Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- Preface
- 1 Wealth, power, and corruption
- 2 The international setting: power, consensus, and policy
- 3 Participation, institutions, and syndromes of corruption
- 4 Influence Markets: influence for rent, decisions for sale
- 5 Elite Cartels: how to buy friends and govern people
- 6 Oligarchs and Clans: we are family – and you're not
- 7 Official Moguls: reach out and squeeze someone
- 8 From analysis to reform
- Appendix A Countries in each cluster and distances from statistical cluster centers
- Appendix B Statistical indicators for country clusters
- References
- Index
3 - Participation, institutions, and syndromes of corruption
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 September 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- Preface
- 1 Wealth, power, and corruption
- 2 The international setting: power, consensus, and policy
- 3 Participation, institutions, and syndromes of corruption
- 4 Influence Markets: influence for rent, decisions for sale
- 5 Elite Cartels: how to buy friends and govern people
- 6 Oligarchs and Clans: we are family – and you're not
- 7 Official Moguls: reach out and squeeze someone
- 8 From analysis to reform
- Appendix A Countries in each cluster and distances from statistical cluster centers
- Appendix B Statistical indicators for country clusters
- References
- Index
Summary
Opportunities, constraints, and corruption
Understanding corruption in real social settings, and identifying the variations among cases that are most important, requires careful study of the contrasting political and economic opportunities available in various societies, of the people and groups who seek and use (or who are closed out of) them, and of the institutions and norms that influence their choices. But what are the most important contrasts? Varying techniques (bribery, patronage) or the locations within the state seem natural beginnings, but the prevalence of a particular technique or venue of corruption would seem to be a response to the opportunities and constraints present in a given situation. Categorizing corruption by the scale of benefits involved would require much more information than we typically have and still might not tell us very much: does a case of a given monetary value have the same significance where corruption is the rule compared to places where it is the exception – or in a country where state officials have the upper hand versus another where they are at the mercy of economic interests? Corruption may well follow some regional patterns – African/Asian contrasts are a prime example – but that is all the more reason to search for deeper influences.
In this chapter I propose four corruption syndromes called “Influence Markets,” “Elite Cartels,” “Oligarchs and Clans,” and “Official Moguls.” These syndromes, and the names suggesting their distinctive aspects, reflect frequently encountered combinations of stronger or weaker participation and institutions.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Syndromes of CorruptionWealth, Power, and Democracy, pp. 36 - 59Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2005