Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- Acknowledgments
- Principles of citation
- Introduction: the faces of judgment
- 1 The psychology of judging: three experimental approaches
- 2 Judgment as synthesis, judgment as thesis: existential judgment in Kantian logics
- 3 The judgment stroke and the truth predicate: Frege and the logical representation of judgment
- 4 Heidegger and the phenomeno-logic of judgment: methods of phenomenology in the dissertation of 1913
- 5 Elements of a phenomenology of judgment: judgmental comportment in Cranach's Judgment of Paris
- Bibliography
- Index
2 - Judgment as synthesis, judgment as thesis: existential judgment in Kantian logics
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 September 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- Acknowledgments
- Principles of citation
- Introduction: the faces of judgment
- 1 The psychology of judging: three experimental approaches
- 2 Judgment as synthesis, judgment as thesis: existential judgment in Kantian logics
- 3 The judgment stroke and the truth predicate: Frege and the logical representation of judgment
- 4 Heidegger and the phenomeno-logic of judgment: methods of phenomenology in the dissertation of 1913
- 5 Elements of a phenomenology of judgment: judgmental comportment in Cranach's Judgment of Paris
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
He [Kant] was not so disinclined as he ought to have been toward common logic, and did not destroy it from the ground up as his philosophy truly required, and as we here undertake to do in his name.
Fichte 1812: 111–12Not only does the combination of representations not suffice to bring about a judgment, it is often not even necessary. This can be seen from the so-called existential propositions: es regnet, es donnert, es gibt ein Gott (it is raining, it is thundering, there is a God).
Brentano 1870–77: 99I turn now from the history of psychology to the history of logic, a theme that will occupy us through most of the remainder of this study. The history of formal logic may well be as abstruse a topic as one can hope to find; nonetheless, it proves to be a rich source in the history of the judgment problem. In this chapter and the two that follow I take up themes and disputes from the long history of attempts to provide a systematic logical representation of judgment; I focus on cases where logical doctrines have shaped and influenced phenomenological investigation.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Theories of JudgmentPsychology, Logic, Phenomenology, pp. 42 - 73Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2006