negative affect, cognitive load, prior exertion of self-control, acute stress, and insufficient sleep. These are factors that all of us experience on a more or less daily basis, meaning that all of us may suffer bouts of poor self-control. To be sure, when the stakes are high, people have mental reserves they can call upon, thus rising to the occasion, but again, there are limits. In the end, no one is immune to self-control failure.

The last chapter summarizes the book’s main findings and advances three policy recommendations, two of which transcend the issue of self-control and apply to politics and government more generally: • Behavioral science must have a much stronger position at the policymaking table. The current practice of installing “Behavioral Insight Teams” by governments around the world does not go nearly far enough, and can even be seen as an obstacle to real change. • The need for considering three epistemological standpoints (see Chapter 8) means that our “regulatory condition” is one of imperfection and brokenness. We need more room for what Aristotle called epieikeia: the rectification of the law as an expression of the highest form of justice. One of the reasons for epieikeia may be limited self-control. • Due to both the long-term social changes discussed in Chapter 7, the demands of self-control have become too exacting for substantial parts of the population. The book’s final and most urgent conclusion is that prevailing political views and public policies are based on beliefs about self-control that are simply false. A more fair and just society requires a relaxation of these views and policies.

This is the first chapter of Part I, which covers the relevant psychology. I summarize research showing that self-control is “a significant predictor of school and work achievement, income and socioeconomic status, financial planning and struggle, physical health, eating and weight-related behavior, substance abuse, decision-making, relationships and interpersonal skills, ability to deal with anger, frustration, and stress, and – last but not least –criminal offenses.” The correlation between these outcomes and the capacity for self-control is considerable, sometimes even outstripping the correlation with intelligence. The chapter also shows that having good self-control is not just a matter of volition, but has all the characteristics of a personality trait. Some people are better at self-control than others, with the basic capacity for self-control largely determined by genes and early upbringing.