This chapter explores the implications of the argument that prior research has not provided a coherent and systematic framework for understanding what it means for the state to achieve victory. The discussion is divided into two sections: The first addresses the implications for scholarship – which general arguments it calls into question and which it reinforces; the second focuses on the implications for policy and the policy prescriptions that follow from this analysis. Some consideration in each of these sections is given to the implications suggested by this study for further research.

IMPLICATIONS FOR SCHOLARSHIP

A discussion of the implications of this research for scholarship begins with the argument that prior formulations of victory have been inadequate. At the risk of oversimplification, the framing argument in this study may be recapitulated as follows: We do not have a precise theory of victory that is evident from the writings of the prominent military strategists and theorists about the nature of strategy and war in the history of Western civilization. As discussed at length in Chapters 2 and 3, many have written extensively about victory, but the principal focus has been on the “how”; that is, what needs to be done in a mechanical sense to achieve victory. To complicate matters, despite the vast literature on strategy and war, we do not have any clearly defined theory, set of concepts, or language for victory. Although the problem of victory is of immense importance, the language used to describe victory consists largely of terms whose usage is imprecise.