Over the last decades, moral philosophers have become increasingly interested in questions that modern ethics had been neglecting since the seventeenth century: What does it mean to have a moral character? How can such a character be acquired and developed? What is the link between character and responsibility? Since a morally valuable character trait is traditionally called ‘virtue’, the new focus on moral psychology is typically combined with a renewed concern for the virtues. Some participants in the debate have proposed ‘virtue ethics’ as a third type of normative ethics next to theories in the Utilitarian and Kantian traditions. Those who argue that a substantial account of virtue can be assimilated into the existing types tend to use virtue ethics as a remedy for certain defects characteristic of morality as understood by modern philosophers. However, what the different positions in the debate on moral psychology share is the constant and explicit reference to the way moral philosophy was practised by the ancient Greeks.

Ancient Greek ethics sets out to teach the good life as a whole without being confined either to justifying moral principles and values, as in modern ethics of duty since the Enlightenment, or to resolving moral dilemmas, as in much contemporary analytic philosophy. Virtue (aretē) is one of its key terms. In order to clarify what the Greeks have to say on virtue, moral education, the emotions and related issues, historians of ancient philosophy have started revisiting their sources with greater scrutiny than ever before.