Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- Preface
- 1 Wealth, power, and corruption
- 2 The international setting: power, consensus, and policy
- 3 Participation, institutions, and syndromes of corruption
- 4 Influence Markets: influence for rent, decisions for sale
- 5 Elite Cartels: how to buy friends and govern people
- 6 Oligarchs and Clans: we are family – and you're not
- 7 Official Moguls: reach out and squeeze someone
- 8 From analysis to reform
- Appendix A Countries in each cluster and distances from statistical cluster centers
- Appendix B Statistical indicators for country clusters
- References
- Index
4 - Influence Markets: influence for rent, decisions for sale
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 September 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- Preface
- 1 Wealth, power, and corruption
- 2 The international setting: power, consensus, and policy
- 3 Participation, institutions, and syndromes of corruption
- 4 Influence Markets: influence for rent, decisions for sale
- 5 Elite Cartels: how to buy friends and govern people
- 6 Oligarchs and Clans: we are family – and you're not
- 7 Official Moguls: reach out and squeeze someone
- 8 From analysis to reform
- Appendix A Countries in each cluster and distances from statistical cluster centers
- Appendix B Statistical indicators for country clusters
- References
- Index
Summary
The value of access
Influence Market corruption revolves around the use of wealth to seek influence within strong political and administrative institutions – often, with politicians putting their own access out for rent. In market democracies many people have interests to pursue and the means with which to do so, and points of public–private access proliferate. Where institutions are strong and credible the overwhelming majority of advocacy takes place within accepted limits, but Influence Market societies also have evolved in ways accommodating to political and economic elites. This corruption syndrome thus does not ordinarily threaten the viability of institutions or the broader system; indeed, to do so would devalue the access at stake.
The stakes are the details of policy – whether a program will be funded, a contract awarded, a group declared exempt from a tax, or the rules of a program changed. Private parties do offer bribes and officials practice extortion, but in most Influence Market countries such actions are the exception, not the rule, or are confined to specific agencies and decisions. At times it can be difficult to distinguish legal political contributions and routine “constituent service” by elected representatives from corrupt dealings, a fact contributing to market democracies' favorable scores on indices that emphasize outright bribery. That does not mean bureaucrats in Influence Market countries never collude with elected officials and interest groups.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Syndromes of CorruptionWealth, Power, and Democracy, pp. 60 - 88Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2005