The Founders erected the new American state upon two pillars: federalism and the separation of powers. The Civil War and the Roosevelt revolution knocked the first aside – not entirely, but largely so. The breathtaking expansion of the executive apparatus during the twentieth century shook but failed to topple the second pillar. The separation-of powers system remains the foundation of that amazingly complex and ever changing construction, the American federal government.

In a system of “separated institutions sharing powers,” bargaining between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches becomes the modus operandi of governance. Of course, building legislative coalitions and managing bureaucratic hierarchies are also key features of American government, as they are in parliamentary governments. But in no system but the American is bargaining across the distinct branches of the government so formal and so important.

This book is about one type of interbranch bargaining, veto bargaining between president and Congress. When the policy preferences of the president and Congress differ dramatically, as they often do during periods of divided government, veto bargaining is instrumental in shaping important legislation. The process works through anticipation, through threats, and through vetoes, including vetoes of repassed legislation. This book examines all these mechanisms. Because we are living in the most concentrated period of divided government in our nation's history, a theory of veto bargaining is essential for understanding the recent operation of American government. It is also necessary for understanding American political history.