Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
Hostname: page-component-8448b6f56d-c47g7 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-19T16:19:55.492Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

7 - Humean metaphysics versus a metaphysics of powers

from Part II - Probability and chance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 August 2010

By
Michael Esfeld
Edited by
Gerhard Ernst  and
Andreas Hüttemann
Gerhard Ernst
Affiliation:
Universität Stuttgart
Andreas Hüttemann
Affiliation:
Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Germany
Get access

Summary

Humean metaphysics

Whereas the philosophy of science was dominated in the second half of the twentieth century by epistemological issues raised in the context of logical empiricism and its critics, the project of a metaphysics of Nature (metaphysics of science) has been rehabilitated recently. One can broadly distinguish three positions within that project: a Humean metaphysics that is close to empiricism (e.g. David Lewis, Barry Loewer and Helen Beebee), a metaphysics of universals (e.g. David Armstrong) and a metaphysics of powers (e.g. Sydney Shoemaker, Alexander Bird, Stephen Mumford as well as Charles Martin and John Heil). This chapter is about the opposition between the first and the third of these positions. I shall first outline the Humean view on properties, laws, causation and probabilities, and point out how on the one hand this view is parsimonious, whereas on the other hand it provokes the objection that it is deficient (this section). I shall explain how the metaphysics of powers seeks to remedy these deficiencies and consider its view of probabilities (Section 7.2). The chapter then recalls the standard argument against the conception of properties in Humean metaphysics, goes into arguments from physics and finally maintains that the metaphysics of powers, in contrast to Humean metaphysics, is able to do justice to both the ontological commitments of physics and of the special sciences (Section 7.3).

Type
Chapter
Information
Time, Chance, and Reduction
Philosophical Aspects of Statistical Mechanics
 , pp. 119 - 136
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2010

