The development of nuclear strategy and its extension to the far corners of the globe in the postwar world were made possible only through the optimism and enthusiasm of American power and culture. While Soviet policy played no small role in the subsequent development of nuclear militarization, the leading edge role assumed by US strategy established a precedent that deserves attention in its own right, even though it cannot alone be held accountable for the ensuing scope of the world military order that developed in the postwar era. Nonetheless, as the self-appointed post-colonial power responsible for liquidating colonial holdings worldwide, and as the sole world power whose economic, industrial, military and political capabilities enabled it to assume global functions, the US bears particular scrutiny. Moreover, the accessibility of source material to researchers in the field has enabled students of strategy to achieve a far more detailed picture of American strategic policy than has been possible with respect to the Soviet Union, Britain or France. For all of these reasons, a sustained look at the American contribution to postwar militarization is appropriate, though it should not be mistaken for a “burden of guilt” argument placing exclusive responsibility for subsequent militarization on American shoulders.