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2 - Procedural Cartel Theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 September 2012

Gary W. Cox
Affiliation:
University of California, San Diego
Mathew D. McCubbins
Affiliation:
University of California, San Diego
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Summary

The job of speaker is not to expedite legislation that runs counter to the wishes of the majority of his majority.

– Speaker Dennis Hastert (R-IL)

In this chapter, we present and discuss the assumptions that undergird procedural cartel theory. To provide a context for comparison, however, we first briefly survey the literature on partisan legislative organization.

THEORIES OF PARTISAN LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION

Much of the literature on legislative organization focuses on why political parties are created within legislatures in the first place. We divide extant explanations into those that hinge primarily on the internal legislative payoffs to forming parties and those that hinge primarily on the external electoral payoffs. We then turn to survey the literature on how parties are organized and what parties do.

Why are There Parties in Legislatures?

Parties are Created to Solve Internal Collective Action Problems

One line of theorizing about why parties exist is similar to the distributive line of argument regarding committees. Absent any organization (other than a voting rule for floor decisions), legislators face a chaotic and unpredictable agenda. They cannot be sure that the legislature will not vote tomorrow to strip them of benefits conferred today. Nor is it clear how to ensure that the benefits are conferred to begin with, given a world where any legislator can move any amendment at any time.

In order to deal with the unpredictability – and unprofitability – of the unorganized legislature, legislators form political parties to bind themselves together in durable coalitions.

Type
Chapter
Information
Setting the Agenda
Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives
, pp. 17 - 34
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2005

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