This chapter focuses on a feature of utilitarianism that is attracting considerable attention in current moral theory: the fact that utilitarianism assumes that the only rational response to value is to promote it. In current discussions, this consequentialist principle is often taken to be the defining feature of the whole utilitarian tradition, to the extent that utilitarianism is presented as one form of consequentialism. Utilitarianism is consequentialism (morality promotes value) plus welfarism (value is aggregate human welfare).

Opponents of consequentialism argue that, unless they abandon the basic consequentialist idea, utilitarians cannot hope to avoid either the demandingness or injustice objections. Any theory telling us to maximize value will make unreasonable demands and permit appalling injustices – no matter what theory of value it incorporates, or whether it seeks to maximize value individually (as do act- and indirect utilitarianism) or collectively (as do rule- and institutional utilitarianism). The shift in emphasis from utilitarianism to consequentialism thus raises several questions. What is the consequentialist response to value? Is it unreasonably demanding or otherwise counter-intuitive? What are the alternative responses to value? How does consequentialism relate to utilitarianism?

What is consequentialism?

The basic point of consequentialism is that the appropriate response to value is to promote it. If you think x is good, then you should try to increase the amount of x in the world. If happiness is good, you should maximize happiness.