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7 - Too Much of a Good Thing?

Conventional Military Effectiveness and the Dangers of Nuclear Escalation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 November 2017

Dan Reiter
Affiliation:
Emory University, Atlanta
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Summary

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Chapter
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The Sword's Other Edge
Trade-offs in the Pursuit of Military Effectiveness
, pp. 197 - 226
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2017

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