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Anjum, R. L. and Mumford, S. (2009). Dispositional modality. In Lebenswelt und Wissenschaft. XXI. Deutscher Kongress für Philosophie. Kolloquien, ed. Gethmann, C. F., Hamburg: Meiner, in press.
Armstrong, D. M. (1983). What is a Law of Nature?Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bartels, A. (1996). Modern essentialism and the problem of individuation of spacetime points. Erkenntnis, 45, 25–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bartels, A. (2009). Dispositionen in Raumzeit-Theorien. In Lebenswelt und Wissenschaft. XXI. Deutscher Kongress für Philosophie. Kolloquien, ed. Gethmann, C. F., Hamburg: Meiner, in press.
Beebee, H. (2006). Does anything hold the world together?Synthese, 149, 509–533.Google Scholar
Beebee, H. and Mele, A. (2002). Humean compatibilism. Mind, 111, 201–223.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bird, A. (1998). Dispositions and antidotes. Philosophical Quarterly, 48, 227–234.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bird, A. (2007). Nature's Metaphysics. Laws and Properties. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRef
Bird, A. (2009). Structural properties revisited. In Dispositions and Causes, ed. Handfield, T.. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 215–241.
Black, R. (2000). Against quidditism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 78, 87–104.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Callender, C. (2001). Thermodynamic asymmetry in time. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Zalta, E. N.. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2001/entries/time-thermo.Google Scholar
Choi, S. (2008). Dispositional properties and counterfactual conditionals. Mind, 117, 795–841.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cross, T. (2005). What is a disposition?Synthese, 144, 321–341.Google Scholar
Dorato, M. (2006). Properties and dispositions: some metaphysical remarks on quantum ontology. In Quantum Mechanics: Are There Quantum Jumps? On the Present State of Quantum Mechanics, American Institute of Physics Conference Proceedings, vol. ed. Bassi, A., Dürr, D., Weber, T. and Zanghi, N.. New York: American Institute of Physics, pp. 139–157.CrossRef
Ellis, B. (2001). Scientific Essentialism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Esfeld, M. (2004). Quantum entanglement and a metaphysics of relations. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 35B, 601–617.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Esfeld, M. (2007). Mental causation and the metaphysics of causation. Erkenntnis, 67, 207–220.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Esfeld, M. (2009). The modal nature of structures in moderate structural realism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 23, 179–194.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Esfeld, M. and Lam, V. (2008). Moderate structural realism about space-time. Synthese, 160, 27–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
French, S. (2006). Structure as a weapon of the realist. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 106, 167–185.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
French, S. and Ladyman, J. (2003). Remodelling structural realism: quantum physics and the metaphysics of structure. Synthese, 136, 31–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Frigg, R. and Hoefer, C. (2007). Probability in GRW theory. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 38B, 371–389.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ghirardi, G., Rimini, A. and Weber, T. (1986). Unified dynamics for microscopic and macroscopic systems. Physical Review D, 34, 470–491.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gundersen, L. (2002). In defense of the conditional-account of dispositions. Synthese, 130, 389–411.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Handfield, T. (2008). Humean dispositionalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 86, 113–126.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hawthorne, J. (2001). Causal structuralism. Philosophical Perspectives, 15, 361–378.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Heil, J. (2003). From an Ontological Point of View. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRef
Heil, J. (2009). Obituary. C. B. Martin. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 87, 177–179.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ladyman, J. (1998). What is structural realism?Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Science, 29, 409–424.Google Scholar
Ladyman, J. and Ross, D. (2007). Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalised. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRef
Lewis, D. (1973a). Causation. Journal of Philosophy 70, 556–567. Reprinted in D. Lewis (1986). Philosophical Papers. vol. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 159–172.
Lewis, D. (1973b). Counterfactuals. Oxford: Blackwell.
Lewis, D. (1986). Philosophical Papers, vol. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lewis, D. (1994). Humean supervenience debugged. Mind, 103, 473–490. Reprinted in D. Lewis (1999). Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 224–247.CrossRef
Lewis, D. (1997). Finkish dispositions. Philosophical Quarterly, 47, 145–158. Reprinted in D. Lewis (1999). Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 133–151.CrossRef
Lewis, D. (2004). Causation as influence. In Causation and Counterfactuals, ed. Collins, J., Hall, N. and Paul, L. A.. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 75–106.
Lewis, D. (2009). Ramseyan humility. In Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism, ed. Braddon-Mitchell, D. and Nola, R.. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 203–222.
Loewer, B. (2007). Counterfactuals and the second law. In Causation, Physics, and the Constitution of Reality. Russell's Republic Revisited, ed. Price, H. and Corry, R.. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 293–326.
Malzkorn, W. (2000). Realism, functionalism, and the conditional analysis of dispositions. Philosophical Quarterly, 50, 452–469.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Martin, C. B. (1994). Dispositions and conditionals. Philosophical Quarterly, 44, 1–8.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Martin, C. B. (1997). On the need for properties: the road to Pythagoreanism and back. Synthese, 112, 193–231.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mumford, S. (1998). Dispositions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mumford, S. (2006). The ungrounded argument. Synthese, 149, 471–489.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Popper, K. R. (1990). A World of Propensities. Bristol: Thoemmes.
Price, H. and Corry, R. (2007). Causation, Physics, and the Constitution of Reality. Russell's Republic Revisited. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Psillos, S. (2006). What do powers do when they are not manifested?Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 72, 137–156.Google Scholar
Russell, B. (1912). On the notion of cause. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 13, 1–26.Google Scholar
Shoemaker, S. (1980). Causality and properties. In Time and Cause, ed. Inwagen, P.. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 109–135. Reprinted in S. Shoemaker (1984). Identity, Cause, and Mind. Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 206–233.
Shoemaker, S. (2007). Physical realization. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRef
Sparber, G. (2006). Powerful causation. In John Heil. Symposium on his Ontological Point of View, ed. Esfeld, M.. Frankfurt: Ontos, pp. 123–137.
Sparber, G. (2009). Unorthodox Humeanism. Frankfurt: Ontos-Verlag.CrossRef
Suárez, M. (2007). Quantum propensities. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 38B, 418–438.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fraassen, B. C. (2006). Structure: its shadow and substance. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 57, 275–307.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×