NPFL leader Charles Taylor came to power through his connections with foreign governments and corporations, and his ties to skilled commanders. External patrons provided Taylor with financial resources that he used to create incentives and enforce discipline among his commanders, at least in stable and accessible areas. On two occasions Taylor's ability to offer these incentives faltered and the NPFL split into competing factions.

Near the NPFL's headquarters at Gbarnga and in other major towns, civilians benefitted from relatively high security and were able to continue farming and trading at prewar levels. But near the front lines and in remote areas, civilians suffered from abusiveNPFL soldiers. Ethnic Krahn and Mandingoes, in particular,were targeted. The other groups – ULIMO, LPC,LURD, and MODEL – were unable to provide even this modest level of security.

The narrative supports the theory's three causal mechanisms: (1) external patrons shape the characteristics of rebel leaders and the financial resources available to them; (2) the leader's ability to control commanders depends on spot payments, credible promises, and the presence of lootable resources; and (3) commanders are capable of controlling their soldiers, although they may choose not to.

FORMATION

The roots of the NPFL date back to the 1985 coup attempt against Samuel Doe by General Thomas Quiwonkpa. Members of the government and military who shared Quiwonkpa's Gio ethnicity were targeted in the aftermath, and hundreds of Gio soldiers left Liberia for refugee camps near Danané, Côte d'Ivoire. Almost immediately, the soldiers began organizing to return home and overthrow Doe's regime. The soldiers met weekly and appointed a former General, Nicholas Podier, as their leader because he had international experience, and the soldiers hoped a foreign government would supply weapons and training (Huband; TRC0D1 1998: 48–50).

Podier's attempts to secure external support failed to bear fruit, and the soldiers began looking for other, more promising leaders. The soldiers were contacted by Alfred Mehn, a well-respected government official who had fled Doe's purges.Mehn informed the soldiers about another former official, Charles Taylor, and explained that Taylor could arrange training for them in Libya, as well as support from Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire. Taylor also had relationships with leading Ivorian, French, and Lebanese businessmen who had commercial interests in Liberia (Ellis 1999: 89).