The last thirteen months of British rule saw the tragic collapse of Jinnah's strategy – tragic, because the Quaid-i-Azam had always tried to keep himself above communalism in its cruder forms and had cherished his own vision of Indian unity. For six years he had managed to paint a thin veneer of solidarity and unanimity over interests which were neither solid nor unanimous. This he had achieved only by keeping his purposes to himself and by allowing his Muslim constituents to see whatever they chose to see in a Pakistan which he left intentionally undefined. When the Cabinet Mission came to India, Jinnah was forced to reveal something of his hand, particularly since the Mission's proposals of 16 May did offer him some part of what he was after. By grouping Muslim provinces compulsorily, the Mission gave Jinnah at least a chance of curbing the particularism of his constituents. But Congress did not want grouping and did not need it since its centre was much stronger than the League's; scenting victory, it was not ready to make concessions to the League. Whatever else the Mission may have failed to accomplish it did succeed, whether intentionally or not, in straining Jinnah's already uncertain hold over followers who for the first time were given a hint of their leader's purposes at the centre and began to sense the weaknesses in his bargaining position.